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executive summary
This Task Force Report is the outcome of an interdisciplinary research project 
organized by the Boston University Center for Finance, Law & Policy, in collabo-
ration with The Frederick S. Pardee Center for the Study of the Longer-Range 
Future. The purpose of the Task Force was to research, analyze, and propose 
policy recommendations regarding the role of remittances in post-conflict envi-
ronments and their potential to serve as a major source of development funds. 
The Report’s authors collectively suggest a broader approach to remittance insti-
tutions that provides flexibility to adapt to specific local practices and to make 
broader institutional connections in an era of growing population displacement 
and expanding human and capital flows. Conditions for more productive utiliza-
tion of migrants’ remittances are analyzed while drawing upon case studies from 
post-conflict countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Migrant remittances play an increasingly central role in post-conflict reconstruc-
tion and national development of conflict-affected states. Violent conflicts and 
prolonged ethnic and religious hostilities lead to population displacement; the 
livelihoods of those left behind vitally depend on remittance transfers. Private 
remittances are of central importance for restoring stability and enhancing 
human security in post-conflict countries. Yet the dynamics of conflict-induced 
remittance flows and the possibilities of leveraging remittances for post-conflict 
development have been very sparsely researched to date. Remittance flows often 
face severe obstacles in conflict-affected environments, including poor integra-
tion with the formal economy and unnecessarily strict regulations. 
The papers in this Task Force Report establish the vital importance of remit-
tances for sustaining local livelihoods as well as rehabilitating institutional 
infrastructures and improving financial inclusion in post-conflict environments. 
Drawing upon existing networks of social support and interacting with a variety 
of local institutions, remittance flows can enable connections between diverse 
organizations and networks, fostering local entrepreneurship and empower-
ment. Highlighting the increasing complexity of global remittance systems, the 
Report examines the growing informality of conflict-induced remittance flows 
and explores solutions for more efficient linkages between financial institutions 
of different scales and degrees of formality. It discusses challenges to regulat-
ing international remittance transfers in the context of growing concerns about 
transparency. The collection of papers establishes the increasing role of diaspora 
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networks and migrant associations in post-conflict co-development initiatives, 
and the growing importance of social remittances in the form of skills, knowl-
edge, and expertise. 
The discussions highlight the role of remittances in building local resilience to 
diverse forms of humanitarian crises. Because of their centrality to many social 
and economic institutions, post-conflict remittance flows are increasingly critical 
to all aspects of human security and peace-building for the longer-term. The 
Report outlines the main challenges to leveraging remittances for post-conflict 
development and makes recommendations for further research and policy 
applications. It suggests that remittances are indispensable for achieving human 
empowerment and agency that promote an improved future for many communi-
ties devastated by violent conflict. 
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introduction
Post-Conflict remittances and Human security:  
Perspectives on Peace-Building, institutions, 
and development
Daivi Rodima-Taylor, Donald F. Terry, and John R. Harris
Vast amounts of capital are transferred around the world through remittanc-
es.1 Remittances can be a major catalyst for economic and social development 
particularly in post-conflict contexts of widespread population displacement and 
endemic institutional breakdown. Currently, there is a lack of proper under-
standing of the role of remittances in the post-conflict processes of rehabilitation, 
development, and productive investment. Because of the prevailingly informal 
nature of remittance delivery mechanisms in post-conflict settings, the impor-
tance of remittances in the economies of these regions has been vastly under-
estimated. Yet, remittances could be the largest source of capital for rebuilding 
post-conflict countries. 
Post-conflict situations characterize a country or region that is emerging from 
a violent conflict or prolonged social, ethnic, or religious hostilities that have 
resulted in widespread population displacement and the formation of consider-
able refugee communities abroad. As potential for further violence remains in 
these fragile settings, remittances play a major role in post-conflict recovery and 
development. Violent conflicts, civil wars, and rebel insurgencies impact local 
livelihoods and family relations, networks of social security, and institutional 
and physical infrastructures. By diversifying local livelihoods and spreading risk, 
remittances contribute to poverty alleviation. Remittances are not only material 
but may also include transfers of new skills, values, and technologies. Remit-
tances are important to all aspects of human security, including economic and 
food security, health, environment, and community.
It has been widely accepted that migrant remittances make up a sizable por-
tion of global financial flows and considerably exceed official development aid: 
“Taking remittances through unofficial channels into account, remittances are 
surely greater than foreign aid, and constitute a more constant source of income 
1 The term “remittances” refers to migrants’ material transfers to their country of origin either for personal use, 
savings, investment, or community development. Remittances can be both monetary and in-kind; individual as well 
as collective (Lindley 2009).
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to developing countries than other private flows and foreign direct investments” 
(Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 26). The study of post-conflict 
remittances has been very sparse, however. In order to facilitate better local 
access to this vital resource, more research is urgently needed into post-conflict 
remittance flows, the mecha-
nisms of their delivery, and 
the ways of better integration 
of remittances in post-conflict 
reconstruction and develop-
ment efforts. 
tHe roLe oF Migrant reMittanCes in Post-ConFLiCt 
 deveLoPMent
Remittances can be of utmost relevance in fighting poverty—by diversifying 
household sources of income in the contexts of insecurity, providing capital 
for productive investment and facilitating local markets, and funding educa-
tion, health, and other social expenses (Plaza and Ratha 2011; Lindley 2009). 
Numerous studies from Africa have shown that “remittances are associated with 
a reduction in the share of people in poverty—and, in some cases, the depth 
and severity of poverty as well” (Mohapatra and Ratha 2011, 17). Evidence 
from conflict-affected Somalia shows how refugees’ remittances have proved 
significant in providing “substantial charitable funding for public services and 
infrastructure—schools, hospitals, mosques and community projects such as 
building water reservoirs” that have fostered local and decentralized reconstruc-
tion processes in the war-torn country (Lindley 2009, 778). Remittances have 
a potential of contributing to financing post-conflict recovery in the long term. 
Remittance flows are particularly important for “unbanked” individuals and 
households and can facilitate their ties with the formal financial sector (Gupta, 
Pattillo, and Wagh 2009).
The relevance of remittances to the macro-economic development of a post-con-
flict country is enhanced by their relative independence from economic cycles, 
making them more stable than private capital flows or foreign development 
assistance. Remittances help reduce the volatility of capital flows and improve 
the evaluations of countries’ sovereign ratings, creditworthiness, and outreach to 
international capital markets (Mohapatra and Ratha 2011, 12).
Because of the prevailingly informal nature 
of remittance delivery mechanisms in post-
conflict settings, the importance of remit-
tances in the economies of these regions has 
been vastly underestimated.
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discussion Points from Boston african diaspora Focus group on 
“remittances and development,” held at Boston University’s  
Pardee Center, september–october 2012 
•  Many members of the Boston African diaspora regularly send money to their 
relatives and friends in their communities of origin. Although the diaspora 
members frequently use formal money transfer operators, transaction fees 
can be prohibitively high. Various informal means of remittance transfers 
remain popular for that reason. 
•  Members of the diaspora generally consider remittances to be a very private 
and personal issue.
•  When evaluating the role of remittances in local development, regional, 
cultural, and religious factors should be taken into account. Some geographi-
cal areas have long-standing traditions of labor migration and remittances 
networks, which may affect the attitudes and behavior of the remitters. Cer-
tain religious requirements to dedicate part of one’s income for community 
assistance may also affect remitting behavior.
•  Social remittances deserve more attention alongside economic ones. Several 
cases of successful co-development projects involved transfers of techniques, 
skills, and expertise.
•  Although senders of remittances are often motivated by a sense of moral obli-
gation or debt, they cannot be sure that their contributions are put to good 
use. Institutional frameworks that enable productive use of remittances are 
important, including business and skills training, savings, and credit services. 
•  Although there is great interest among the diaspora in funding co-devel-
opment efforts, collective remittances for community development proj-
ects need careful organization from both the sending and receiving sides. 
Networks of interested parties may exist in the communities of senders and 
recipients but these networks must be identified and connected. Institutional 
capacity is important in remittance transfers for community development 
projects; it is often easier to work through already established local charitable 
institutions or informal civil society associations, including village or home-
town associations and elders’ councils, to set up “development trusts.”
•  Remittances can foster entitlement and dependency, just like donor devel-
opment aid. The issues of informed targeting and financial education are 
important on both sides of the transfers. This can help improve the long-term 
effectiveness of remittances in addressing issues of human security, and also 
help resolve differing priorities between senders and recipients.
Neal Estey, Daivi Rodima-Taylor, and John Harris
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But most importantly, remittances are a primary mechanism for rebuilding 
family ties and connections between individuals in the global contexts of rapidly 
increasing international human and capital flows: “the commitment to fam-
ily remains at the core of these flows. In this sense, remittances can be truly 
characterized as the human face of globalization” (Terry 2005, 6). The nature of 
transnational migrant networks and diaspora profiles has a decisive role in shap-
ing the impact of migrants’ remittances to the source country’s development. 
According to recent research findings, both high- and low-skilled diasporas can 
make important contributions to the development of their homeland (Plaza and 
Ratha 2011, 7). 
While low-skilled diasporas can be particularly relevant in contributing to the 
welfare of their family members in the contexts of massive forced evacuations 
that often characterize conflict-affected situations, high-skilled diaspora mem-
bers can be instrumental in facilitating transfers of skills and technology that 
are of utmost importance for post-conflict development: “A diaspora can be an 
important source and facilitator of research and innovation, technology transfer, 
and skills development” (Plaza and Ratha 2011, 20). Besides material resources, 
diaspora networks can therefore be an important source of “social remit-
tances” in the form of ideas, values, skills, and behaviors that travel back to the 
migrants’ communities of origin (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). By facilitating 
organizational learning and exchange of knowledge, migrants’ collective organi-
zations can contribute to diverse “state-society synergies” that enhance collabo-
ration between public and private sectors (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). This 
calls more attention to policy agendas that facilitate the participation of migrants 
in the development of their home country, including issues such as multiple 
citizenship and voting rights. Both categories of migrants also contribute to send-
ing collective remittances through various development projects administered 
through networks and organizations like “hometown associations (HTAs), ethnic 
associations, alumni associations, religious associations, professional associa-
tions, nongovernmental associations, investment groups, national development 
groups, welfare and refugee groups, and Internet-based virtual organizations” 
(Plaza and Ratha 2011, 17). Although such institutions are increasingly prevalent, 
research of the impacts of collective remittances to the development of migrants’ 
home countries has still been scarce.
The economic and political support provided by remittance flows and diaspora 
activities can also potentially serve to perpetuate violence in a conflict-affected 
setting. There is some evidence that the existence of an extensive diaspora can 
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pose a considerable risk towards the inception or continuation of a violent con-
flict (Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2003; Collier 2000; Anderson 
1999). Diaspora remittances in conflict-affected Somalia, for example, have been 
known to contribute to military and political purposes like rebel movements, 
warring factions, and localized clan conflicts over natural resources, in some 
cases “helping armed factions and precarious local administrations survive with-
out delivering much to the people” (Lindley 2009, 778). Although the impacts of 
remittance transfers differ from one case to another, attention to proper develop-
ment policies is crucial: “More thought needs to be given to the extent to which 
policy interventions can encourage the deployment of transnational activities in 
a positive direction, such as towards conflict resolution or post-conflict recon-
struction” (Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 27). 
ForCed Migration and Mass disPLaCeMent: 
iMPLiCations For reMittanCes
Although economic migration based remittances have received a considerable 
share of attention recently, the role and dynamics of remittances in conflict-
affected settings has remained relatively unexplored. Forced migration is a 
sudden and unplanned event rather than a carefully devised household income 
diversification strategy as is often the case with labor migration. The situations 
of forced migration, however, are frequently known for heightened remittance 
flows: “We often do not recognise that many of the countries where remittances 
are most significant owe this largely to mass migration in the wake of recent 
conflicts and political upheavals—official remittances are 10 percent or more 
of GDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina, El Salvador, Haiti, Lebanon, Nicaragua, 
and Serbia and Montenegro” (Lindley 2009, 775). Migrant remittances can be a 
crucial resource for avoiding further displacement: “Those who stay are highly 
vulnerable and, more often than not, economically dependent. Conflict tends 
to undermine both general economic stability and personal livelihoods. Coping 
strategies, where possible, include economic support from relatives who have 
migrated” (Fagen and Bump 2006, i). 
Violent conflict and poverty are interwoven and often contribute to each other. 
Because of that, boundaries between economic and refugee based migration are 
often blurred: “What begins as economic migration may transmute into internal 
displacement or international refugee movements, and conversely, what are orig-
inally refugee movements may over time develop into other forms of movement” 
(Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 14). Different types of refugees 
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often mix in the countries of destination, making it difficult to distinguish remit-
tance flows based purely on forced migration. However, forced displacement 
on remittance flows and their impact on the development of the source country 
have several distinctive characteristics. First, the mass character of the exodus 
often means that conflicts are usually accompanied by displacements of large 
numbers of population within a relatively short time. That may also pose at least 
temporary challenges to the operation of remittance transfer systems between 
the countries of origin and destination. Secondly, many refugees often stay in 
the neighboring areas within the region instead of migrating to economically 
better-off countries, which may result in lower levels of remittances at least 
at the beginning of the conflict. Thirdly, the refugees may end up in displace-
ment camps and other protracted situations of uncertainty, which may further 
impair their ability to remit: “The displaced often find themselves in a state of 
protracted limbo. Nationality or citizenship may not be easily acquired or reac-
quired, and is often disputed or problematic” (Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-
Pedersen 2003, 15). Because they occur in contexts that are often governed by 
profound uncertainty and instability, remittances from forced migration should 
not be seen as deliberate and carefully planned strategies for household income 
diversification and risk aversion (Lindley 2009). The lack of explicit contracts 
with family members in the source country renders the behavior of conflict 
migrants less motivated by expectations of future return. At the same time, the 
urgent need of the family members left behind in conflict settings for economic 
support may be a powerful motivating factor: “Refugees might be more likely 
than other migrants to remit out of altruism to meet material needs of family 
members” (Lindley 2009, 780). Therefore, despite the challenges, the remit-
tances of those displaced in the conflict frequently remain a primary resource for 
economic support for those left behind as well as for national development and 
institution-building of the post-conflict country. 
reConCePtUaLizing Post-ConFLiCt deveLoPMent:  
PoLiCy FraMeworks
Insecurity and repeated cycles of violence have become primary obstacles to 
development in many parts of the world. Conventional war between nation 
states has gradually been replaced by a more chaotic and complex dynamic of 
violence, including criminal activities, trafficking and terrorism, and chronic 
civil unrest (The World Bank 2011, 2). The total number of deaths from civil wars 
is declining, but repetitive cycles of violence facilitate other forms of illegality 
and hinder economic and social development. People in conflict-affected envi-
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ronments “are more than twice as likely to be undernourished as those in other 
developing countries, more than three times as likely to be unable to send their 
children to school, twice as likely to see their children die before age five, and 
more than twice as likely to lack clean water” (The World Bank 2011, 5). 
The changing nature of violent conflict and its social and economic conse-
quences has also created the need to reconceptualize research and policy 
approaches to post-conflict settings. According to a broad definition, a post-con-
flict country is a country that is emerging from a severe conflict. In post-conflict 
situations, open warfare has ended, but a potential for violence remains (Wal-
lensteen 2007). Post-conflict contexts are characterized by human loss, destruc-
tion of infrastructure and means of production, as well as adverse economic and 
political conditions (Collier 2000). Attempts to precisely identify a post-conflict 
condition in any given case, however, are faced with increasing challenges in 
determining the beginning and end dates of the post-conflict period. Despite 
signing formal ceasefire agreements, unrest may still fester and conflicts flare 
up, destabilizing the peace process. It is also increasingly difficult to determine 
at what point in time the consequences of the conflict would lose their disrup-
tive influence; under conditions like that, “it is impossible to say exactly when a 
country returns to normalcy from its post-conflict state” (Nkurunziza 2008).
The increasingly recurrent and ambiguous nature of violent conflicts is also 
reflected in recent research and policy approaches to conflict-affected states. 
The UCDP/PRIO2 Armed Conflict Dataset, for example, lists multiple separate 
recurrent incidents for many of the 50+ countries that have experienced violent 
conflict in the last 30 years.3 UCDP emphasizes its focus on political determi-
nants and frameworks of the conflict as well as organized parties using violent 
means, over the previous emphasis on conflict as primarily a function of fatali-
ties (Strand and Dahl 2010). The focus on diverse state and non-state actors and 
political incompatibilities also highlights the ambiguities relating to the defini-
tion of “post-conflict” and lays emphasis on the increasingly recurrent character 
of violence in present-day societies. 
2 Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, have produced a dataset 
of external and internal armed conflicts for the period of 1946–2008. Key variables of the dataset concern incom-
patibility, actors of the conflict, and its intensity.
3 According to UCDP definition, conflict is defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government 
and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 battle related deaths” (The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook, p. 1).
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According to the World Bank estimations, about 40 percent of conflict-affected 
and post-conflict countries relapse into conflict within 10 years. Fragile and 
conflict-affected situations (FCS) are also responsible for increasing poverty and 
declining social conditions in many poor countries. To better address the needs 
of conflict-affected situations, the World Bank has recently emphasized the need 
for a broader, more issues-based approach to conflict and fragility. According 
to The World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development, 
the risk of violent conflict in a country or region stems from a combination of 
internal and external stresses with which the country lacks effective institutional 
capacity to cope. Weak state, market, and social institutions can therefore be 
seen as primary factors contributing to chronic unrest and violence. One of the 
main reasons of that fragility is the low priority frequently given to the rebuild-
ing of national institutions. For peace and development to become sustainable, 
the existence of functioning and self-sustaining government systems becomes 
crucial: “The end of fighting does offer an opportunity to work towards last-
ing peace, but that requires the establishment of viable institutions, capable of 
ensuring lasting security for the entire population” (Brahimi 2007). For rebuilding 
the institutional infrastructure, strong partnerships of the international devel-
opment community with national and local stakeholders become particularly 
urgent (Brahimi 2007). 
A significant shift in the international development discourse can therefore be 
observed that affords increasing attention to sustainable institution-building 
instead of mediating conflicts between distinct parties or adversaries for achiev-
ing lasting peace in conflict-affected areas. Focus on broader settings that can 
provide security, justice, and economic sustenance to individuals and communi-
ties affected in the crisis is reflected in the human security approach to post-
conflict development. 
HUMan seCUrity as a new ParadigM For Post-ConFLiCt 
deveLoPMent
Human security has, in recent years, become a defining concept in many global 
policy initiatives centering on post-conflict rehabilitation and peace-building.4 
It emerged as an alternative paradigm in the multipolar world at the end of the 
4 The human security approach as a novel direction to development was first presented in the UNDP 1994 
Human Development Report that called for a broader interpretation of the concept of security which would take 
into account its people-centered character. Emphasizing the need for protection from both chronic and sudden dis-
ruptions in people’s daily lives, the concept signified “a shift from security through armament to security through 
sustainable human development” (Frerks and Goldewijk 2007, 26).
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Cold War when it became evident that the nature and modes of management of 
violent conflicts have profoundly changed: “Attention is now drawn to persis-
tent and diffuse regional conflicts in fragile, failing, and failed states plagued by 
problems that inhibit their basic governing capabilities, including mass displace-
ment of populations, uneven economic development, delegitimization of the 
state, and the rise of factionalized elites” (Goldsworthy 2010, 451). The processes 
of liberalization and globalization have created new political spaces, but also 
given rise to new conflicts and instabilities. Increasing transnational mobility and 
diversity of interests and affiliations have profoundly changed the contexts for 
security management. The concept of human security constitutes a conceptual 
shift from a state-centered security paradigm to an individual and community-
centered approach. Through a focus on diverse factors that can undermine 
security and well-being from a human centered perspective, a human secu-
rity approach promotes concentration on a broader set of problematic issues, 
including environmental, social, and economic causes of vulnerability. Human 
security therefore enables a more integrated approach that relates the concerns 
stemming from violent conflicts as well as increasing economic inequalities and 
deprivation: “Essentially human security is both about preventing violent conflict 
and reducing the multiple deprivations and social inequalities experienced by 
people” (Taylor 2004, 66).5 
The human security approach allows a broader focus that goes beyond armed 
conflicts, recognizing a variety of factors that can destabilize peace and secu-
rity. These threats fall into diverse categories—economic security, food security, 
health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, 
and political security (Therien 2012). Famines, environmental shocks and 
disasters, financial crises as well as various forms of violent unrest and criminal-
ity are thereby all seen as potentially disruptive to peace and development. One 
of the major contributions of the human security approach is highlighting the 
increasing interconnectedness of these threats that suggests a need to build local 
resilience to diverse shocks and disruptions. 
5 A broader approach to security that links peace to the issues of social justice and sustainable development 
is not an entirely novel phenomenon. Even before the recent systematic articulation of the human dimensions of 
security, elements of more comprehensive approaches to security issues have been elaborated in various earlier 
UN initiatives including the Brandt Commission, Palme Commission, and Brundtland Commission of the 1980s 
that highlighted the connections between peace, poverty, environment, and economic development (Therien 2012, 
192). The 1994 UNDP report articulated the need for a redefinition of the concept of security along the following 
lines: “’From an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security’ and ‘[f]rom 
security through armaments to security through sustainable human development’” (cited in Therien 2012, p. 199).
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Because of its focus on the multidimensional aspects of sustainable peace-
building, the human security approach has profoundly impacted global poli-
cies of interventionism in armed conflicts: “Bringing together security, political, 
humanitarian, and economic goals, the multi-dimensional approach of peace-
building has spawned a variety of practices, including the disarmament and 
social reintegration of combatants, the reform of the security sector, demining, 
the negotiation of peace accords, the organisation of elections, the establish-
ment of independent legal systems, the repatriation of refugees, the promotion 
of human rights, and the framing of economic development strategies” (Therien 
2012, 206). With its focus on post-conflict participatory institution-building rather 
than military protection, the post-interventionist approach6 to human security 
highlights local resilience as a key to sustainable peace-building (Chandler 2012). 
Defined as “the capacity to positively or successfully adapt to external problems 
or threats,” the concept of resilience draws attention to a subject who is an active 
agent, capable of self-transformation (Chandler 2012, 217). Instead of treating 
conflict-affected populations as victims in need of external protection, the resil-
ience paradigm to human security places an emphasis on broader institutional 
framework for the management of security concerns through local empower-
ment and participatory capacity building (Chandler 2012). The focus on multi-
faceted local development over military-strategic considerations in the security 
discourse has opened up new spaces of collaboration including the state, policy 
makers and military specialists, but also “’non-traditional’ actors, such as local 
civil society organizations, women groups and international NGOs” (Frerks and 
Goldewijk 2007, 28).7 The multi-sided participatory post-conflict development 
approach advocated by the human security discourse therefore draws attention 
to the importance of cooperation among a wide range of transnational and local 
actors and the issues of sectorial and institutional coordination in post-conflict 
development. 
6 Human-centered approaches to security have sometimes been criticized for a narrow focus on armed protec-
tion and military intervention, together with an emphasis on individual rights and economic objectives that may 
come at the expense of equality and social goals. To address these potential pitfalls, there has been an increasing 
emphasis in policymaking on long-term strategies to prevent insecurity and vulnerability that may lead to violence. 
The “interventionist” paradigm to the protection of human rights of the 1990s is increasingly being replaced by 
a “post-interventionist” paradigm that recognizes the importance of jointly shared responsibility for peace and 
long-term development.
7 One example of the increasing and multi-faceted global cooperation that is framed by the concept of human 
security is the United Nations Millennium Development Goals that set strategies for the reduction of human global 
poverty by analyzing the causes of diverse kinds of insecurity and allocating multi-sided responsibilities for achiev-
ing the entitlements of the individuals in poor countries: “The human security approach engenders the collabora-
tion necessary between diverse kinds of national governments, multilateral governing bodies and NGOs in order to 
bring them together around a common goal of increasing individual securities” (Goldsworthy 2010, 453).
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reMittanCes and Post-ConFLiCt reConstrUCtion
Remittances can be a valuable resource for post-conflict reconstruction. Their 
application, however, depends on a favorable policy environment and effec-
tive coordination among different sectors and development actors. The use 
of migrants’ remittances in 
development is often hin-
dered by insufficient interna-
tional frameworks for labor 
and remittance flows and a 
poor coordination of these: “Current international institutions provide little space 
or initiatives for negotiations on labour mobility and the flow of remittances. 
There is a pressing need to reinforce the view of migrants as a development 
resource” (Sorensen, Van Hear, and Engberg-Pedersen 2003, 6). The authors 
suggest that better coordination is needed for policies concerning migration, 
development aid, refugee protection, and humanitarian relief.
Policymaking processes surrounding post-conflict remittances often face the 
challenges of unavailable or inconsistent data about remittance flows, their 
channels, and uses. Recent discussions among international development actors 
about leveraging remittances for development have concentrated on the need to 
improve the quality of available data on remittance flows and modes of transfer, 
particularly by expanding formal reporting to include non-banking institutions 
involved in remittance transfers, conducting household surveys among senders 
and recipients, and estimating remittance flows based on available migration 
statistics in the countries of destination (Mohapatra and Ratha 2011, 38–39).
To maximize the contributions of post-conflict remittances for poverty alleviation 
and national development, collaboration among a wide range of stakeholders 
is crucial. These include local, national, and transnational actors, and formal as 
well as informal institutions. Input from all of these groups is critical to reestab-
lishing well-functioning financial systems and regulatory frameworks. Well-func-
tioning remittance systems, in turn, are extremely important for the redevelop-
ment of the country’s financial sector, thereby contributing to private sector 
development and overall poverty reduction. Because of the post-conflict break-
down and instability, most remittances reach post-conflict societies through 
informal means, posing a specific set of challenges to their integration into the 
country’s financial system. However, remittances also have a potential to serve as 
an important entry-point to financial inclusion: “The very process of sending and 
Policymaking processes surrounding post-
conflict remittances often face the challenges 
of unavailable or inconsistent data about 
remittance flows, their channels, and uses. 
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receiving remittances provides an enormous opportunity for millions of families 
to enter the world’s financial system: to open a savings account, or obtain a loan 
or mortgage” (Terry 2005, 11).
Local development initiatives can be very important in post-conflict situations. 
Building upon existing remittance systems and encouraging local initiative 
rather than seeking to import formal financial institutions is relevant in conflict-
affected contexts where basic financial and legal infrastructures are severely 
lacking and large parts of populations are displaced: “By focusing on what is left 
after the conflict, rather than what is lost, it is then possible to begin to see the 
full potential of remittance systems as potential partners in the development 
of financial systems” (Maimbo 2007, 28). Maimbo emphasizes that sustain-
able financial reforms are long-term processes that require proper sequencing 
and institutional integration, and introducing and supporting a competitive 
and diversified environment for remittance services can often be pivotal. The 
processes of financial sector development and diversification should therefore 
accord more attention to “promoting alternative providers such as microfinance 
institutions, credit cooperatives, and postal savings banks” (Mohapatra and 
Ratha 2011, 40). That involves improving coordination among various regula-
tory entities and legislatures as well as promoting novel institutional linkages 
for sending and delivering remittances: “Financial democracy also requires new 
partnerships: with civil society, nongovernmental organizations, microfinance 
institutions, and others close to remitters and their families” (Terry 2005, 12).
There is an increasing recognition of the need to view financial inclusion initia-
tives as an integral component of human security. As emphasized in the UN 
Millennium Development Goals that operationalize the components of human 
security and set forth strategies for a multi-sided cooperation for global poverty 
reduction, financial inclusion and microfinance initiatives should not be seen 
as separate from issues such as environment, health, education, and gender 
empowerment. Therefore, there is a need to focus on broader, transformational 
goals of financial inclusion, apart from transactional ones like the flow of people 
and capital within microfinance institutions (Goldsworthy 2010, 455). As building 
local resilience to a multitude of partially related hazards—economic, environ-
mental, and political—is therefore at the forefront of post-conflict development, 
remittance systems should involve linkages to diverse local institutions and dif-
ferent social and economic realms.
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In local communities, remittances circulate through local associations and net-
works of mutuality, trust, and solidarity. The role of social capital is particularly 
important in creating sustainable institutional linkages on multiple scales. In 
post-conflict contexts, the fragility of existing institutions hinders their ability to 
link with each other and additional groups, networks, and institutions to bolster 
important social systems (Vervisch and Titeca 2010). Attempts by outside groups 
to facilitate connections among institutions often focus on the technical aspects 
of institutional operations and overlook the social and political contexts, result-
ing in the existing elites retaining leadership and disrupting opportunities for 
local leadership to evolve (Vervisch and Titeca 2010; Brune and Bossert 2009). 
Thus, the challenge of post-conflict institutional development is determining 
how best to help improve the ability of local institutions to connect with existing 
local social support systems, which in turn have been disrupted by widespread 
population displacement and social and physical devastation.
External interventions in institutional syncretism can often be technically 
oriented rather than socially and politically embedded, leading to favoring of 
the existing elites and interfering with the evolution of local leadership (Vervisch 
and Titeca 2010; see also Brune and Bossert 2009). The challenge of post-conflict 
institutional development therefore lies in facilitating the building of local social 
capital endowments to enhance the bridging capacities of local institutions. In 
such environments, customary security networks and group loyalties are often 
weakened due to widespread population displacement and social and physical 
devastation. 
Because of severely limited access to land and natural resources and the break-
down of formal infrastructure, economic exclusion is a serious issue in post-con-
flict communities; as a result, informal businesses and second market activities 
emerge as major coping mechanisms (Cain 2007). Facilitating the post-war 
informal economy is therefore frequently seen as central to the rehabilitation 
of the affected communities. This includes investing in the informal economy 
through micro-loans and savings mechanisms (374–375). The role of grassroots 
associations and informal micro-businesses is increasingly discussed in recent 
studies of post-conflict development. In post-conflict Liberia, for example, the 
growing importance of informal businesses over subsistence farming has been 
observed, and these businesses are financed primarily through indigenous rotat-
ing money saving schemes (locally called susu)—about 70 percent of local busi-
ness owners were observed to use these informal clubs (Tarway-Twalla 2011, 63). 
This highlights the importance of collaborating with these diverse local financial 
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associations for post-conflict institution-building. It also highlights the unique 
capability remittance transfers often provide for expanding financial inclusion in 
conflict-affected environments. 
Partnering with local microfinance institutions can be an important strategy for 
expanding remittance delivery channels and leveraging remittances for local 
development. Microfinance organizations and other semi-formal local finan-
cial institutions expand people’s options for financial inclusion, especially in 
marginal, remote, and low-income communities: “Increasing access to savings 
and credit products tailored to low-income families can help families receiving 
remittances channel these funds toward future investments, such as in housing, 
education, or microenterprise” (Jaromillo 2005, 133). In many cases, these orga-
nizations have good knowledge of local communities and their clients’ needs as 
well as the necessary experience and physical infrastructure for providing finan-
cial services to local “unbanked” populations. As many microfinance programs 
emphasize social and empowerment goals alongside economic ones, these 
institutions have the potential to connect remittances with wider development 
goals of the local communities. Besides novel organizational forms and alliances, 
the use of new information and communication technologies like mobile phone 
based financial applications for cross-border remittance transfers have proven 
increasingly relevant for remittance delivery in post-conflict settings.
All of this suggests that when leveraging remittances for post-conflict recon-
struction, diversification of multi-scale institutions and partnerships for better 
remittance delivery and their more efficient use for poverty reduction and 
productive investment is vital. This necessarily includes fostering collaboration 
and coordination among local political, social, and financial groups and institu-
tions with a shared goal of leveraging remittances to enhance human security in 
post-conflict contexts.
ContriBUtions oF tHe rePort to anaLyzing reMittanCes in 
Post-ConFLiCt deveLoPMent
The papers of this Task Force Report investigate some critical issues involved in 
leveraging remittances for post-conflict development as well as outline directions 
for policy changes and future research. The topics discussed include broader 
analytical issues pertaining to remittance systems, diaspora networks, and the 
impact of remittances on post-conflict social and economic rehabilitation, as well 
as country-specific issues drawn from a variety of conflict-affected settings in 
different parts of the world. 
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Conflict-induced remittance systems are often informal in character, embed-
ded in existing social institutions and networks of reciprocity. The informality 
of post-conflict remittance transfers poses challenges to their integration into 
rehabilitation and development efforts. The nature of the remittance systems 
that characterize many post-conflict settings is discussed and their potential for 
facilitating multi-level institutional linkages is explored. Contemporary informal 
remittance systems form increasingly complex global financial networks that 
are still very poorly understood. The Report suggests that the formalization of 
remittance transfer systems should be seen as a local and socially embedded 
process, and opportunities for further institutional development and diversifica-
tion should be sought in collaborative efforts among a broad set of local and 
global actors. Regulatory amendments are also discussed that currently define 
remittance transfers to post-conflict countries. The Report reveals the ways 
the existing regulations may inhibit remittance flows through formal channels 
as they have been designed for remittance contexts that are characterized by 
predictability, transparency, 
and well-developed financial 
infrastructure. Suggestions are 
offered for introducing more 
flexibility into regulatory 
frameworks for transnational 
remittance transfers. 
The integral connections among diverse aspects of vulnerability are also exam-
ined, particularly the relationships between building resilience to violent conflict 
and adaptation to environmental hazards. A paper concentrating on the impact 
of remittances to community resilience in Northwestern Pakistan points out 
the importance of viewing human conflict in combination with environmental 
crisis when exploring the role of remittances in local adaptation to vulnerability. 
That discussion highlights the role of remittances as an adaptive mechanism to 
multiple simultaneous crises and disruptions. 
The Report also focuses on the contributions of diaspora networks and migrant 
associations to post-conflict development. There is discussion of novel types of 
government–diaspora collaboration that have potential to facilitate post-conflict 
rehabilitation, with a focus on using information and communication technology 
for financial empowerment of the poor in El Salvador and benefit the communi-
ties of both senders and recipients of the remittance flows. Emigration of health 
specialists from conflict-affected countries is also discussed, and some measures 
The Report reveals the ways the existing 
regulations may inhibit remittance flows 
through formal channels as they have been 
designed for remittance contexts that are 
characterized by predictability, transparency, 
and well-developed financial infrastructure.
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are proposed to avoid the associated brain drain and to encourage the return of 
skilled professionals to their countries of origin after a humanitarian crisis. The 
role of social remittances like skills, technology, and knowledge in the rehabili-
tation of post-conflict societies is examined in the examples of Liberia and Sri 
Lanka. Conditions for more productive use of migrants’ remittances are analyzed 
while drawing upon case studies from post-conflict countries in Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America.
The focus of this volume is on the increasing connectedness of diverse aspects 
of human vulnerability that may disrupt peace and development, and the role 
of remittances in building local resilience through a broad range of local institu-
tions and with attention to individual and community empowerment. Although 
remittances have a vast potential to enhance post-conflict human security, the 
integration of remittance flows into economic and social rehabilitation efforts 
still faces considerable challenges. The main findings of the Report as well as 
suggestions for further research and policy application are outlined in Section IV. 
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Section I: Remittance Transfer Systems: 
Issues of Formalization and Regulation
1. “informal” remittance systems and 
Post-Conflict development
Daivi Rodima-Taylor 
In settings of widespread human and infrastructural devastation, the role of 
migrant remittances can be pivotal. Violent conflicts and prolonged ethnic and 
religious hostilities lead to population displacement and the formation of large 
refugee communities abroad. The livelihoods of those left behind can be vitally 
dependent on remittance transfers. Private remittances also form a crucial 
resource for the national development of post-conflict states amid a breakdown of 
formal financial institutions and poorly functioning governments. 
Most remittance flows in these fragile environments are transferred through infor-
mal channels and draw upon existing social institutions and solidarity networks. 
Although conflict-induced remittance flows are more precarious and unpredict-
able than those resulting from labor migration, conflict refugees frequently 
exhibit a strong motivation to improve the welfare of their relatives left behind 
(Lindley 2008). Conflict-induced migrants may build upon already existing labor 
migrant communities in their destination countries, further contributing to the 
establishment of vibrant regional remittance networks among the diaspora. Many 
of these networks rely on culturally embedded ways of transmitting money back 
to the countries of origin, including informal remittance systems like hawala and 
others discussed in more detail later in this section. As legal money transfers are 
increasingly inhibited by stringent international anti-crime and anti-money laun-
dering regulations, informal modes of remitting are diversifying and growing in 
volume (Fagen and Bump 2006). It has been estimated that informal remittances 
amount to as much as 450 billion USD annually (Slota 2012). 
The informality of post-conflict remittance flows poses challenges to their integra-
tion into national rehabilitation and economic development efforts. Populations in 
conflict-affected countries are severely limited in their access to financial services 
due to the lack of legal and regulatory frameworks, payment infrastructures, 
or functioning systems of credit collaterals (Maimbo 2007). Attempts to capture 
informal remittances by formalizing their delivery systems have therefore not 
had much success in contexts like these. This draws attention to the need for a 
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broader approach to post-conflict remittance systems and the possibilities of their 
institutional integration. Conflict-induced remittance systems have often proven 
to be highly entrepreneurial in character, encouraging local adaptations that 
create linkages between financial institutions of different levels and degrees of 
formality. Contemporary informal remittance systems form increasingly com-
plex global financial networks that are still very poorly understood. This section 
examines the modern informal remittance sector with its origins, social embed-
dedness, and global connections, and explores the contributions and challenges 
of informal remittances to post-conflict development. A broader approach to 
remittance institutions is suggested that provides flexibility to adapt to specific 
local practices and to draw broader institutional connections in an era of growing 
population displacement and increasing movement of people and capital across 
international borders. 
inForMaL reMittanCe transFer systeMs: origins and History
The modes of remittance delivery have frequently been divided into the catego-
ries of “formal” or “mainstream” and “informal” or “alternative.” Formal chan-
nels of remittance transfer include banks as well as some non-bank financial 
institutions such as dedicated and licensed money transfer operators (including 
Western Union and MoneyGram), post offices, and various side services offered 
by microfinance institutions or credit unions. Alternative or informal modes of 
transfer include physical transfers or courier services of money or goods (often 
via traders or public transport operators); sideline remittance services offered by 
various types of cash-intensive businesses (shopkeepers, market traders, foreign 
exchange outlets, travel agents, phone and fax shops, transportation companies); 
sharing stored value, debit and credit cards; as well as dedicated small-scale 
money transmitters (Sander and Maimbo 2003; Pieke, Van Hear, and Lindley 
2007; Passas 2003). Remittances classified as “informal” or “alternative” therefore 
lie outside the realm of banks or licensed money transfer companies, and their 
supervision by regulatory agencies is generally limited.
One of the most widespread informal money transfer systems, hawala, originates 
in early Middle Eastern and South Asian societies and has a rich and complex 
history. As a mechanism for debt transfer, it emerged as a tool to facilitate long-
distance and cross-border trade in conditions of incomplete legal frameworks and 
insufficient means of payment. Various similar arrangements have been recorded 
in many parts of the world—including fei-ch’ien or the Flying Money system of 
China, which emerged in the second half of the first millennium and played an 
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important role in country-wide tea and cotton trade; hundi of South Asia (includ-
ing India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, and Afghanistan); padala of the 
Philippines, phei kwan of Thailand, and even the bills of exchange1 of medieval 
Europe, which were used for transmitting money (El Qorchi, Maimbo, and Wilson 
2003; Hariharan 2012). Hawala translates as “transfer” in Arabic, and hundi 
means “trust” in Hindi. The terms have been applied to both instruments of trans-
fer and credit (a promissory note or bill of payment) as well as to the complex 
system of credit relations within which they operate.
In early mercantile networks, one of the main functions of hawala may have 
been facilitating trade rather than transfer of remittances. Martin (2009) argues 
that the historical trade dimension of hawala has often been underestimated, 
making it easy to overlook its 
potentially complex con-
nections to the movement 
of goods and capital. Some 
historical records indicate 
that hundi or promissory 
notes were developed in India 
earlier than paper money, were issued by brokers for the purpose of debt collec-
tion, and used among traders for financing internal trade (El Qorchi, Maimbo, 
and Wilson 2003, 19). Playing an important role in medieval Indian merchants’ 
networks, hawala transactions have fostered administrative and military expan-
sion of different regimes by creating reliable routes for monetary and trade flows 
(Martin 2009). The ability of hawala to successfully operate in the environments 
of incomplete or incompatible legal and fiscal systems has contributed to its inde-
pendence of formal regulatory frameworks. 
This self-sufficiency has been grounded in the mechanisms of effective self-
regulation entailed in hawala arrangements; hawala is deeply embedded in 
cultural and religious traditions and also has certain systemic characteristics. One 
of the elements responsible for hawala’s resilience is its composition as a chain 
of loosely connected transactions. Instead of a reciprocal set of exchanges, it can 
be seen as a network of “relational contracts” among a multitude of participants. 
Schramm and Taube (2003) differentiate two distinct operating layers in the 
hawala contract: “core transactions” between the hawaladar and “peripheral 
transactions” between hawaladar and their clients. They argue that the core 
1 A bill of exchange was “an obligation in the form of a payment order addressed to the person responsible for 
honoring the payment” (El Qorchi, Maimbo, and Wilson 2003).
Conflict-induced remittance systems have 
often proven to be highly entrepreneurial 
in character, encouraging local adapta-
tions that create linkages between financial 
institutions of different levels and degrees of 
formality.
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networks can be seen as “homogenous clubs” that enable their members effec-
tive safeguarding of their contractual agreements and lower transaction costs—as 
voluntary groups “gaining mutual benefits from sharing” production costs and 
benefits (Schramm and Taube 2003, 411). The authors liken the hawala network 
to other informal financial institutions like rotating savings and credit associations 
that similarly arise in the contexts of insufficient formal financial institutions and 
enable people transactional security through reference to social and cultural safe-
guards. One of the main elements securing an orderly functioning of the network 
is its reliance on social prestige and reputation. Cooperative behavior enhances 
one’s reputation and increases the trust between the transactors, enabling them 
further benefits through continued participation in the network. Islamic religious 
and ideological values are also of relevance in ensuring the widespread social 
acceptance of certain norms of reciprocity that are instrumental to the functioning 
of the hawala transactional system (Schramm and Taube 2003). The unified ethi-
cal and legal framework provided by Islamic religious traditions and Islamic law 
(Shari’a) helped facilitate dispute negotiation and regulate uncertainties involved 
in complex business transactions between fragmented political alliances of the 
pre-modern Near and Middle East (Razavy 2005, 281). 
The importance of cultural values and templates is evident not only in the 
functioning of past hawala arrangements but also in present-day transnational 
diaspora networks. Monsutti (2004) describes how culturally recognized mecha-
nisms of solidarity and competition have been instrumental in forging a durable 
transnational community among the Hazaras (the third largest ethnic group of 
Afghanistan) through remittance transfers. Cooperation among the Hazaras is 
shaped by the norms of domestic solidarity and hierarchical competition that are 
embedded in local patrilateral kinship structures. These patterns of alliance-build-
ing and fragmentation have become pivotal in structuring social interaction in the 
absence of effective state administration (Monsutti 2004). The cultural templates 
of forging fictive kinship relations are of a particular importance in facilitating the 
transnational networks of Afghani refugees in Pakistan, Iran, and beyond through 
transfers of money and merchandise. Hawala therefore contributes to building 
both material wealth and social ties among the transnational Afghani community, 
providing Afghani refugees with means to cope with dispersion and insecurity 
(Monsutti 2004, 239). The relevance of Hazara patterns of cooperation in forging 
new global alliances underlines the importance of cultural practices and values 
of the migrants in the transnational circulation of material and social remittances 
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(Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). It also highlights the relevance of such locally 
embedded value transfer mechanisms for post-conflict reconstruction processes.
The importance of cultural values and norms in the functioning of hawala has 
also been noted elsewhere. Ballard (2003) reports that many hawala operators 
in the UK-based South Asian (particularly Indian and Pakistani) networks draw 
upon quasi-kinship relationships with their partners and clients, and kin or peer 
group guarantees are crucial in repayment of debts and fulfilling obligations (Bal-
lard 2003, 15). Behind the cultural logic are strong economic incentives. If one’s 
contractual obligations are not fulfilled, the person is excluded from the system. 
The religious and ethnic dimensions present in hawala networks often prohibit 
transactions with groups of different affiliations (Schramm and Taube 2003, 412). 
Despite the lack of formal regulations or written sanctions, hawala networks are 
bound by effective social and cultural codes of conduct.
Modern Hawala as a gLoBaL vaLUe transFer network
Somewhat paradoxically, the rise of modern Western banking has not rendered 
hawala obsolete; its relevance has been on the rise in many parts of the world 
in recent decades. Some reasons for the vibrant reemergence of hawala-based 
money transfer arrangements include fast increases in remittance rates due to 
growing migration from developing countries to the Western world; dramatic 
expansion of the manufacturing and business sector in India, China, and South 
East Asia with restrictions that limit foreign exchange; and the rapid development 
of modern information and communication technologies (Ballard 2003, 6). The 
modern hawala is a highly efficient system of transnational money transfers that 
has developed through modifying age-old principles of informal money transfer 
networks. Providing their customers with reliable means for transferring funds, 
hawala operators enable more diversified outreach and better exchange rates 
than licensed financial institutions, strongly contributing to hawala’s economic 
attraction (Wilson 2002, 3–4). 
The functioning of the modern hawala involves an intriguing combination of 
contemporary and more traditional organizational principles. According to Bal-
lard, contemporary hawala arrangements have a clearly economic rationale as 
they offer their customers considerable advantages over formal financial services; 
at the same time, some degree of familial or quasi-familial connections is vital to 
secure an efficient functioning of the network of hawaladar (7). Compared to the 
formal financial sector that draws upon bureaucratic procedures and safeguards, 
trust in hawala transactions is articulated on a more personalized basis (29). 
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That personalized nature of hawala transactions also enables its constituent parts 
greater anonymity and fragmentation, reducing the transparency of the overall 
transaction. Although it can often vary in complexity, the basic hawala mecha-
nism works as follows:
An immigrant in one country wishing to send money back to his family in 
another country pays the sum of money (and often a small fee) to a transfer opera-
tor (hawaladar A) in the first country, who then contacts his associate (hawaladar 
B) in the second country to inform him of the payment amount and password. 
The client in the first country communicates the password to the money recipient 
in the second country, and the second transfer operator releases the funds to the 
recipient. That completes the immediate part of the transaction, with no actual 
funds been transferred between the two hawaladar. Record-keeping is usually 
minimal, and most of the transfers can be completed within 24 hours. At some 
later point, clearing of account balances has to occur between the two hawaladar. 
That can take place as a movement of goods and merchandise or in some other 
form. Therefore, connections between these different parts of the transaction 
are usually far from obvious. Simple bilateral hawala transfers rarely exist as 
remittance flows are by definition asymmetrical (Wilson 2002). Hawala-related 
counter-transfers may take several forms, including bilateral or multilateral 
financial settlement or trade, international investment, purchase of educational 
or medical services abroad, but may also include illegalities like misstatement of 
trade values or smuggling prohibited goods (Ballard 2003, 8; Hariharan 2012). 
The increasing diversity entailed in the settlement processes at the end of hawala 
transactions has created a surge towards financial consolidation, adding another 
layer of complexity to the system. A multi-tiered system has developed for 
balancing hawala accounts, with balances transferred to increasingly diverse 
localities and actors (Hariharan 2012, 284). That has led to a constant evolvement 
of higher levels of the network containing intermediaries active in consolidating 
the claims of lower-level operators. Dubai has emerged as one of the main hubs 
for such services, with over 100 exchange houses centered in the United Arab 
Emirates (Wilson 2002). 
The rapid development of such centralized hubs for consolidating hawala 
settlements has further blurred the boundaries between formal and informal.2 
Ballard (2003) argues that the exchange houses in Dubai are facilities in which 
2 The evolvement of centralized hubs of “wholesale” hawala brokers has also been a factor in the recent develop-
ment of the specialized money transfer enterprises out of Somali xawilaad arrangements (Hariharan 2012, 285).
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“bilateral and multilateral exchanges of hawala debts involving hugely consoli-
dated tranches of funds can be lined up and swapped on a global scale” (29). In 
such exchange hubs, the digital movement of hawala funds is routed through 
other global financial centers, including New York and London (Ballard 2003). 
On the one hand, connections to the formal sector are therefore integral to the 
functioning of the hawala system at the global level, as ultimately “virtually all 
transactions are settled through the formally organized banking system” (28). On 
the other hand, the constituting principle of hawala networks where reciproci-
ties operate on a personalized basis remains rather different from the formal 
bureaucratic underpinnings of the banking sector. As Ballard points out, the hub 
in Dubai depends on its “capacity to facilitate complex swaps between networks 
operating on a basis of unqualified trust in European, North American, West 
Asian, Iranian, Afghani, South Asian, Chinese, and South East Asian markets. 
Once relationships of trust are in place, which at this level are organized primarily 
in terms of quasi-kinship, differences in ethnicity and nationality are no obstacle 
to the construction of hawala deals” (34). Thus, the workings of the modern-day 
hawala present a fascinating combination of highly personalized trust relation-
ships and quasi-kinship reciprocities between individuals, and highly anonymous 
digital capital flows routed through the global banking system. 
tHe roLe oF Hawala in Post-ConFLiCt reMittanCe transFers
Grounded in culturally determined patterns of reciprocities, informal remittance 
transfer systems like hawala can be economically competitive and adaptive in 
modern conditions. That is particularly evident in conflict-affected societies, such 
as Afghanistan and Somalia. According to Lindley (2009; 2010), the evolvement 
of informal remittance networks in war-ravaged Somali communities demon-
strates that conflict can encourage commercially viable adaptations that build on 
existing social institutions in the absence of effective state administration. Somali 
money transfer infrastructure that has evolved from local xawilaad3 institutions 
has become a highly sophisticated and expansive network. The activities of the 
local xawilaad operators began expanding during the civil war of the 1980s and 
1990s with the spread of high frequency radios. The agents joined into larger 
networks and gradually formed centralized businesses—including Dahabsiil and 
Amal that are currently among the largest Somali money transmitters (Lindley 
2009, 522–524).
3 Local term for Arabic hawala.
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Customary law (xeer) and other traditional institutions still remain central in 
regulating transactions (526). Clan-based networks and customary authority are 
widely drawn upon when recruiting collaborators for money transfer operators. 
Both traditional and contemporary solidarities are put into use when building 
local money transfer networks, restructuring political alliances, and creating new 
opportunities for local entrepreneurs. Lindley argues that the collapse of state 
institutions resulting from the prolonged civil conflict has paved the way to “new 
forms of socio-political authority” that contributed to the viability of the remit-
tance transfer sector in Somalia. Another factor that has facilitated the rise of 
the most advanced money transfer system on the African continent is Somalia’s 
highly advanced telecommunications infrastructure. After a complete devastation 
of the fixed line system in the early 1990s, Somalia “leapfrogged into wireless and 
other advanced technologies” (Feldman 2007, 571). This was done with the help 
of satellite communication devices of the VSAT4 type that provided the flexibility 
and cost-effectiveness needed for functioning in the war-torn environment. The 
rapid development of the country-wide system with a high degree of intercon-
nectivity became possible due to grassroots cooperation among a multitude of 
Somali telecommunication operators. With some facilitation from the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), the Somali Telecom Association was formed in 1998 (568). The vital 
importance of remittance transfers for local livelihoods, in turn, became a power-
ful incentive for the private sector operators to develop the telecommunications 
sector—leading to a somewhat paradoxical situation where “in an unregulated 
society, such as exists in Somalia, a form of self-government, essentially self-reg-
ulation, for an individual sector can arise to provide optimal benefits” (Feldman 
2007, 568). Because of the efficient and well-coordinated money transfer infra-
structure, Somalia was also able to make timely adjustments after the assets of its 
main remittance company, Al-Barakaat, were frozen due to terrorist suspicions 
in 2001. Only months later, 
local transfer networks were 
successfully reconfigured and 
other money transfer compa-
nies came forward to replace 
Al-Barakaat—most of them 
complying with the regula-
tions of the international Financial Action Task Force and cooperating in the 
framework of the Somali Financial Services Association, overseen by the UNDP 
4 Very small aperture terminal.
Lindley argues that the collapse of state in-
stitutions resulting from the prolonged civil 
conflict has paved the way to “new forms of 
socio-political authority” that contributed to 
the viability of the remittance transfer sector 
in Somalia. 
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(Fagen and Bump 2006). Somali money transfer companies have also helped 
forge ties between different development actors and facilitate diversified services 
involving deposit, microfinance, and investment functions (Lindley 2009, 537). 
However, the prolonged lack of state administration has had some negative 
effects on the Somali remittance environment. The lack of a central bank 
coordinating the country’s financial affairs has left it up to the remittance agents 
to ensure the security of their transactions in a context of profound instability. 
Insufficient national regulatory institutions to unify operational and reporting 
mechanisms of remittance transfers in an environment of growing international 
demands for greater transparency poses a disadvantage for Somali financial net-
works (Omer and El Koury 2005). On the whole, however, the rapid development 
of Somali remittance infrastructure demonstrates the relevance of local initiative 
in conflict-affected situations: “On the surface, the landscape is one of poverty and 
anarchy, but underneath, it is the true entrepreneurial spirit and unification of 
private industry that prevails” (238).
Informal value transfer systems like hawala are often used by international 
development agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to transfer 
funds for post-conflict reconstruction efforts. As formal financial infrastructure 
often has been severely damaged, informal transfer options remain the only 
means to transport large amounts of cash among the regions in need (Hariharan 
2012, 290). In Afghanistan, hawala has been used by international development 
actors for efficient and reliable transportation of funds across the country since 
the fall of the Taliban (Maimbo 2003). Such transfers have amounted to several 
hundreds of millions of US dollars in reconstruction and relief funding, and tens 
of thousands of dollars are transmitted daily by various NGOs within the country 
(4). The process is fast, with international transfers taking about 6–12 hours, as 
well as cost-effective, with transfer fees at around 1–2 percent; the international 
NGOs interviewed reported “general satisfaction with the delivery of funds” (5). 
The local hawaladars enable local NGOs necessary liquidity and develop checks 
and other financial products to assist NGOs in their transactions with suppliers 
and shopkeepers in the area (13). 
tHe HyBrid natUre oF Modern Hawala
The complex remittance environments described above also highlight certain 
arbitrariness in the formal/informal dichotomy. Despite a chronic lack of cen-
tralized state administration, Somali remittance networks are more centralized 
and transnationally regulated than hawala arrangements in many other parts of 
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the world (Lindley 2009, 531). Much of their resilience and commercial viability 
derives from their “hybrid” organizational character, which consists of “a central 
hierarchical hub” that draws upon an extensive and fragmented agent network 
(535). Even outside Somalia, a distinguishing feature of the modern-day hawala 
is its integral connectedness to the formal financial sector. Hawala operators 
frequently employ formal banking services like savings accounts for depositing 
and consolidating funds: “A majority of international hawaladars hold at least one 
or two accounts with formal financial institutions” (Hariharan 2012, 283). Hawala 
transfers are also heavily dependent on modern information and communica-
tion technologies—including fax, email, telephone, and radio communication 
and various combined financial service platforms. At the same time, people often 
resort to informal financial institutions like rotating savings groups to mobilize 
funds for hawala transfers (see also Ballard 2003). Informal and formal elements 
thus intersect and overlap in remittance transfer systems, resulting in increasingly 
complex “hybrid” arrangements on multiple scales. 
Because of the growing ambiguities between formal and informal spheres in 
remittance transfers, Pieke, Van Hear, and Lindley (2007) have suggested that 
the term “informal remittance transfers” should be seen as a residual category, 
defined by elements that it fails to possess according to certain regulatory con-
cerns. The precise form of these concerns cannot be easily determined because of 
the variety of criteria considered relevant on each occasion, which may include 
“financial regulation, registration, licensing or supervision, law enforcement, or 
requirements to keep records, report transactions, or confirm to certain account-
ing conventions” (359). As the legal and regulatory environments as well as the 
organizational systems of “informal” transfers like hawala do not remain con-
stant, it is difficult to define the attributes of that informality. That poses particular 
challenges to the efforts to regulate hawala-like remittance systems.
ConCerns oF aBUse and regULatory issUes
The high degree of fragmentation and anonymity of hawala transfers renders 
them vulnerable to criminal and terrorist activities. A lack of documentation 
about hawala transfers is exacerbated by the relative isolation of individual trans-
actions within the hawala chain. The fragmented hawala channels can be seen 
as “labyrinths replete with pseudonyms, middlemen and dead ends” (Looney 
2003, 166) and the governments often lack the capacity to monitor the dispersed 
transactions. As hawala transfers often form part of other commercial transac-
tions, the actually circulating values can be easily obscured. The settlement end 
Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development     31
of the hawala transaction is the most likely area for criminal abuse considering 
the multiplicity of possible means for balancing accounts: “Apart from compensa-
tory payments, other ways of balancing accounts include formal transfers (check, 
wire, bank-to-bank, etc.), the use of couriers and payments in kind, as well as 
through commercial transactions, falsified invoices, and third parties. Not being 
subject to the same rules as formal institutions and operating frequently in paral-
lel economies through not always known third parties make the whole process 
susceptible to illegal uses” (Passas 2008, 409). The system can therefore be used 
for various criminal activities including tax evasion, smuggling, terrorist funding, 
and capital flight (Maimbo and Passas 2005, 214). 
The terrorist attacks of September 2001 further highlighted the need for better 
regulation and supervision of informal funds transfer systems. The Financial 
Action Task Force5 (FATF) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) addressed informal remittance systems in one of its eight 
Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing of 2001, calling upon states to 
require licensing or registering informal remittance businesses and applying cer-
tain “know your customer” and “control your business” strategies (Maimbo 2003; 
Lindley 2009). The Best Practices Paper6 that FATF issued in 2003 addressed the 
potential for financial abuse in informal remittance systems in greater detail. It 
offered a nuanced approach to informal “money and value transfer services” that 
pointed out the need to take into account cultural and regional characteristics, 
calling for a “functional, rather than a legalistic, definition” of informal remittance 
systems (Maimbo and Passas 2005, 222). In an attempt to develop an interna-
tional regulatory framework, recommendations were made to require registration 
and encourage licensing of the informal operators7, and transactions reporting 
requirements were called for in line with other financial institutions (Maimbo and 
Passas 2005).
5 The Financial Action Task Force, founded in 1989, is an intergovernmental organization aimed at developing 
policies to combat money laundering and financing terrorism.
6 FATF Combating the Abuse of Alternative Remittance Systems: International Best Practices.
7 “Licensing means a requirement to obtain permission from a designated competent authority in order to 
operate a money/value transfer service legally. Registration (...) means a requirement to register with or declare 
to a designated competent authority the existence of a money/value transfer service in order for the business to 
operate legally.” (From The Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation VI, FATF, cited in Shah 2007, 209). 
According to Shah, “Licensing is the optimal method of assuring persons of dubious background and intentions are 
not allowed legal operating status, while the more minimalist registration approach at least allows regulatory and 
law enforcement agencies a straightforward way of contacting IFTS operators for both specific investigations and 
research opportunities.” (Ibid.)
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A problematic issue for the regulators has been developing a comprehensive defi-
nition of informal remittance delivery systems that would take into account their 
operational peculiarities. The term used initially by FATF was “alternative remit-
tance systems,”8 defined as “financial services, traditionally operating outside the 
regulated financial sector, where value or funds are moved from one geographic 
location to another” (Maimbo and Passas 2005, 213). However, Passas (1999) and 
Maimbo and Passas (2005) have criticized this term as misleading and ethnocen-
tric as it implies “the existence of other mainstream or conventional remittance 
systems,” which is not the case for many parts of the world; the term “informal 
value transfer systems” was subsequently developed, indicating the transactions 
occur outside conventionally regulated financial channels (Maimbo and Passas 
2005).9 A more recent definition used by FATF is “money or value transfer service” 
or MVTS, defined as “financial service that accepts cash, cheques, other monetary 
instruments or other stores of value in one location and pays a corresponding 
sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary in another location by means of a com-
munication, message, transfer or through a clearing network to which the money/
value transfer service belongs” (Shah 2007, 206). Shah credits the FATF definition 
of MVTS for its attention to both the actors as well as the nature of the activity 
involved. However, he contends that although the FATF regulatory framework 
addresses many problematic aspects of informal value transfer systems, it fails to 
adequately address the settlement side of the transfer processes, and by exten-
sion, provides an insufficient framework for including the more recent complex 
permutations of the informal systems (217–218).10 By not considering the pecu-
liarities of existing informal remittance arrangements, the suggested recommen-
dations may result at times in “an ill-fitting transposition of formal financial sector 
regulations onto the informal sector” (218). 
For these reasons, compliance reinforcement of FATF anti-money laundering 
regulations remains problematic in many parts of the world: “Attempts to formal-
8 The definition originates from the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.
9 It is sometimes suggested to separate IVTS further into Informal Fund Transfer Systems and Informal Value 
Transfer Mechanisms, which incorporates the differentiation between “funds” (value present in physical currency) 
and “value” (items that hold material worth), but also refers to the processes that constitute the transfer (Shah 
2007; Passas 1999, 2003). The differentiation is founded on the dimension of legality or illegality, with IFTS as 
“largely legitimate operations with legitimate clients,” and IVTM as methods to transfer money illegally, either via 
“formal financial system infrastructure without detection” or by some other means (Shah 2007, 196). In the latter, 
most funds transferred are not constituted by migrant remittances, and they involve “much more complicated and 
higher value transfers,” but are often part of business transactions that are seemingly legitimate (Ibid.).
10 Shah points out that the international anti-money laundering recommendations are addressed mainly at IFTS 
and not IVTM—see footnote 9.
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ize the informal equal efforts to alter the age-old traditional networks, which suc-
cessfully resisted prohibitions and authoritarian regimes in the past” (Passas 2008, 
411). Passas suggests that compliance and transparency are more likely to occur 
if policymaking processes include the input of local hawaladars. As the local 
appeal of the hawala system is central to its resilience, “there must be incentives 
in place for hawala dealers to register willingly with various national and interna-
tional bodies” (Razavy 2005, 291). It is also important to consider competing legal 
paradigms and strive for their harmonization at local, national, and transnational 
levels (Razavy 2005; Passas 2008). 
There is a growing recognition of the need for a contextual approach to the licens-
ing and registration requirements of informal value transfer systems. For coun-
tries where hawala-like networks exist alongside a functional formal financial 
sector, registration and record-keeping requirements have been suggested along 
the lines of FATF recommendations. In conflict-affected or post-conflict situations, 
formal banking systems may have broken down and supervisory capacity of the 
state diminished. A nuanced and gradual approach to regulating the informal 
remittance sector has been recommended for such environments (El Qorchi, 
Maimbo, and Wilson 2003; Passas 2005, 221). In post-conflict Afghanistan, for 
example, where the capacity of the Central Bank to exercise formal regulations 
is extremely limited, the options for local hawaladars include self-regulation 
through a dealers association and existing business codes, or application of spe-
cial regulations through some degree of registration (although not licensing) and 
some form of record-keeping and customer identification (Maimbo 2003, 17). 
Conflict-related insecurity sometimes also can result in an increased local scrutiny 
of remittance agents and transactions and lead to a greater compliance with 
international regulatory requirements, as the case of Somalia demonstrates. 
Omer and El Koury (2005) describe how post-conflict insecurity in Somalia led 
to thorough screening and documentation practices of the staff and customers of 
local remittance agencies. Various types of written identifications, collaterals, and 
community references were drawn upon by the Somali remittance entrepreneurs: 
“Their enforced innovativeness in protecting themselves against insecurity has 
unknowingly brought them into compliance with the global sphere of financial 
regulations, particularly concerning the ‘know your customer’ and ‘know your 
processes’ methods of anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulations” 
(232). A flexible and locale-specific approach is therefore required when imple-
menting anti-money laundering regulations in local remittance networks. 
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Despite the stringent regulatory environment, informal remittances remain a vital 
economic resource in many areas. The main advantages of informal value trans-
fers as compared to more formal mechanisms like licensed money transfer opera-
tors (MTOs), banks, and post offices include cheaper delivery services and greater 
geographical reach, particularly in remote areas and among unbanked popula-
tions. Informal remittance transfer fees were recently estimated in the two to five 
percent range (Slota 2012). Maimbo (2003) has reported six to 12 hours as an aver-
age delivery time for hawala remittances in Afghanistan; various other sources 
suggest 24 to 48 hours as a maximum delivery time for international transfers 
in remote rural areas. Because of its fragmented nature, the hawala network 
is capable of operating in environments with minimal physical or institutional 
infrastructure; it has flexibility and adaptability that are indispensable in set-
tings devastated by violent 
conflict or natural disasters. 
Minimal documentary pro-
cedures and identification 
requirements safeguard 
the privacy of transfers and 
make the service acces-
sible to populations in 
poor and marginal areas (Hariharan 2012, 296–297). The relative anonymity of 
hawala transactions can minimize immigration concerns among its customers 
(Slota 2012), particularly relevant among frequently under-documented refugee 
populations. Hawala’s constitution of segmented chains of relational contracts 
highlights its personalized and socially embedded dimensions, managing risk 
and providing a strong economic incentive to reciprocate (Schramm and Taube 
2003; Hariharan 2012). The security of hawala is thus enhanced by its reliance on 
socially accepted mechanisms of solidarity that effectively permeate the networks 
of transnational diaspora.
seeking HarMony Between tHe ForMaL and inForMaL: 
 integrating FinanCiaL institUtions For Post-ConFLiCt 
 deveLoPMent
Some degree of regulation of informal remittance transfers is needed to counter-
act the threats of organized crime and terrorism. Unrecorded remittance flows 
can undermine national economies and contribute to macroeconomic instability 
(Slota 2012; El Qorchi, Maimbo, and Wilson 2003). At the same time, remittances 
flowing through unofficial channels can be indispensable for post-conflict recon-
The main advantages of informal value trans-
fers as compared to more formal mecha-
nisms like licensed money transfer opera-
tors (MTOs), banks, and post offices include 
cheaper delivery services and greater geo-
graphical reach, particularly in remote areas 
and among unbanked populations.
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struction and development. Means should be sought to harmonize and integrate 
formal and informal remittance sectors without outlawing the latter or pushing it 
further underground. 
Integration of these two sectors is particularly relevant for creating sustainable 
financial solutions in post-conflict situations where central banking and formal 
infrastructure may be lacking. Solid financial sector development will require 
innovative approaches to facilitate private sector investment, indispensable 
for post-conflict rehabilitation and economic development (see Maimbo 2007). 
Post-conflict rehabilitation efforts should pay more attention to actual financial 
arrangements instead of adopting a top-down approach to institutional develop-
ment: there is a need to “focus on financial products and services instead of the 
bricks and mortar of institutions” (27). Maimbo points out that conflict-affected 
countries may not have formal institutions such as active credit or property reg-
istries, national payments systems, and government supervised financial sector 
regulations, but they may have well-functioning social practices to facilitate finan-
cial interactions and established networks of financial intermediaries (27–28). The 
challenge is to build on such existing arrangements and strengthen the financial 
sector from within. Instead of entering a post-conflict country with pre-set institu-
tional repertoires and transactional procedures, Hariharan (2012) suggests explor-
ing the possibilities of adopting some “Hawala-inspired techniques” to make 
formal sector remittance institutions more accessible to local populations (302). 
That includes some form of reliance on existing social reciprocities and relational 
contracts: “Requiring credit references, a credit history, and documentation from 
individuals surviving a devastating conflict is both unrealistic and highly insensi-
tive to those survivors’ plight” (305). Instead of outlawing or ignoring informal 
funds transfer systems, possibilities should be sought for broadly integrating 
IFTS into the formal economy and enabling them access to national payments 
systems, electronic retail facilities, and other similar resources (306). 
Looking for the opportunities of collaboration and synthesis between the for-
mal sector and already existing local financial arrangements also presumes a 
broader view of remittance institutions. “Non-traditional” remittance actors like 
microfinance institutions, savings and credit cooperatives, and mobile money 
transfer operators may already have an efficient network of agents in place (Slota 
2012; Pieke, Van Hear, and Lindley 2007). Drawing upon existing institutional 
frameworks rather than building formal financial institutions from scratch can be 
particularly helpful in post-conflict situations. Thus, a broader view of institutional 
evolution is needed that takes into account a wider range of actors and innovative 
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possibilities of collaboration. Pieke, Van Hear, and Lindley (2007) have suggested 
that the evolvement of remittance institutions should be seen as a gradual and 
organic process that can occur in stages: initially, remittance institutions may 
evolve from other social institutions and practices, and the resulting “specialized” 
remittance institutions may in turn give rise to other types of financial services—
including savings/credit, banking, investment, and insurance (362). As the case 
studies examined in this section testify, local creative combinations of existing 
remittance institutions and diverse infrastructural opportunities can harness 
adaptive potentials even in the contexts of widespread devastation. The cases of 
post-conflict Afghanistan and Somalia demonstrate that local innovative solu-
tions can produce novel opportunities for formal sector engagement and result in 
viable hybrid arrangements. On a transnational level, the need is for a systematic 
engagement of the diasporas in reconfiguring international remittance networks 
and related banking services in culturally acceptable and productive ways. 
The formalization of remittance transfer systems should therefore be seen as a 
local and socially embedded process, and opportunities for further institutional 
development and diversification should be sought in collaborative efforts among 
a broader set of local and global actors.
Findings and reCoMMendations
•   Most conflict-induced remittances, while a crucial resource for post-conflict 
development, are transferred through informal channels. These are embed-
ded in existing social institutions and networks of reciprocity.
•   Contemporary informal remittance systems are part of increasingly complex 
global financial networks. Highly fragmented and anonymous, informal 
remittance transfers may contain potential for criminal abuse. Regulatory 
efforts should search for contextually differentiated and culturally sensitive 
approaches to local remittance institutions in post-conflict areas in collabora-
tion with local remittance agents, customers, and diaspora representatives.
•   Modern informal remittance transfers involve complex connections to formal 
sector institutions. Research is needed to better understand these mutually 
beneficial connections and the potential to leverage them for development. 
•   Conflict-induced remittance systems can be highly entrepreneurial, with 
local adaptations that foster linkages between financial institutions of differ-
ent levels and degrees of formality. Instead of focusing on building up formal 
financial institutions in the contexts of post-conflict devastation, development 
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opportunities should focus on existing remittance institutions and diverse 
infrastructural opportunities.
•   When developing post-conflict remittance transfers, collaboration should be 
explored among a wide range of existing institutions of financial inclusion, 
such as post offices, mobile banking platforms, microfinance institutions, 
credit unions and cooperative marketing associations, as well as local rotating 
savings associations, women’s economic groups, farmers’ associations and 
natural resource user groups, and umbrella organizations for local producers 
and entrepreneurs. A broader view of remittance institutions that bridge the 
formal and informal divide and enable productive partnerships should be 
encouraged.
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2. dodd-Frank act and remittances to 
Post-Conflict Countries: the Law of Unintended 
Consequences strikes again
Raymond Natter* 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank 
Act” or “Act”) was enacted in the United States in response to the financial crisis 
that began in 2007. There are many reasons that have been identified as a 
significant cause of the crisis,1 and, in response, the Dodd-Frank Act mandates 
a wide array of changes in the regulation of financial institutions and financial 
products. The Act is an omnibus legislative document that contains hundreds 
of sections and more than 800 pages of text. Many of those sections relate to 
consumer protection. As such, the Act established a new agency, the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), which received almost all of the consumer 
protection powers of the federal banking agencies.2 
Among them is the power to implement and enforce most sections of the Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA).3 In addition, section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank 
Act amended the EFTA to provide a new regulatory framework for remittance 
transfers made from the United States to a foreign country.4 The regulatory 
framework includes detailed disclosure requirements and error resolution pro-
cedures, and establishes significant civil liability (both fines and potential class 
action suits) for violation of these requirements.5 
This section will discuss the regulatory implementation of section 1073, and 
focus on the impact this new regulatory regime will have on remittance transfers 
to post-conflict countries. The section concludes that the proposed regulatory 
*  Barnett Sivon & Natter, P.C. represents financial institutions, including companies that engage in remittance 
transfer activities. However, the views expressed in this article are solely those of the author. I wish to thank Katie 
Wechsler, Associate at Barnett Sivon & Natter, P.C. for her invaluable assistance in preparing this article. An 
earlier version of this article appears at 25 Loyola University Consumer Law Review 101 (Spring 2013). 
1 See, e.g., Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (Jan. 2011); Gary Gorton, Ques-
tions and Answers about the Financial Crisis Prepared for the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Feb. 20, 
2010), available at http://tinyurl.com/financial-inquiry.
2 12 U.S.C. §§ 5581-5583.
3 Dodd-Frank Act § 1084.
4 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1.
5 Id.
40   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  October 2013
treatment may have the unintended consequence of impeding the use of regu-
lated remittance transfer providers for sending funds to these countries.
tHe iMPortanCe oF reMittanCes For Post-ConFLiCt CoUntries
Post-Conflict Countries
A post-conflict country is typically defined as a nation that is emerging from a 
severe conflict. In these countries, open warfare has ended, but a potential for 
violence remains.6 Studies have shown that post-conflict situations are charac-
terized by human loss, destruction of infrastructure and means of production, 
as well as adverse economic and political consequences.7 The main goals of 
post-conflict transition and recovery are achieving peace, sustaining economic 
growth, and reducing poverty.8 The establishment of sustainable institutions is 
often the most important step in achieving security and growth in post-conflict 
situations.9 
In post-conflict situations, there is an absence of war, but not necessarily real 
peace. The end of fighting offers an opportunity to work towards lasting peace, 
but that requires the establishment of viable institutions, capable of sustain-
ing lasting security for the entire population.10 Extended conflict leads to the 
collapse of the systems and institutions that make a stable society function and 
these are the systems that need to be resurrected.11 The instability common in 
post-conflict countries constrains investment.12 The collapse in law and order is 
disruptive to political and economic governance, thereby increasing uncertainty 
and making contract enforcement difficult.13 Dramatic changes in financial 
rules and practices may be common in these nations, financial infrastructure 
is damaged, and financial conduits may not function properly. Business norms 
may change dramatically due to changes in economic conditions or government 
6 Peter Wallensteen, Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System (SAGE Publications 
2007).
7 Paul Collier, Doing Well out of War (The World Bank 1999).
8 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Understanding the Post-Conflict Country at 3 (2009).
9 Lakhdar Brahimi, State Building in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries at 3-4 (United Nations 2007).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Janvier Nkurunziza, Civil War and Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa at 23 (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 2008).
13 Id.
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In many post-conflict nations remittances 
exceed the total amount of official devel-
opment assistance, and in about one-third 
of all developing countries, remittances 
exceed all capital flows.
leadership. Formal payments systems and financial intermediation may function 
poorly or not at all.14 
role of remittances in Post-Conflict Countries
Remittances are funds sent home by nationals living and working in other coun-
tries, usually to family members in the country of origin. In achieving stability 
and economic security, post-conflict nations rely heavily on these remittances.15 
The funds are widely distributed and flow to many areas that are neglected 
by other forms of aid.16 Funds sent from abroad are generally spent on indi-
vidual or household private needs, such as food and housing, and create ripple 
effects throughout the local economy.17 Remittances help the national balance 
of payments, boost economic development, and improve the general standard 
of living.18 
There is no question that remit-
tances have become a critical 
source of foreign currency for 
many post-conflict nations. 
Countries in conflict generate 
significant diasporas, a portion 
of which prefers its new life to repatriation after the conflict but seeks to support 
relatives who remained behind.19 As a result, in post-conflict areas, remittances 
have become a critical source of capital for development and stability.20 In many 
post-conflict nations remittances exceed the total amount of official develop-
ment assistance, and in about one-third of all developing countries, remittances 
14 Rob Mills and Qimiao Fan, Investment Climate in Post Conflict Situations, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 4055 at 11 (2006).
15 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Conflict and Fragility, Fragile States Resource Flows 
and Trends, 42 (2013).
16 Russell King and Julie Vullnetari, Remittances, Return, Diaspora: Framing the Debate in the Context of Albania and 
Kosovo, Southeastern Europe and Black Sea Studies, 9:4, 385–406, 390 (2009).
17 Id.
18 K. M. Abdul Azeez and M. Begum, International Remittances: A Source of Development Finance, 4 International 
NGO Journal 299, 301–04 (2009).
19 US Agency for International Development, Understanding the Post-Conflict Country Analytical Template at 34 
(September 2009).
20 In 2010, formal remittance flows worldwide exceeded $440 billion, with approximately $330 billion sent to 
developing countries. This is three times the amount of official aid provided to these nations, and approximates the 
aggregate amount of foreign direct investment in these countries. The World Bank, Migration and Remittances Fact 
Book 2011 (2nd Ed. 2011).
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exceed all capital flows.21 A recent World Bank study found that remittances 
“play a vital and life-sustaining role for millions of vulnerable people in poor 
countries, particularly in post-conflict countries and in situations where formal 
financial services and infrastructures are nonexistent.”22 
In addition, remittances tend to be markedly more stable than other private 
capital flows, such as portfolio investments and bank credits.23 The importance 
of remittances in helping post-conflict countries was emphasized in a report 
issued by the International Peace Academy, which stated: 
Nearly all the countries in the conflict, war-to-peace transition, and crisis 
categories are highly dependent on remittances. The slow recovery of 
livelihoods and persistent violence or repression ensure high levels of 
migration and the need for remittances in such countries for several 
years after conflict and crises have ended. By all accounts, migrant 
remittances reduce poverty in important ways in developing countries. 
Research shows that migrants transfer funds and invest in their countries 
of origin at times when international investment has all but disappeared. 
By serving these purposes in countries emerging from or still experi-
encing conflicts . . .remittances can be seen as a sine qua non for peace 
and rebuilding.24 
impact of regulation
Studies indicate that a significant portion of remittance transfers flow through 
unregulated channels and the use of such informal channels hampers efforts 
to prevent funds from flowing to entities that engage in criminal or terrorist 
activities.25 The preference among remitters for informal transfer mechanisms 
partly reflects low financial literacy, as well as widespread distrust of government 
21 Id. at 1758.
22 M. Maimbo and D. Ratha, Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects at 13 (World Bank 2005).
23 Historically, remittances have been stable and even countercyclical, tending to rise during times of financial 
crisis and natural disasters because migrants living abroad send more money to help their families back in places 
of origin. United Nations Development Program, Towards Human Resilience: Sustaining MDG Progress in an Age  
of Economic Uncertainty at 129 (2011), available at http://tinyurl.com/UNDP-MDG-Progress.
24 Patricia Weiss Fagen and Micah N. Bump, Remittances in Conflict and Crises: How Remittances Sustain Liveli-
hoods in War, Crisis and Transitions to Peace, International Peace Academy and Georgetown University at i (2005) 
(hereinafter “Fagen and Bump”).
25 That unregulated transfer systems are open to abuse—ranging from money laundering to support for terrorist 
activity—is well documented. Id. at 11.
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and financial institutions.26 Resorting to informal channels also results from the 
deterrent effect of what is viewed by the immigrant community as the “intimi-
dating regulatory apparatus” erected to staunch money laundering and terrorist 
financing.27 
Studies have indicated that the remittances most adversely affected by regula-
tory control are those transferring funds to countries where governments are 
weak, institutions are not reliable, and criminal activity is high.28 These are the 
characteristics of many post-conflict nations. As a result, a substantial number 
of migrants who consider supporting their families to be an urgent commitment 
do not use regulated remittance services.29 The unintended consequences of the 
regulatory scheme in the U.S. was noted in a 2005 study by the International 
Peace Academy: 
The regulatory system in place—especially in the United States following 
the Patriot Act of 2001—was intended to prevent abuses. It may well be 
serving this purpose. . .but the cost has been high. Indeed, burdensome 
regulations challenge the ability of legitimate institutions and businesses 
to process money lawfully. The regulations impose stiff economic and 
bureaucratic burdens. . . The use and, at times, abuse of regulations has 
led to blacklisting remittance transfer agencies on the basis of perceived 
irregularities or minor infractions. The system put in place to target 
criminal elements has resulted instead in a system where the small 
operations most likely to serve particularly difficult areas are at a decided 
 disadvantage.30 
While these studies concerned regulatory controls designed primarily to prevent 
money laundering and to restrict the flow of funds to criminal and terrorist 
organizations, some of the same unintended effects may be seen with respect to 
26 S. Brown, Can Remittances Spur Development? A Critical Survey, 8 International Studies Review 55, 56 (2006).
27 Id.; A. Catalina, C. Bansak, and S. Pozo, On the Remitting Patterns of Immigrants: Evidence from Mexican Sur-
vey Data. Paper presented at the Payments in the Americas Conference. Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, October 
7–8 (2004).
28  Fagen & Bump, supra note 22, at 9. A recent World Bank report noted “scant attention” paid to the impact of 
regulation on the flows of funds to poor and post-conflict nations. The report suggested that “the effects of policies 
and regulations on the availability of financial services and the range of products available and attractive to a low-
income clientele requires more attention and, in some cases, reduced regulatory burdens to make them viable.” 
The World Bank, Remittances: Development Impact and Future Prospects 71 (Samuel M. Maimbo ed., Dilip Ratha 
ed., 2005).
29 Fagen & Bump, supra note 22, at 10.
30 Fagen & Bump, supra note 22, at 11.
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the new consumer protection regulations mandated by section 1073 of the Dodd-
Frank Act.
tHe dodd-Frank aCt
Legislative History
Section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank Act amended the EFTA by providing for detailed 
disclosures of numerous items in connection with a remittance transaction, 
establishing rules for correcting errors in the remittance process, and authorizing 
fines and civil actions for failure to comply with various mandates.31 
The impetus for this part of the legislation may be traced to a 2005 report issued 
by the Appleseed Fund for Justice and Appleseed Foundation (“Appleseed”) call-
ing for greater transparency in the remittance market.32 The report found that 
the then-existing disclosures often made it hard for consumers to understand the 
full costs of sending a remittance before they engage in a transaction, includ-
ing transaction fees and the exchange rate spread. In 2007, Appleseed testified 
before the House Committee on Financial Services that immigrants face enor-
mous fluctuations and inconsistencies in pricing for remittances, even within 
the same company.33 Appleseed recommended that the Federal Reserve Board 
should be granted rulemaking authority to delineate disclosure requirements, in 
consultation with consumer participants and representatives of the remittance 
industry. In 2009, Appleseed again testified before the House Financial Services 
Committee, but in this testimony, they recommended specific minimum disclo-
sures.34 In particular, Appleseed felt that baseline disclosures must include the 
fee for sending the remittance; the current exchange rate; the day and time the 
remittance will be available for pickup; and a sample of the remittance cost.35 
Appleseed also recommended that disclosure should occur visually before the 
transaction; that there should be a mechanism for error resolution; and that dis-
31 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1 (2012).
32 Ana Baddour & Sonja Danburg, Creating a Fair Playing Field for Consumers: The Need for Transparency in the U.S.–
Mexico Remittance Market (Appleseed, 2005).
33 Remittances: Access, Transparency, and Market Efficiency: A Progress Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Domestic and Int’l Monetary Policy, Trade, and Tech. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 110th Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of 
Annette LoVoi, Field Director, Appleseed).
34 Remittances: Regulation and Disclosure in a New Economic Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. 
of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 8–9 (2009) (statement of Annette LoVoi, Field Director, Appleseed).
35 Id.
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closures should be both in English and in the foreign language used in the three 
markets that the provider sends most of the remittances.36 
Legislative text
Interestingly, various studies have found that increasing competition in the 
marketplace and other factors drove down the cost of remittance transfers, espe-
cially in the Latin American market, without the need for further regulation.37 
Nevertheless, Congress adopted a new and comprehensive remittance law in 
the Dodd-Frank Act, in order to “establish minimum protections for remittances 
sent by consumers in the United States to other countries.”38 The legislation was 
based on the concern that senders of remittance transfers “face significant prob-
lems with their remittance transfers, including being overcharged or not having 
the funds reach intended recipients.”39 
Pursuant to section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank Act, before making a remittance 
transfer to a foreign country, a remittance transfer provider40 must disclose, at 
the time when the consumer requests a remittance transfer, but prior to making 
any payment:
• the amount of currency to be received by the recipient in the currency to 
be received; 
• the amount of any fees charged by the transfer provider; and 
• the exchange rate accurate to the one-hundredth of one percent.41 
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., Manuel Orozco, International Flow of Remittances: Cost, Competition and Financial Access in Latin Amer-
ica and the Caribbean—Toward an Industry Scorecard 4 (2006), available at http://tinyurl.com/Remittance-Flow 
(Technology may also be a driving factor). See also The World Bank, Global Economic  Prospects: Economic Implica-
tions of Remittances and Migration 137–38 (2006); Electronic Fund Transfers ( Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 6194, 6199 
(Feb. 7, 2012) (to be codified at 12 CFR Part 1005). The U.S. General  Accountability Office (GAO) found that the 
average cost of sending remittances from the United States to Latin America ( particularly Mexico) declined from 
12.5 percent to 7 percent from 2003 to 2005, and where comparable to the fees charged by banks, credit unions 
and the U.S. Postal Service. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-006-204, International Remittances, 3–4 (2005).
38 S. Rep. No. 111-176, 176 Sec. 1076 at 179176 (2010).
39 Id.
40 Defined to include any institution that makes remittance transfers to a foreign country in the regular course of 
business. The CFPB regulation states that an institution is presumed not to meet this standard if it made less than 
100 transfers in the previous year, and continues to make less than 100 transfers in the current year.
41 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1(a)(2).
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Following the payment of money to the remittance transfer provider, the cus-
tomer must obtain:
• a written receipt that includes all of the information disclosed before payment; 
• the promised date of delivery;
•  the name of the recipient;
• a statement about consumer rights for error resolution; and 
• the state and federal agencies that regulate the provider.42 
Disclosures must be in English and in each of the foreign languages principally 
used by the remittance transfer provider, or any of its agents, to advertise, 
solicit, or market, either orally or in writing, at that office.43 Disclosures must be 
accurate when made, but the statute specifically provides that insured deposi-
tory institutions may be allowed by the regulator to use reasonably accurate 
estimates for a limited period, ending on July 21, 2015, unless further extended 
by regulations.44 
regULatory iMPLeMentation
Proposed and Final rules issued in 2012 and 2013
The original regulatory proposal to implement section 1073 was drafted by the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and published for comment 
by that agency on May 23, 2011.45 On July 21, 2011, regulatory authority was 
transferred to the CFPB.46 This agency issued a final regulation and a series of 
interpretations implementing section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank Act on February 
7, 2012 (“February Final Rule”).47 Prior to the rule going into effect, the Bureau 
42 Id.
43 15 U.S.C. § 1693o1693O1693o-1(b). (2012).
44 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1(a)(4). (2012).
45 Electronic Fund Transfers, 76 Fed. Reg. 29902 (proposed May 23, 2011) (to be codified at 12 CFR Part 205).
46 Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5582 (authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to designate a specific date for 
the transfer of consumer protection functions from the Federal banking agencies to the CFPB.). The Secretary 
selected July 21, 2011 as the designated transfer date. 75 Fed. Reg. 57252-3533 (Sept. 20, 2010).
47 Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) 77 Fed. Reg. at 6194; Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) 77 Fed. 
Reg. 50244, 50282 (Aug. 20, 2012) (to be codified at 12 CFR Part 1005) (The CFPB issued a modification to the 
final rule, establishing that a company that made less than 100 remittance transfers in a year was not covered by 
the regulation. The August amendment also addressed compliance issues raised when remittance transfers are 
scheduled on a regular basis in advance).
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issued a new proposed regulation December 31, 2012 that would make several 
significant changes in its original rule,48 and at the same time announced that 
it was going to delay the effective date of the February Final Rule until after it 
considers the proposed amendments.49 On May 22, 2013 the agency published 
in the Federal Register a new final regulation making three significant changes 
to the remittance regulation, and setting the effective date for regulatory compli-
ance as October 28, 2013.50 
The regulatory implementation creates a number of practical compliance 
problems for remittance transfer providers that could well result in increasing 
the cost of, or reducing the availability of, remittance services.51 However, the 
adverse impact of these regulations on remittances to post-conflict countries will 
be much greater than for remittances sent to countries that have a stable and 
well-functioning government with a transparent financial regulatory structure.
The most significant problems include harsh penalties imposed on remittance 
companies for minor or inadvertent misstatements relating to the mandated 
disclosures; the imposition of liability for the acts of literally thousands of agents 
and representatives around the globe; and the costs imposed on remittance 
companies to correct mistakes even if the mistake was due to customer errors.52 
Even the CFPB has expressed concern that the new regulatory structure may 
result in companies exiting the field or reducing offerings by not sending remit-
tances to areas where it would be more difficult to obtain the data that must be 
48 Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 77188 (proposed Dec. 31, 2012) (to be codified at 12 
CFR Part 1005).
49 Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) Temporary Delay of Effective Date, 78 Fed. Reg. 6025 (Jan. 29, 2012).
50 Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 78 Fed. Reg. 30662 (May 22, 2013).
51 See, e.g., Joint Trade Association Comment Letter on the Proposed Amendments to Regulation E to Implement 
Section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank Act, Federal Reserve Board Doc. No. 1419, July 22, 2011. The CFPB acknowledged 
the possibility of adverse consequences of its regulation, including increased consumer costs and a decrease in the 
availability of remittance services at 77 Fed. Reg. 6201-02, 6208, 6218, 6220, 6224, 6279-82.
52 Any company that fails to comply with the EFTA or implementing regulations will face civil liability for actual 
damages and statutory damages of between $100 and $1,000 per violation. Class action liability for each violation 
is capped at $500,000 or 1 percent of the net worth of the company, whichever is less. Attorney fees are also 
awarded in a successful claim. 15 U.S.C. §1693m. (2012). In addition, the CFPB may levy administrative civil money 
penalties. 15 U.S.C. § 1693o. (2012). Intentional violations are subject to criminal penalties including imprisonment 
for up to one year. 15 U.S.C. § 1693n.
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disclosed.53 Recently, the Federal Home Loan Bank of New York announced that 
in response to the new regulatory environment, it would no longer be providing 
remittance transfer services for its member institutions.54 
With respect to remittance transfers to post-conflict nations, disclosures relating 
to third-party fees and exchange rates are especially troubling. The remainder 
of this section will explain the nature of the compliance problems caused by the 
regulation, recent efforts by the CFPB to address at least some of these concerns, 
and why much more needs to be done in response.
disclosure of third-Party Fees
Pursuant to the regulation issued on February 7, 2012, remittance transfer 
companies must provide “accurate” disclosures before any money is exchanged 
(pre-payment disclosures) and a post-payment receipt that contains the pre-pay-
ment information, as well as additional disclosures. One of the more problematic 
requirements is to disclose all fees that may be charged by third parties, whether 
or not the remittance transfer provider has knowledge of such fees.55 The 2012 
final rule provides that insured depository institutions may make good-faith esti-
mates of these fees if they lack actual knowledge (at least until July 21, 2015),56 
but the agency chose not to exercise its discretion to afford similar treatment to 
other remittance providers.57 Thus, under the 2012 regulation, except for insured 
depository institutions, fees imposed by third parties must be itemized and accu-
rately disclosed, even if the amount of the fee is not known by the remittance 
transfer provider when the transaction is initiated.
There are several reasons why remittance providers may not be able to com-
ply with the disclosure requirement when transmitting funds to post-conflict 
countries. For example, remittance funds may be sent abroad either through a 
53 According to the CFPB, “some remittance transfer providers and industry associations have indicated that 
some providers are considering exiting the market or reducing their offerings, such as by not sending transfers to 
corridors where tax or fee information is particularly difficult to obtain, or by limiting the size or type of transfers 
sent in order to reduce any risk associated with mis-deposited transfers.” Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 
77 Fed. Reg. at 77190.
54 Press Release, Federal Home Loan Bank of New York, FHLBNY to Stop Processing International Wire Transfers at 
Year-End (Nov. 30, 2012) available at http://tinyurl.com/FHLBNY-press.
55 12 CFR § 1005.31. (2011).
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 1693o1693O1693o-1(a)(4) (2010) (specifically authorizes the CFPB to allow insured deposi-
tory institutions to use estimates for certain disclosures. . .).
57 The regulation tracks the statute in this case, since 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-1(a)(4) allows the CFPB to authorize 
estimates for insured depository institutions until July 21, 2015, unless further extended by the agency.
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“closed network,” in which all of the intermediaries are agents of the remittance 
provider, or through an “open network,” such as through wire transfers.58 An 
open network is composed of intermediary financial institutions.59 The funds are 
transmitted from one financial institution to another as it winds its way to the 
recipient. The transaction may be routed differently, depending upon a number 
of factors beyond the control of the remittance transfer provider. Therefore, 
when funds are transmitted through an open network, the specific intermedi-
ary institutions and the exact amount of third party transaction fees cannot be 
determined beforehand.60 When funds are transmitted to a post-conflict region, 
the remittance provider is less likely to have an office or other presence in the 
region. As a result, in many post-conflict areas, the open network framework 
will be an important transmission method, but the remittance provider will not 
be able to determine in advance the exact route that the funds will traverse nor 
the fees that will be imposed by third party intermediaries.
The problem is worse in post-conflict nations where the transparency and 
sufficiency of the financial regulatory structure may be lacking. Without a 
strong financial regulatory structure, entities receiving remittance payments 
for disbursement to the recipient may be able to establish fees that vary based 
on local economic conditions, relationships with the consumer, or other factors 
intrinsic to that particular entity. In some cultures, the exact fee that some third 
parties may charge could be subject to negotiation and bargaining between the 
consumer and the paying entity. The U.S. regulatory requirements for advance 
notice and/or publication of consumer fees is certainly not the norm in many 
58 Wire transfers are generally open network transactions that can reach virtually any bank worldwide through 
national payment systems that are connected through correspondent and other intermediary bank relationships. 
Providers of wire transfers usually charge up-front fees at the time of the transaction. In some cases, intermediary 
institutions impose additional fees (sometimes referred to as ‘‘lifting fees’’) and recipient institutions may also 
charge fees for converting funds into local currency and/or depositing them into recipients’ accounts. See generally 
Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E), 77 Fed. Reg. 6194 - 6198 (in-depth discussion of open networks and 
wire transfers).
59 Id. at 6197.
60 In an open network, the sending institution may not have a contractual relationship with the receiving institu-
tion. Rather, in an open network transaction, the sending institution will send payment instructions and funds to a 
correspondent institution, which will then transmit the instructions and funds to the recipient institution directly or 
indirectly through other intermediary institutions. The identity of the intermediary institutions is not always known 
because more than one transfer route is possible. There is no global practice regarding communication between 
these various institutions regarding fees. Id.
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parts of the post-conflict world, and the regulatory language does not take that 
into account.61 
CFPB response relating to third-Party Fees
The 2013 regulation deals with only one aspect of the problems relating to 
third-party fees. It provides that such fees need not be disclosed, but only if 
they are imposed by the recipient’s institution, and only if that institution is not 
considered to be an agent of the remittance transfer provider.62 The recipient’s 
institution must be a bank or similar financial institution, and the funds must be 
placed into an “asset account,” such as a savings account or checking account. 
The requirement to disclose accurately all fees charged in other circumstances, 
for example, by intermediary institutions in an open network, was not changed. 
This will make the use of open networks by remittance transfer providers (other 
than depository institutions) difficult if not impossible. 
Definition of Agent
One practical difficulty in applying even this limited exemption is that the term 
“agent” is not clearly defined. The term “agent” is defined, for other purposes, to 
mean “agent, authorized delegate, or person affiliated with a remittance transfer 
provider, as defined under State or other applicable law, when such agent, autho-
rized delegate, or affiliate acts for that remittance transfer provider.”63 The 2013 
amendment added, however, that this definition applies “except as otherwise 
provided.”64 The preamble explains that this “except as otherwise provided” 
clause was added to clarify that the term “agent” may be modified by the provi-
sions in the rule regarding fee disclosures.65 However, there is no specific refer-
ence to the definition of the term “agent” in these sections of the rule. Thus, it is 
not clear to what extent the existing definition of “agent” applies to the exemp-
tion from disclosure of the fees charged by the recipient’s institution.
61 See, e.g., B. Narteh, Challenges of Marketing E-Banking Services in a Developing Country: The Case of Ghana, 17 J. 
of Internet Banking and Commerce 10 (2012), http://www.arraydev.com/commerce/jibc/; L. Brix and K. McKee, 
Consumer Protection Regulation in Low-Access Environments: Opportunities to Promote Responsible Finance, CGAP 
Focus Note No. 60 (2010).
62 CFR §30(h)(2).
63 12 CFR §1005.30(a).
64 12 CFR §1005.30.
65 78 Fed. Reg. 30666.
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Some guidance may be found in the preamble, which explains that the CFPB is 
“not adjusting the required disclosures for transfers that a recipient picks up at 
a paying agent.”66 In other words, if the recipient’s institution is deemed to be a 
“paying agent” under applicable law, the fee must be disclosed even if the remit-
tance transfer provider cannot determine the amount of the fee. The preamble 
notes that the recipient’s institution may also be an agent of the remittance 
transfer provider. The preamble states: “(I)f the designated recipient’s institution 
is an agent of the provider . . . the provider must disclose all fees imposed on the 
remittance transfer.” 
The problem is made more complicated because there is no guidance regarding 
the applicable law to be used for determining if the recipient’s institution is an 
“agent” or “paying agent” of the remittance transfer company. The 2012 regula-
tion states that when determining when an entity is an “agent” of a remittance 
provider, reference should be made to “State or other applicable law.”67 This 
could refer to the State where the remittance transfer provider is located, the 
State where the transaction occurred, the home State of the consumer, or the 
law of the foreign country in which the remittance is sent. Each of these jurisdic-
tions may have different rules for determining if the recipient’s institution is the 
“agent” or “paying agent” of the transfer provider. Thus, without further clarifica-
tion, a remittance provider may face liability for not precisely disclosing the fees 
charged by the recipient’s non-affiliated depository institution that is deemed 
under applicable law (which is not defined) to be the “paying agent” of the remit-
tance company.
Limitation to Depository Institutions
The 2013 amendment may also be criticized for limiting the exemption to a 
recipient’s depository institution (e.g., a bank, savings association, or credit 
union). According to the World Bank, three-quarters of the world’s poor don’t 
have a bank account, not only because of poverty, but also because of the cost, 
travel distance, and amount of paperwork involved in opening an account.68 In 
post-conflict nations the percent of the population with access to bank accounts 
is reduced further by the degradation of the country’s financial system that 
results from warfare, enhanced concerns about the security of the nation’s finan-
cial institutions, potential for sharp changes in exchange rates, and the fear of 
66 78 Fed. Reg. 30673.
67 12 CFR § 1005.30(a).
68 See: http://tinyurl.com/WB-Unbanked.
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government corruption. Thus, limiting the benefit of the exemption to transfers 
made into a recipient’s “asset account” at a bank or similar depository institution 
is particularly disadvantageous to the remittance transfer providers seeking to 
provide services to post-conflict areas. 
Exclusion for Transfers to Credit Card, Prepaid Card, or a Virtual Account Held 
by an Internet-Based or Mobile Telephone Company 
The CFPB considered, but specifically declined, expanding the fee disclo-
sure exemption to include transfers to credit cards, prepaid cards, and virtual 
accounts held by internet companies (e-wallets) and mobile phone companies 
(mobile phone payments). According to the Bureau, the systems for offering 
such transfers are not yet fully developed and currently most of these transfers 
are provided through systems in which remittance transfer providers have 
contractual arrangements with the recipient institutions, or the providers and 
the recipient institutions operate within one single network.69 The Bureau 
concluded that, going forward, “arrangements will likely permit providers to 
exercise some control over, or learn about, fees charged by recipient institutions 
 [emphasis added].”70
In the case of post-conflict nations, the failure to provide flexibility for trans-
fer into such non-bank 
accounts, and in particular 
to mobile phones and 
other devices, is par-
ticularly problematic. In 
these nations the use of 
mobile banking devices 
has become a financial 
lifeline for much of the 
population. In 2009, the 
Global System for Mobile Communications Association reported more than four 
billion mobile phone subscriptions globally, with 80 percent of new connections 
in emerging markets and mostly by lower-income consumers.71 Both the World 
Bank and the U.S. Agency for International Development support and encourage 
69 78 Fed. Reg. 30673.
70 Id.
71 USAID, Enabling Mobile Money Interventions at 2 (2010).
Both the World Bank and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development support and 
encourage the use of mobile devices for 
money transfers. These agencies have found 
that mobile phones are widely available 
in developing nations and have the added 
benefit of allowing access to funds without 
the need to travel through dangerous coun-
tryside.
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the use of mobile devices for money transfers.72 These agencies have found that 
mobile phones are widely available in developing nations and have the added 
benefit of allowing access to funds without the need to travel through dangerous 
countryside.73 The use of mobile phones for monetary transactions is expanding 
dramatically in post-conflict areas, and is supported by the U.S. government. For 
example, beginning in 2007 the USAID began to actively assist in the develop-
ment of mobile banking in Afghanistan,74 and the U.S. Department of Defense 
has invested $2 million to establish mobile phone and other forms of electronic 
banking in Iraq.75 
As the CFPB has stated, the use of e-wallets and mobile phones for monetary 
transactions is a developing model. It is not clear how these systems will ulti-
mately develop, and it is not clear that every country will have a similar model. 
For example, in some countries the funds must pass through a domestic banking 
institution before they are transferred to a mobile device. In other models, the 
transfer can be made directly to the phone or internet provider. In some countries 
only one internet provider may be authorized, while in other nations there may 
be no restriction on the number of internet providers. However, under the CFPB 
regulation, the fees charged by mobile device providers to transfer funds into 
their customers’ mobile accounts must be disclosed by the U.S. remittance trans-
fer provider prior to the transaction, even if the U.S. remittance company has no 
knowledge of the fee, or no practical way of determining the fee in advance. 
The World Bank has found that a major obstacle to the increased use of mobile 
phones and other forms of e-money is overly complex or stringent regulation.76 
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), which is housed at the World 
Bank, recommends that policymakers and regulators should be careful not to 
unnecessarily inhibit the use of mobile phone for monetary transfers through 
regulatory overreach. Instead, the CGAP urges that rules should be imple-
mented gradually and should be designed to evolve as the industry expands 
72 Id. at 5, noting that the use of mobile devices provides a safe and secure way of transferring funds without ne-
cessitating the transport of currency through the more dangerous countryside. The USAID has undertaken signifi-
cant efforts to support mobile banking projects in many post-conflict areas, including Ethiopia, El Salvador, Nigeria, 
Afghanistan, and Malawi. The World Bank strongly supports the development of mobile money infrastructure, and 
recently issued a report highlighting the benefits of mobile money for developing countries. See, The World Bank, 
“Maximizing Mobile” at chapter 4 (2012).
73 Id.
74 USAID, Enabling Mobile Money Interventions at 19.
75 USAID, Enabling Mobile Money Interventions at 16 (2010).
76 Id. at page 10.
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and matures. The ultimate goal should be to allow for oversight without stifling 
innovation.77 
Nevertheless, the Bureau determined not to include transfers to credit cards, 
prepaid cards, mobile phones, and e-wallets because it believes that future 
development of the use of these instruments for money transfer “will likely 
permit providers to exercise some control over, or learn about, fees charged by 
recipient institutions.”78 It is not clear how the Bureau came to this conclusion. 
There is considerable risk, however, that the Bureau’s regulation will lead to this 
result, even if other payment models would provide more competition, less costs 
for the recipient, or provide better ways to address the specific needs of consum-
ers in post-conflict areas. 
Open Networks and Intermediary Institution Fees
The 2013 regulation does not ameliorate the problems identified in the origi-
nal rule with respect to remittances carried over open networks, such as wire 
transfers or the Automated Clearinghouse System (ACH).79 As explained previ-
ously, the exact amount of fees charged by open network intermediaries must 
be disclosed prior to and at the time a consumer initiates a remittance transfer. 
However, this information is unknowable under current systems until after the 
remittance transaction has been completed and the funds delivered. Remittances 
to post-conflict countries may rely on open networks since these companies are 
less able to move funds through closed networks in areas with a higher potential 
for violence, damaged transportation and other necessary infrastructure, high 
levels of poverty, and a lack of governmental regulatory oversight and police 
protection. If the use of open networks is restricted because the fees cannot be 
determined with certainty before the transaction in entered into, the result will 
be significantly less availability for regulated transfers, and consumers will be 
driven to use unregulated methods of remitting funds to these areas.
77 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor. (January 2008). Regulating Transformational Branchless Banking:  
Mobile Phones and Other Technology to Increase Access to Finance. Focus Note #43. http://tinyurl.com/CGAP-
BranchlessBanking.
78 78 Fed. Reg. 30673.
79 The ACH system is a funds transfer system that provides for the clearing and settlement of batched electronic 
transfers for participating depository institutions. In contrast, wires transfers are typically higher-dollar, individual 
(not batched) credit transactions that settle between depository institutions immediately. The originator of an 
ACH transfer generally authorizes its depository institution to send a payment instruction. The depository institu-
tion combines the payment instruction with payment instructions from its other customers and sends them to an 
ACH operator—the Federal Reserve Bank’s Fed ACH or The Clearing House’s Electronic Payments Network—for 
processing. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Report to Congress on the Use of Automated Clear-
ing Systems for Remittance Transfers to Foreign Countries (July 4, 2011).
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Foreign taxes
Under the 2012 regulation, remittance providers would have to disclose all taxes 
imposed on a remittance transfer, including taxes assessed by a local, state, 
provincial or regional foreign government.80 In its 2013 rulemaking, the CFPB 
recognized that the determination of all foreign taxes, and keeping that informa-
tion current, would be a difficult and costly undertaking. It therefore determined 
to amend the regulation to only require the disclosure of foreign taxes that are 
“collected on the remittance transfer by the provider.”81 
The new regulatory language raises the question of whether a tax collected by a 
paying agent would be considered a tax collected by the remittance transfer pro-
vider. Generally, the actions of an agent are attributed to the principal, and thus 
a tax collected by the recipient’s institution could be viewed as a tax collected by 
the remittance transfer provider, if the recipient’s institution is determined to be 
the agent of the transfer provider. As discussed previously, the regulation does 
not provide a clear definition of the term “agent” or even the appropriate State or 
foreign law to consult. On the other hand, it is possible that the rule only intends 
to capture taxes collected directly by the remittance transfer provider and not by 
the provider’s agents. This is an area where additional guidance from the CFPB 
would be helpful.
exchange rates
The remittance regulation requires a remittance transfer provider to disclose the 
exchange rate used by the provider, rounded consistently for each currency to 
no fewer than two decimal places and no more than four decimal places.82 The 
2013 regulation did not make any changes to this requirement.
While the exchange rate may be determined with certainty for certain products, 
this is not true in all cases. In post-conflict countries there will likely be far more 
volatility in the exchange rate than in more settled nations. To account for this 
risk, remittance companies may offer transfers with an exchange rate that is 
set when the recipient picks up the funds.83 This would not be possible under 
the regulation, since it requires disclosure of the exchange rate when transfer is 
initiated.
80 12 CFR § 1005.31.
81 78 Fed. Reg. 30674—77.
82 12 CFR § 1005.31(b)(1)(iv).
83 77 Fed. Reg. 6196 (Feb. 7, 2012) (so called “floating rate” transfers are described).
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Further, remittance transfers to post-conflict nations may rely on open network 
systems. Determining the exchange rate in advance in open network transac-
tions is not always possible.84 A sending institution may exchange the currency 
at the time of transfer, using an exchange rate that the sending institution sets. In 
such cases, the principal amount will then be transferred in the foreign currency. 
Even if the funds are to be received in a foreign currency, however, the sending 
financial institution may not conduct the foreign exchange itself. Some financial 
institutions, particularly smaller institutions, may not participate in any foreign 
currency markets.85 In other cases, the sending institution may choose not to 
trade an illiquid currency or a consumer may request that the transfer be sent in 
U.S. dollars. In these cases, the first cross-border intermediary institution in the 
recipient’s country, or the recipient’s institution, may set the exchange rate that 
applies to the transfer. Under these conditions, the remittance company may 
not know the exact exchange rate that will be applied until the transferred funds 
are received.
The potential for making an error of as little as one-hundredth of one percent 
when disclosing exchange rates could create significant risks to the remittance 
provider, especially when making a transfer to a post-conflict country. As a 
result, the cost of such transfers may increase, or the availability of such services 
through regulated companies may be inhibited.86 And once again, post-conflict 
nations will typically have more volatile movements in exchange rates, and, 
thus, will be particularly disadvantaged by strict application of this disclosure 
requirement.
date when Funds will Be available
The receipt that must be given by the remittance transfer provider to the sender 
must include the date in the foreign country on which funds will be available 
to the designated recipient.87 Due to the instability in post-conflict countries, 
remittance providers may not be able to provide a firm date by which the funds 
84 Id. At 6197.
85 See discussion of the mechanics of setting foreign exchange rates at 77 Fed. Reg. 6197.
86 Supra note 55 at 6220, a discussion of comments including a Federal Reserve Bank commenter, as well as 
industry commenters, arguing that requiring a fixed exchange rate for purposes of providing an exchange rate 
disclosure would result in less favorable exchange rates for senders. These commenters stated that if providers are 
required to fix the exchange rate, they will increase the spread they use in order to minimize the risks associated 
with rate volatility, so the cost of sending remittance transfers would increase for senders. A major remittance 
transfer provider warned the CFPB that it would stop providing service to approximately 10,000 foreign locations 
that currently offer only floating rates.
87 12 CFR 1005.31(b)(2).
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will be available in all cases. CFPB guidance appears to recognize that fight-
ing and other disruptions may delay the date on which funds will be ready for 
disbursement, and provides an exception for war or civil unrest, natural disaster, 
garnishment or attachment of the funds after the transfer is sent, and govern-
ment actions or restrictions that could not have been reasonably anticipated 
by the remittance transfer provider, such as the imposition of foreign currency 
controls.88 Many of the causes for delay in receiving funds when sent to a post-
conflict region can be anticipated, but the length or severity of the disruption 
cannot be determined in advance. The CFPB was notified during the comment 
period that infrastructure deficiencies in some countries may make it impos-
sible to determine the actual date on which funds will be available, but did not 
address this problem in its 2013 regulation.
Foreign Laws Prohibiting Compliance
In its 2012 rule, the CFPB addressed the problem that the laws of certain foreign 
countries effectively prohibit compliance with its disclosure requirements.89 As 
such, the CFPB created an exception that permits remittance transfer providers 
to use estimates, rather than exact numbers, if the provider cannot determine 
the exact amounts when disclosure is required because of a recipient nation’s 
laws.90 However, since this exception only applies when there is a national law 
that prevents compliance with the disclosures, it will not be of assistance when 
compliance is made impossible due to the local political, economic, regulatory, 
and social conditions, such as may exist in post-conflict nations.
CFPB Can do More
The CFPB has broad authority to create exceptions and limitations to the 
statutory provisions on remittance transfer providers. Section 904 of the EFTA 
governs all of the CFPB’s rulemakings under the EFTA.91 This section specifi-
cally states that the EFTA regulations may contain “such classifications, dif-
ferentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and 
88 12 CFR §1005.33.
89 Electronic Fund Transfers (Regulation E) 77 Fed. Reg. 50244.
90 The August regulation also created an exception for international ACH transfers where the terms of the trans-
fer have been negotiated by the United States Government and the recipient country’s government, and where 
the exchange rate is set by the recipient country on the business day after the provider has sent the remittance 
transfer. The CFPB has published a list of the countries that qualify under the second exception. These countries 
are: Aruba, Brazil, China, Ethiopia, and Libya. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Remittance Rule Safe 
Harbor Countries List (Sep. 26, 2012), available at http://tinyurl.com/Safe-Harbor-List.
91 15 U.S.C. § 1693b.
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exemptions for any class of electronic fund transfers or remittance transfers, as 
in the judgment of the CFPB are necessary and proper to effectuate the EFTA.” 
Likewise, section 1022 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which is the CFPB’s general 
authority to issue regulations for federal consumer laws (including the EFTA), 
provides that the CFPB may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any class 
of covered persons, service providers, or consumer financial products from 
any rule.92 Taken together, these statutory provisions leave no question that the 
CFPB has plenary authority to develop regulations that can create exemptions, 
differentiations, adjustments, and exceptions from the general requirements, 
and the CFPB can classify products as subject to or not subject to regulation, 
and otherwise tailor its regulations to achieve the purposes of the EFTA and the 
policy objectives of section 1022 of the Dodd-Frank Act. The legal authority of 
the CFPB to make adjustments to the disclosure rules to take into account the 
special circumstances of post-conflict nations is clear. 
ConCLUsion
The Dodd-Frank Act amendments to the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, and the 
implementing regulations issued by the CFPB, are intended to provide enhanced 
consumer protections to U.S. residents sending funds to foreign countries. The 
legislation and regulations were designed for a model in which the remittance 
transfers are subject to known rules and regulations, where all fees can be 
determined beforehand, and where exchange rates and timing can be predicted 
with near certainty. This model does not exist for remittances sent to many post-
conflict countries. In these nations, the financial regulatory structure is weak, the 
political and legal infrastructure unstable, and corruption or fear of corruption 
prevalent. Under these circumstances, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know 
with certainty many of the facts that the regulation requires remittance provid-
ers to disclose accurately when the remittance is initiated. The CFPB has made 
attempts to deal with these issues, but much more needs to be done to assure 
that these new rules will not inhibit fund transfers to post-conflict regions. 
92 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (b)(3).
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Section II: Remittances in Post-Conflict 
Development: Country Studies
3. Migration, remittances, development,  
and the Civil Conflict in sri Lanka 
Suranjana Nabar-Bhaduri
This section looks at the role of remittances in Sri Lanka in the context of the 
civil war between Sri Lankan government forces and secessionist Tamil militants 
that lasted from 1983 to 2009. It examines the composition of migration (labor 
versus refugee) from Sri Lanka, the effects of the conflict on the pathways of 
migration and remittances, the channels used to remit money, and the use of 
remittances at the macro and micro levels. The section also discusses challenges 
that appear to be impeding remittances from addressing the broader issues of 
post-conflict development in Sri Lanka, and suggests policies that could help 
address these challenges. It uses the Sri Lankan case to point towards policies 
that could better enable remittances to address the development and recon-
struction needs of post-conflict countries, and facilitate a more sustainable and 
inclusive path of long-run development. 
The Sinhalese-speaking population has historically been Sri Lanka’s largest 
ethnic group, and constituted 74.9 percent of Sri Lanka’s population of about 
20.2 million in 2012. The Sri Lankan Tamils have been the second major ethnic 
group, constituting 11.2 percent of the population in 2012 (2012 Sri Lanka 
Census of Population and Housing). During the British colonial rule, the dispro-
portionate representation given to the minority Tamils in higher education and 
administration politicized ethnic identity in Sri Lanka. In the years following 
independence in 1948, Sri Lankan government policies on language, university 
admission rules, and access to public service employment came to favor the 
dominant Sinhalese population. Additionally, the government introduced settler 
programs for Sinhalese farmers in Tamil areas. These policies created a sense 
of alienation among Sri Lanka’s minority ethnic groups. The rivalry between 
the Sinhalese and Sri Lankan Tamils became increasingly confrontational over 
time, and gave rise to the Tamil nationalist struggle. The attack by the Libera-
tion Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that killed 15 Sinhalese soldiers on July 23, 
1983 resulted in an anti-Tamil pogrom, and marked the beginning of Sri Lanka’s 
descent into a civil war between the Sri Lankan government and secessionist 
Tamil militants that lasted for 25 years. 
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Post-indePendenCe Migration FroM sri Lanka: 
CoMPosition and tHe eFFeCts oF tHe CiviL war 
Between 1948 and the early 1970s, Sri Lankan migrants primarily consisted 
of the Sinhalese and Tamil English-speaking educated and professional elite, 
who migrated mainly to the United Kingdom, and in smaller numbers to other 
Commonwealth countries in the West for higher education and employment. 
The 1970s witnessed a second wave of migration to the UK by young Tamil men, 
who found their education opportunities limited when the Sri Lankan govern-
ment introduced quotas in the early 1970s to restrict Tamil admissions in Sri 
Lankan colleges and universities (Sriskandarajah 2002; Lindley and Van Hear 
2007; and Orjuela 2008). 
The late 1970s marked the beginning of a third wave of migration flows of 
mainly Sinhalese semi-skilled and unskilled labor to the Middle East in response 
to the rising demand for construction and other unskilled labor in the petroleum-
producing countries. These flows were facilitated by the migration promotion 
policies of the Sri Lankan government from 1977 that saw labor migration as 
a means for absorbing surplus labor and easing foreign exchange shortages. 
Large-scale migration by Sri Lankan female domestic workers became another 
defining aspect of labor migration flows to the Middle East. The scale of these 
migration flows have caused the Middle East to emerge as the major destina-
tion of Sri Lankan labor migrants, and the main source of remittances to Sri 
Lanka. In 2010, 93 percent of labor migrants from Sri Lanka were employed in 
the Middle Eastern countries [Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE) 
Annual Report 2010]. Housemaids constituted 42.44 percent of total departures 
for foreign employment from Sri Lanka, and 86 percent of total female migrant 
workers from Sri Lanka. Thus, labor migrant flows from Sri Lanka have been 
dominated by unskilled labor, with housemaids and other unskilled labor 
constituting nearly 65 percent of labor migration flows in 2010 (SLBFE Annual 
Report 2010). Despite some marginal increments in the migration of skilled 
labor to Europe and the United States in more recent years, the skills profile of 
labor migrants from Sri Lanka remains predominantly unskilled (Arunatilake 
et al. 2010). 
Finally, a fourth wave of migration occurred since the 1980s, especially following 
the onset of the civil war between secessionist Tamil militants and government 
forces in 1983. The majority of this migration consisted of refugee flows, mainly 
poor Tamils directly affected by the conflict from the rural areas of northeast 
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Sri Lanka. The conflict also resulted in the departure of many professionals 
and middle-class Tamils with the financial means and skills, and an increase in 
asylum claims by Tamil students and guest workers already living overseas. Esti-
mates suggest that between 1983 and 2002, total net migration from Sri Lanka 
was between 1.5 to 2 million, or 10 percent of the country’s total population of 
approximately 20 million (Sriskandarajah 2002). 
geograPHiCaL disPersion oF tHe sri Lankan diasPora
Besides the domestic and unskilled labor migrants in the Middle East, the Sin-
halese diaspora, mainly consisting of middle-class professionals, is concentrated 
in the UK, Australia, Italy, and Canada. The UK served as the main destination 
of Tamil students and professionals immediately after independence and during 
the 1960s and 1970s. The UK also was the major destination for Tamil asylum-
seekers until the mid-1980s, when the British government introduced restric-
tions to curb Tamil asylum migration. Consequently, more Tamil asylum-seekers 
began migrating to continental Europe and Canada. Indeed, the considerably 
higher acceptance rate for Tamil refugee claimants in Canada lead Toronto to 
become an epicenter of the Tamil diaspora. The Tamil Sri Lankan diaspora is 
currently spread out in Canada, India, Australia, Germany, UK, Switzerland, 
France, and the Scandinavian countries. Over time, there has been some second-
ary migration of European Sri Lankan Tamils to the UK (Cheran 2003; Zunzer 
2004; and Lindley and Van Hear 2007). 
sri Lanka’s externaL BaLanCes and reMittanCes
Remittances have increased significantly since the 1980s, reflecting the increase 
in migration flows to the Middle East, as well as migration flows forced by the 
civil war since 1983. Data from the World Development Indicators (WDI) data-
base of the World Bank indicates that between 1983 and 2011, recorded private 
remittances increased from approximately $295 million to approximately $5 
billion. Figure 1 (p. 62) shows 
Sri Lanka’s recorded private 
remittance receipts as a 
percentage of GDP since the 
late 1970s. Private remit-
tances currently amount to 
eight percent of the country’s 
GDP. These magnitudes are likely to be greater if these figures included inflows 
through informal remittance channels and the value of in-kind remittances.
Private remittances currently amount to 
eight percent of the country’s GDP. These 
magnitudes are likely to be greater if these 
figures included inflows through informal 
remittance channels and the value of in-
kind remittances.
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Figure 1: Private remittance receipts in sri Lanka (% gdP)
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the WDI database of the World Bank (http://databank.
worldbank.org/ddp/).
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the Sri Lankan current account,1 trade balance, 
and remittances as a share of the exports of goods and services from 1975 
onwards. As seen in Figure 2, Sri Lanka’s trade balance has been in persistent 
deficits, amounting to nearly 60 percent of exports in 2011. Excluding 1977, the 
current account deficits have also been perennial, and stood at approximately 
35 percent of exports in 2011. 
1 The part of the balance of payments recording a country’s exports and imports of goods, services, and transfer 
payments.
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Figure 2: Current account, trade Balance, and remittances (% exports) 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the WDI database of the World Bank.
The increase in private remittance inflows since the 1980s has meant that these 
inflows now account for a significant proportion of total export earnings, besides 
serving as a major source for financing Sri Lanka’s trade deficits. Remittance 
inflows have also significantly surpassed foreign financial inflows under foreign 
direct investment (FDI), official development assistance (ODA), and portfolio 
investment (Figure 3, p. 64).
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Figure 3: Foreign Financial inflows (Million Us dollars), 1991–2011
Source: WDI database of the World Bank.
soUrCes and Uses oF reMittanCes 
The large-scale migration flows of semi-skilled and unskilled labor to the Middle 
East since the late 1970s has resulted in this region becoming a major source of 
remittance flows to Sri Lanka since the 1980s. North America and Europe were 
the two other main sources of remittances in the 1980s and early 1990s due to 
the large-scale migration of asylum-seekers to these two regions. Records show 
that 20.5 percent and 19.5 percent of recorded remittance inflows to Sri Lanka 
came from North America in 1987 and 1990, respectively, while the European 
Union (EU) area accounted for 16.1 and 16.5 percent of remittance inflows in 
these two years (Arunatilake et al. 2010). 
While the share of recorded remittances from North America has subsequently 
declined, Europe has continued to remain a significant source of remittances, 
and is now the second major source after the Middle East. This shift towards 
Europe partly reflects the recent increase in migration flows by skilled Sri 
Lankan male workers to Europe due to visa for jobs programs in Europe that 
seek to address skilled labor shortages, and deliberate efforts by the Sri Lankan 
government to encourage skilled migration in areas such as health care (Aruna-
tilake et al. 2010). In 2011, 58.9 percent of Sri Lanka’s total recorded remittance 
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flows came from migrant workers in the Middle East, 17.2 percent from the EU 
region, and 3 percent from North America (Central Bank of Sri Lanka Annual 
Report 2011). 
As previously noted, at the macro level, remittances have been vital in enabling 
Sri Lanka to finance large trade deficits. At the micro level, given that war-torn 
areas in countries like Sri Lanka often lack well-developed political structures 
to channel sufficient investments, remittances provide a more reliable means 
relative to other forms of foreign financial flows to sustain and insure family 
members unable to migrate. By providing coping strategies for households 
affected and displaced by conflict, remittances can contribute to human secu-
rity. Diaspora-funded reconstruction programs may also have an advantage in 
identifying and addressing local needs compared to donors from other cultures 
since diaspora members are more familiar with the ground realities in their 
home country. Studies suggest that remittances from migrants have provided 
additional financial resources and opportunities to vulnerable sections and fami-
lies in both the Sinhalese and Tamil populations, who have been displaced and 
affected by the civil war; these groups have relied on remittances from migrant 
relatives for private consumption, rebuilding houses, restarting businesses, and 
also for migration (Van Hear 2003; Fagen and Bump 2006; and Orjuela 2008). For 
instance, remittances of one migrant from a Sri Lankan Tamil family displaced 
by the war partly funded the schooling and farming activities of other family 
members who could not migrate. In another Sri Lankan Muslim family that was 
displaced by an LTTE attack in 1990, the wife went to the Middle East to work 
as a housemaid. Her remittances helped the family to repay the loan taken to 
finance her departure, purchase some livestock, and also to invest in jewelry 
that could be sold in the future if the need for cash arose (Van Hear 2003). 
Further studies suggest that remittances have enabled some migrant-sending 
households to spend more on food, health, and education in addition to enabling 
them to receive a higher level of income from property, physical and financial 
assets, compared to non-migrant households (Arunatilake et al. 2010). However, 
these positive benefits of remittances appear to be very limited and uneven in 
their impact. Using data from the 2003-04 Consumer Finance Survey and the 
Central Bank, Arunatilake et al. (2010) show that only approximately 10 percent 
of households in Sri Lanka have been the recipients of remittances, with the 
distribution of these remittances being concentrated among the richer and urban 
households. 
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reMittanCe CHanneLs 
Sri Lanka has a fairly well-developed network of formal financial institutions to 
facilitate formal remittance flows. These include state and private commercial 
banks, the post office network, money transfer operators (MTOs), and microfi-
nance institutions. State commercial banks, such as the Bank of Ceylon (BOC) 
and People’s Bank (PB), dominate the formal remittance business due to their 
extensive reach, with the BOC having approximately 303 branches, and the 
PB 648 branches across the country (Arunatilake et al. 2010). Banks offer retail 
products such as bank drafts, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (SWIFT) telex service, exchange houses, checking accounts, 
insurance products and securities to migrants (Lasagabaster, Maimbo, and Hulu-
galle 2005; and Arunatilake et al. 2010). Rupee accounts and the non-resident 
foreign currency (NRFC) accounts are the two most popular foreign currency 
accounts with remitters, since banks do not charge a commission for these 
accounts, and these accounts are tax-free. Banks also offer online money transfer 
systems such as e-Exchange, People’s e-remittance, BOC e-cash, and Sampath 
e-remittance service (Arunatilake et al. 2010). 
Operating through banks, MTOs like Western Union and MoneyGram have also 
played an important role in providing formal remittance services. Western Union 
is the leading MTO, having approximately 3,000 agent locations in Sri Lanka. 
More recently, an agreement between Western Union and Sri Lanka Post has 
further expanded the reach of Western Union, with its MTO services being made 
available in approximately 640 post offices. Sri Lanka Post also provides formal 
remittance services, such as money orders, but postal networks have been found 
to be less efficient in delivery and more time-consuming compared to banks and 
MTOs (Lasagabaster, Maimbo, and Hulugalle 2005; and Arunatilake et al. 2010). 
This may gradually change with the recent agreement between Sri Lanka Post 
and Western Union.
Nevertheless, informal remittance networks, particularly the Hawala system 
(called Undiyal by Sri Lankan Tamils), have grown in significance, and have 
been used by poorer labor migrants and the Tamil diaspora, particularly those 
from the conflict-affected north and eastern regions of Sri Lanka. While Puri and 
Ritzema (1999) estimated informal remittances to Sri Lanka to be approximately 
13 percent of total remittances in the early 1980s, the World Bank (Lasagabaster, 
Maimbo, and Hulugalle 2005) estimated that these remittances were nearly 45 
percent of total remittances in the mid-1990s. In the mid-2000s, they are esti-
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mated to have accounted for nearly 50 percent of total remittances to Sri Lanka 
(Foundation for Development Cooperation 2007). The preference for informal 
over formal remittance channels by poorer migrants may be attributed to factors 
such as lower service fees, lack of bureaucratic procedures relative to banks 
that limit the affordability of formal services, absence of documentation require-
ments, lack of door-to-door services in formal remittance channels, and the 
limited availability of formal financial services in areas of conflict (Lasagabaster, 
Maimbo, and Hulugalle 2005; Foundation for Development Cooperation 2007). 
Since the 2002 ceasefire, informal money networks have assumed an additional 
role as agents for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction, by helping to channel 
remittances for rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in conflict-affected 
areas (Cheran and Aiken 2005). 
informal remittance Channels in sri Lanka
According to research conducted by Cheran and Aiken (2005), there are a total 
of 100–150 Undiyal (the popular informal remittance channel in Sri Lanka) 
outlets in Toronto. These outlets are run by local entrepreneurs with diverse 
activity profiles. The transactions are fairly simple, cheap, and fast. The sender 
gives the cash to the Undiyal agent, who then fills out a form (including details 
of the sender and receiver and amount in both Canadian dollars and Sri Lankan 
rupees). A transaction fee of five or ten dollars for amounts below and above 
$500, respectively, is charged, with a promise that the money will be delivered 
on the same day or next day. These agents have employees throughout the 
remote parts of the northeastern region, creating an effective delivery sys-
tem. These informal agents route remittances through Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Jakarta, and Bangkok as these markets are less regulated. The foreign exchange 
black market in Colombo is used to convert the money into Sri Lankan rupees. 
These agents seem to bypass the formal banking services of Sri Lanka largely 
because of the lack of Sri Lankan bank branches abroad and regulatory restric-
tions at home. Consequently, informal remittance systems such as this have 
greater geographic reach than formal systems.
Vidya Vermireddy, Department of Economics, Boston University
Reference: R. Cheran and S. Aiken (2005). The impact of international informal 
banking on Canada: A case study of Tamil transnational money transfer net-
works (undiyal), Canada/Sri Lanka. A Working Paper, Spring 2005.
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CHaLLenges and PoLiCy sUggestions
It is important to emphasize that remittances by refugee migrants serve more 
as a means of sustenance during and following a conflict than as a means for 
changing lives and local communities (Lindley 2008). As previously discussed, 
remittances contribute to human security by providing coping strategies for 
households affected and displaced by conflict. Additionally, diaspora initiatives 
may help post-conflict rebuilding and populations affected by the war by provid-
ing additional financial resources for investments in health and education at the 
local level. 
While remittances have indeed enabled some Sri Lankan families to cope with 
the effects of the war, challenges remain. The insecure situation in the conflict-
affected region of northeast Sri Lanka has meant that the major part of diaspora 
remittances has been used for private consumption and war relief, leaving 
limited resources for investments in long-term development projects and quality 
employment generation. Furthermore, as discussed previously, the distribution 
of remittances has been uneven with urban and richer households being the 
main recipients of remittances. Distribution has also been uneven across rural 
households in the areas affected by the conflict (Orjuela 2008). Thus, the eco-
nomic vulnerability of poor households with little or no access to remittances 
remains a major problem. Furthermore, the uneven distribution of remittances 
risks increasing and perpetuating income inequalities in Sri Lanka. 
The predominance of unskilled and female domestic labor migration to the 
Middle East and the prominence of the Middle East in contributing to remittance 
inflows suggest that Sri Lanka has become increasingly dependent on exporting 
unskilled labor. Even assuming that the demand for such labor will continue 
to grow in the future, and ensure that remittances grow sufficiently relative to 
external financing needs, such a development strategy side-steps the broader 
issue of developing and enhancing the skills of the Sri Lankan population, gen-
erating quality employment and improving the living standards of the general 
population. Additionally, given that the EU region is the second major source of 
remittances, and recent Sri Lankan labor migrants to Europe have been skilled 
workers, this dependence on remittances to meet external financing needs also 
creates a brain drain concern. 
Moreover, a major part of the remittances from the poorer labor and politi-
cal migrants is through informal channels. Post-9/11, the activities of informal 
money transfer systems have come under closer scrutiny by international regula-
Remittance Flows to Post-Conflict States: Perspectives on Human Security and Development     69
tory authorities, with some calls for the elimination of these channels. Since 
remittances are often the sole financial source that enables individuals affected 
by conflict to rebuild homes and meet their consumption requirements, there 
is a need for devising policies that would better regulate informal remittance 
channels, while taking into account people with genuine needs who use these 
systems. 
Thus, more policy efforts need to be directed towards the reconstruction and 
development of the conflict-affected areas through direct collaborations with the 
diaspora to channel remittances into local development activities, and through 
infrastructural and rural development programs that include the direct partici-
pation of people living in these areas. Education policies, vocational training 
programs, and public investment also need to be directed towards developing 
skills, well-paid jobs, infrastructural development, and towards diversifying and 
raising the competitiveness of merchandise exports, which would reduce the 
dependence on remittances and the exports of unskilled labor to meet external 
financing needs. 
Given that informal channels are often the only affordable means for refugee 
migrants to remit money, efforts need to be directed towards improving the 
transparency of these informal remittance channels, rather than abolishing 
them. One way of improving transparency could be to have rules requiring 
agents who transfer money through informal channels to be registered or 
licensed, and rules that require informal money transfer systems to maintain 
records and details of their customers and transactions. However, since ano-
nymity is one of the main appealing aspects of informal channels for poorer 
migrants, such policy efforts 
are likely to meet resistance. 
Addressing such resistance 
requires greater dialogue with 
leaders of diaspora commu-
nities in order to achieve a 
better understanding of the 
impacts of such policies and measures (Buencamino and Gorbunov 2002). Addi-
tionally, efforts should be directed towards more migrant-friendly policies and 
towards making the remittance systems in the formal banking channel more 
accessible to poor households (Cheran and Aiken 2005). 
Given that informal channels are often the 
only affordable means for refugee migrants 
to remit money, efforts need to be directed 
towards improving the transparency of 
these informal remittance channels, rather 
than abolishing them.
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4. the role of remittances in Post-Conflict 
reconstruction: the Case of Liberia
Chantel F. Pheiffer
The civil war in Liberia that officially ended in 2003 left the country devastated. 
The physical infrastructure, economic framework, and governance structures 
were barely existent. Not only was there hardly a foundation on which to rebuild 
the country, the majority of Liberians were either living abroad or living in pov-
erty. Hundreds of thousands of Liberians had left and/or fled the country while 
those who remained behind (and survived) had no jobs, no skills, no education, 
and no prospects. The vacuum of human capacity and threat to human security 
was enormous.
While Liberia transitioned out of war, the international community in this 
period became increasingly excited about the potential and actual role of remit-
tances for development in the global South. Research revealed the relatively 
large aggregate sums sent home on an annual basis and the World Bank began 
to investigate the role of these funds in supporting household consumption. 
Throughout the 2000s, professionals and academics have produced an impres-
sive array of studies on the interaction of migration, development, and remit-
tances. Despite this increased attention to the remittance-development nexus, 
however, scholarship of remittances in post-conflict states in particular has 
remained scarce. 
The challenge with post-conflict states is that untenable political situations and 
extreme capacity deficits limit severely the extent to which data can be collected 
and analyzed. Until relatively recently Liberia has been an example of a poten-
tially interesting but largely neglected case study in remittances. This began to 
change as peace settled in and stability began to coalesce in the latter part of the 
decade. In 2006 the Central Bank of Liberia started to publish remittance data in 
its annual reports, which revealed surprisingly large sums of repatriated income. 
The publication in 2009 of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) final 
report underwrote this finding and provided greater detail of the role which the 
diaspora—especially U.S. diaspora—and remittances played in Liberia’s post-
conflict reconstruction. 
What has made the Liberian case even more interesting is the fact that the World 
Bank in 2012 ranked Liberia the second highest remittance-recipient (as a per-
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cent of GDP) in the world. This not only indicates that remittances are important 
to Liberian households but also implies the essentiality of remittances to the 
slow-growing Liberian economy as a whole. After a brief introduction to the 
Liberian civil war, this section 
will begin to outline the size, 
channels, and importance 
of remittances to Liberia in 
an effort to contribute to the 
understanding of remittances 
to developing countries in 
general but also to post-con-
flict states in particular. 
tHe LiBerian CiviL war 1989–2003
In 1980, Master Sergeant Samuel Doe ended more than 100 years of Americo-
Liberian rule when he overthrew and killed incumbent president William Tolbert 
Jr. in a popular coup d’état. Despite initial promises for revolutionary inclusion 
of all ethnic groups, Doe’s military regime ruled with brutality, favoritism, and 
corruption for the next decade. The country’s economic condition declined sig-
nificantly under his military regime (see Figure 1). In 1989, the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL), made up of members from formerly persecuted ethnic 
groups who had fled, invaded Liberia from Côte d’Ivoire. Between 1989 and 
1993, civil war raged as other opposition groups sprang up to fight both the Doe 
government and each other for power.1 Although Doe was killed in 1990, fighting 
between factions continued until 1993 when a ceasefire and coalition govern-
ment was finally agreed upon. Elections were held in 1997 but peace remained 
fragile and intermittent fighting common. 
1 For a detailed account of the dimensions of the civil war see for example Tim Hetherington’s Long Story Bit by 
Bit: Liberia Retold (2009) and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s This Child Will Be Great: Memoir of a Remarkable Life by Africa’s 
First Woman President (2008).
What has made the Liberian case even more 
interesting is the fact that the World Bank 
in 2012 ranked Liberia the second high-
est remittance-recipient (as a percent of 
GDP) in the world. This not only indicates 
that remittances are important to Liberian 
households but also implies the essentiality 
of remittances to the slow-growing Liberian 
economy as a whole.
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Figure 1: Liberia Per Capita income 1960–2011 
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Full-scale war broke out again in 1999 as various old and new opposition 
groups—largely organized along ethnic lines—militarized against the newly 
elected government. In addition, President Charles Taylor felt compelled to 
retaliate against his West African neighbors who had funded several of these 
opposition groups. Liberia consequently was engaged in a multi-front war both 
internally and externally, further wreaking havoc on the country’s human, physi-
cal, and economic resources. In 2003, internal and international pressure for a 
ceasefire led to an agreement for mediated peace talks in Ghana. In August, the 
Accra Peace Agreement was signed and President Taylor resigned and fled the 
country. The National Transitional Government of Liberia took power until free 
elections were held in 2005. 
tHe diasPora
During the civil war as many as 780,000 Liberians2 left the country at various 
points so that by end of the war, nearly 30 percent of the total Liberian popula-
tion was living abroad. Six years after the war ended, 450,000 Liberians—12 per-
cent of the population—were still living as part of the diaspora (Grigorian et al. 
2008). Some sought refuge in neighboring African countries while others fled to 
destinations in Europe and the U.S. where they had relatives or friends already 
living. The “near diaspora” settled in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, 
2 UN projects estimated more than a million Liberians living in the diaspora by the time the civil war ended in 
2003.
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Senegal, and Guinea while those in the “far diaspora” concentrated in the UK, 
the U.S., Sweden, and the Netherlands (Lubkemann 2008). 
The number of Liberians who fled to neighboring countries was estimated at 
133,000 in Guinea, 72,000 in Côte d’Ivoire, 67,000 in Sierra Leone, and 43,000 
in Ghana (Refugees International 2005). The U.S. by far hosted—and continues to 
host—the largest Liberian diaspora outside of Africa. Estimates of the size of the 
diaspora in the U.S. vary; the 2000 U.S. Census measured the Liberian popula-
tion at 39,030 of which 60 percent entered the country between 1990 and 2000. 
Some have argued, however, that the Liberian population was significantly 
undercounted in the census in cities like Minnesota that house some of the larg-
est portions of the U.S. Liberian diaspora (Scott 2006). The U.S. officially resettled 
approximately 31,500 Liberians in the United States; the INS granted asylum to 
more than 6,600 between 1992 and 2007, and the Executive Office for Immigra-
tion Review granted asylum to 1,789 more between 1997 and 2007 (The Advo-
cates for Human Rights 2009).3 The official numbers do not consider Liberians 
who were undocumented or entered the U.S. unofficially. 
Liberians in the U.S. are primarily concentrated in Providence, RI; Minneapolis/
St. Paul, MN; Washington, DC/Baltimore; Philadelphia, PA; and Staten Island, 
NYC. Other major concentrations are known to exist in Worcester, MA; Atlanta, 
GA; New Jersey; Detroit, MI; Chicago, IL; Boston, MA; and Cleveland and Cincin-
nati, OH (Lubkemann 2008).
It is important to note that Liberia for many decades before the civil war had a 
diaspora community abroad. The early diaspora consisted mostly of students, 
diplomats, and businesspeople of the Americo-Liberian ethnic/social group who 
were relatively well off and constituted the upper echelons of the Liberian social 
and political classes. Many Liberians in particular pursued college degrees in 
the United States because of Liberia’s unique historic relationship with the U.S. 
The pre-war Liberian diaspora in the U.S.—and in Britain to a lesser extent—was 
much more homogenous than it would become during the war. The diaspora 
was also much smaller and the length of stay for those abroad tended to be 
much shorter as most Liberians returned home after completing their degrees or 
terms of service.
Liberian diaspora communities are organized along a variety of identities that 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive: political organizations, ethnic and tribal 
3 The 2011 American Community Survey (ACS) measured the Liberian population in the U.S. at 72,262, 58.4% of 
whom left after 2000.
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associations, women’s groups, alumni associations, social clubs, and also faith-
based groups. Although there is some evidence of tribal divisions within the 
diaspora, such cleavages are much less prominent among younger generations 
(The Advocates for Human Rights 2009).
evaLUating reMittanCe data avaiLaBiLity
As a result of the conflict and poor record keeping, remittance data for Liberia 
is largely nonexistent before 2006, and the data made available by the Central 
Bank of Liberia since then has not been wholly consistent with the numbers 
produced by other sources (see Tables 1–3, p. 76). A quick look at World Bank 
data4 reveals what can, at best, be described as erratic: deep troughs and steep 
spikes in remittance flows to Liberia despite what we know about the general 
stability of these funds (Ratha 2005; Grabel 2008; UNDP 2011). Like remittance 
data everywhere, the problem is one both of tracking and measurement.
An underdeveloped (and user-unfriendly) financial sector limits remittance trans-
mission through official channels, and a lack of capacity to measure remittances 
leads to data inconsistency. Such capacity problems tend to be particularly acute 
in post-conflict states like Liberia where mistrust and infrastructure inadequacies 
are widespread. Informal or in-kind transfers, by definition, are not accounted 
for in official estimates calculated from balance of payments residuals. Estimates 
of informal remittance flows to Sub-Saharan Africa generally are an additional 
45–65 percent of formal flows—a proportion significantly higher than in other 
regions (Freund and Spatafora 2005; Gupta et al. 2007). Given the nature of these 
flows, information about informal remittances to Liberia is not readily available. 
It is known, however, that Liberia has a vibrant informal economy. This suggests 
that a large portion of the population either does not have access to, or trust, 
conducting business or transactions in the formal sector.
Furthermore, up until the fifth edition of the International Monetary Fund’s Bal-
ance of Payments Manual, remittance-related items were defined “in ways that 
made identification and analysis of remittances difficult for some data users” 
(IMF 2009:1). The changes in IMF/World Bank methodology have been intended 
to be more inclusive and consistent. But these changes have also contributed 
confusion in measurement despite best efforts to standardize the practice. The 
4 The World Bank uses official country data produced by the Central Bank of Liberia, which makes the inconsis-
tencies between the two sources a bit of an enigma. Discrepancies may be a result of definitional differences of 
“workers’ remittances,” “personal transfers,” and what is counted as such.
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task of analyzing remittances is therefore a difficult and complicated one that is 
perhaps better understood as an art rather than a science.
table 1: Central Bank remittances Classified as workers or “Personal”  
remittances*
Year 2007** 2008** 2009 2010 2011 Nov. 
2012
Remittance Inflows 
(millions USD)
303.2 201.0 184.6 260.0 488.2 459.8
Remittance Outflows 
(millions USD)
139.5 156.0 134.7 234.4 231.2 344.3
Net Remittance Flows 
(millions USD)
163.7 45.6 49.9 25.7 256.9 115.5
Source: Central Bank of Liberia Annual Reports.
*Data identified by the CBL as workers or personal remittances (changed from “workers” in earlier 
reports to “personal” in later reports).
**Total net remittances reported by the CBL in 2007 and 2008 reports were 42.5 and 36.2 million, 
respectively, lining up more closely with World Bank data; this indicates that there may be some 
discrepancies in what is meant by “workers remittances” versus total remittances.
table 2: world Bank workers’ remittance receipts for Liberia
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*
Remittances 
(millions 
USD)
53.5 22.6 60.5 42.1 35.7 7.0 0.2 257.9 378
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
*Data from the November 2012 World Bank Migration and Development Brief.
table 3: United nations remittance Flows*
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Remittance** Inflows 
(millions USD)
79 62 58 25 27
Remittance Outflows 
(millions USD)
1 1
* World Bank staff calculations based on data from IMF Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 
2011 and data releases from central banks, national statistical agencies, and World Bank country 
desks.
**Remittances are defined as the sum of workers’ remittances, compensation of employees, and 
migrants’ transfers.
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reMittanCes to LiBeria
value of remittances
Despite uncertainties of measurement, it is apparent that remittances to  Liberia 
are significant and are becoming increasingly so. Even while various data 
sources disagree on exact values, a steep upward trend is evident. A November 
2012 report by the World Bank ranked Liberia the world’s second highest remit-
tance recipient (as a percent of GDP) based on 2011 data, beat out only by Tajiki-
stan. Remittances for 2012 were estimated to be $18 million higher than in 2011, 
amounting to a total of $378 million. Since GNI per capita in Liberia in 2011 
was a mere $330, it is obvious that remittances make up a significant portion of 
receiving households’ income, even if exact values are difficult to extrapolate.
Survey research and interviews further underscore this finding. The final 
report of Liberia’s TRC Diaspora Project suggests that as many as 72 percent of 
Liberians in the diaspora in the U.S. send money home in annual amounts of 
$3,800–$4,150 per remitting household. Stephen Lubkemann (2008) presents 
similar figures; his three-year 136 household survey shows that these households 
in aggregate sent between $312,891 and $368,261 to Liberia from 2002 to 2004. 
These same households sent an additional $175,315 to $279,275 to Liberians 
living in other West African countries in the same time period. Considering that, 
since Lubkemann’s publication, the size of the diaspora in the U.S. has grown 
to 72,262 and the diaspora as a whole has a relatively high level of education 
(predicating high levels of income), the increase in remittances is not surprising. 
oFFiCiaL reMittanCe FLow CHanneLs 
Liberia has three major money transfer operators (MTOs)—Western Union, 
 MoneyGram and Ria—that provide a combination of cash-to-cash and online ser-
vices. In 2009 commercial banks serving as agents for Western Union and Mon-
eyGram accounted for 99 percent of total inward remittances while the private 
money-remittance firms5 accounted for only one percent (CBL Annual Report 
2009). The cost of sending remittances from the U.S. to Liberia is remarkably 
low in comparison to money-transfer costs in most of Sub-Saharan Africa (Send 
Money Africa 2013). The average cost of sending $200 from the United States to 
5 The Central Bank identified People Enterprises Incorporated and I.B. Xpress Incorporated as the two major 
private remittance firms.
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Liberia is 5.05 percent,6 while it costs only 3.227 percent to send $5008 (Remit-
tance Prices Worldwide). An important component of the relatively low cost of 
money transfer between the U.S. and Liberia is that Liberia has an effectively 
dollarized economy. Because remittance-receivers can use U.S. dollars in Liberia, 
any exchange rate or conversion fees essentially are eliminated. 
Since 2011, Liberia has actively encouraged greater competition in the MTO 
sector to facilitate greater access and lower costs. A Central Bank directive 
prohibited exclusive arrangements in money transfer services between licensed 
financial institutions and MTOs. In the case of violation, financial institutions 
are liable for L$100,000.00 ($1,350 current USD)9 for each day of violation “and/
or other supervisory sanctions as may be deemed appropriate by the CBL” (CBL 
Directive 2011). In July 2012, First International Bank in Liberia became the first 
financial institution to comply with the CBL directive and offer both MoneyGram 
and Western Union services (Williams 2012).
The cost of sending remittances to Liberia cannot, as in some other cases, be 
employed as a primary explanation for high remittance traffic in the informal 
sector. Although the cost of remittance transfers from non-U.S. countries is likely 
to be higher, a great proportion of remittances are sent from the United States. 
The lack of availability of commercial bank branches and MTO services espe-
cially in rural areas (discussed below) is a more likely explanation. A second 
determining factor is also mistrust of the country’s capacity to responsibly 
handle its citizens’ money. Although remittance costs should be monitored and 
competition encouraged, Liberia’s particular situation indicates that factors other 
than costs are more determinant.
tHe inForMaL eConoMy
Liberia’s financial system is not very deep or very integrated. The war left the 
banks and financial sector undercapitalized and saddled with huge non-perform-
ing assets. During the conflict banks that were still operational were forced to 
commit significant resources to having cash-on-hand because escalating conflict 
could cause large and sudden runs on banks. Banks became reluctant to extend 
6 The cost ranges from a low 2.5 percent charge by Ria for cash-to-cash transfers to a high of 7.5 percent for 
online services by Western Union.
7 The cost ranges from a 1.6 percent charge to send cash-to-cash by Ria to 8.4 percent for online services via 
Western Union.
8 Data collected is for the third quarter of 2012.
9 Liberia’s 2011 PPP conversion factor (GDP) to market exchange rate ratio was 0.6.
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credit because of the need to be liquid and to hedge against increased default 
risk. Furthermore, banks needed to have more hard currency in reserve as the 
economy inadvertently had become dollarized. Banks largely became reliant 
on non-funded income, especially from remittance fees charged by Western 
Union and MoneyGram for revenue. An estimated 80 percent of bank revenues 
from 2002 to 2007 came from non-funded income (International Bank (Liberia) 
 Limited 2007).
Bank branches in Liberia number 78 in total and the vast majority of these are 
located in Montserrado County—the most populous and smallest of the 15 coun-
ties. Montserrado is home to approximately one-third of the population with a 
density of more than 1,500 people per square mile. In comparison, the average 
population density for the rest of Liberia is 93 people per square mile, ranging 
from 22 people in Gbarpolu County to 198 in Margibi County (Liberia Census 
2008). Montserrado County is served by 46 bank branches while the other 32 
bank branches are scattered across the rest of Liberia (Table 4).
table 4: expansion in Bank Branches 2010 to 2012
County 2010 2012
Montserrado 46 46
Margibi 9 9
Grand Cape Mount 1 1
Grand Bassa 3 5
Sinoe 0 1
Maryland 4 4
Bong 2 2
Nimba 6 7
Lofa 2 2
Grand Gedeh 1 1
Total 74 78
Source: Liberian Central Bank 2012 Newsletter and 2012 Central Bank Annual Report.
A 2011 survey on the growth of grassroots businesses in Liberia revealed that 
a strikingly low three percent of loans taken for starting grassroots businesses 
came from banks, while 34 percent borrowed from family or friends. Thirty-five 
percent borrowed from the UN or an NGO and another 17 percent borrowed 
from “Susu” clubs.10 Only one percent borrowed from government-sponsored 
10 A form of rotating savings and credit association.
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micro-credit programs from 2004 to 2008 (Tarway-Twalla 2011). Although these 
grassroots businesses are by definition small and informal, a de facto disadvan-
tage for access to credit, their dependence on informal borrowing reveals the 
vibrancy of the informal economy. This trend is amplified in rural areas with lim-
ited access to banks or bank branches (Tarway-Twalla and Geegbae 2012). The 
ILO estimates that 60 percent of those working in the non-agricultural sector in 
2011 were employed informally11 and 49.5 percent of non-agricultural employ-
ees were employed in the informal sector (ILO 2011).12
The point is that although informal remittances are difficult to quantify, the 
existence of a vibrant informal economy indicates that much of the transaction 
that occurs in Liberia does not happen through formal channels. The depth of 
the informal economy is a function of prices in the formal sector, but also of 
access to formal services as well as the perception of credibility and reliability. 
Thus, despite low costs of remittance transfer (at least from the U.S.), activ-
ity in the informal sector remains high and significant sums are still sent and 
received informally.
tHe roLe oF reMittanCes in Post-ConFLiCt reConstrUCtion
The lack of jobs and social services has limited sources of income for many 
 Liberians. With very high unemployment, many work informally or in the 
informal economy (see discussion next page) but limited labor and wage protec-
tions mean very low and inconsistent income (ILO 2011). Remittances tend to be 
relatively reliable and even counter-cyclical, implying that for the unemployed 
(80+ percent of the Liberian population by some estimates), remittances are a 
primary source of household income. The emphasis in remittance research has 
been on strategies to leverage remittances for development rather than “merely” 
for consumption. Yet, consumption support has been an essential function of 
remittances in Liberia and in Liberian refugee camps in West Africa (Lubkemann 
2008). The TRC report indicates that individuals remitting money home often 
support as many as 10–20 people each even though only 11 percent of respon-
dents in a 2011 survey acknowledged receiving remittances (Vinck et al. 2011).13 
11 Informal employment refers to those jobs that generally lack basic social or legal protections or employment 
benefits and may be found in the formal sector, informal sector, or households.
12 The informal sector consists of unregistered and/or small unincorporated private enterprises engaged in the 
production of goods or services for sale or barter.
13 Underreporting by remittance recipients is not uncommon for fear of taxation or the withholding of govern-
ment or other aid, welfare, and support (see, for example, Grigorian et al. 2008).
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Liberians living in Ghanaian refugee camps reported using remittances not only 
for consumption or in emergency situations but also to start up, and invest in, 
small businesses within the refugee camps too. Liberian refugees’ demand for 
remittance services in the camps was so great that Western Union established 
offices in Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire specifically for the transfer of remittances 
from the United States to Liberian refugees (Crisp 2003). 
Furthermore, donations channeled through NGOs, political organizations, 
ethnic/tribal organizations, women’s groups, alumni associations, social clubs, 
remittance transfers in sierra Leone: the Predominance of informal  
Channels
According to the United Nations Development Program, formal money transfer 
operators such as MoneyGram and Western Union account only for a small 
share of the remittance transfers into Sierra Leone. A small proportion of 
remittances also are transferred by mobile phone credits. But the bulk of 
remittance flows enters the economy through unofficial remittance agents 
operating in partnerships with small business owners and merchants in the 
local communities. 
The discrepancy between remittance figures reported by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank and the remittance estimates reported 
by other entities such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
and the government of Sierra Leone highlights the extensive role of informal 
networks in remittance transfers. The high cost of transfers for use of formal 
remittance channels is one factor that hinders their use. The World Bank 
reports that the average cost of sending money to Africa in 2012 was 11.89 
percent, three percent higher than the global average cost for the same period. 
Additionally, the most expensive 10 corridors were all intra-African corridors. 
Commercial bank transfers accounted for the most expensive means for remit-
tance transfers.
In 2009, one company began offering mobile money transfers in Sierra 
Leone. The company operates across all mobile networks and aims to drive 
economic empowerment throughout the country by “banking the unbanked” 
and bringing more convenience to the banked population and businesses. 
The penetration rate of cellular mobile phones has seen a continuous rise 
since 2008—from 18 percent to 36 percent in 2011 (The World Bank 2013). It 
remains to be seen if the mobile remittances sector can provide significant 
competition to the informal transfer networks that currently handle a large 
part of the country’s remittance flows.
Mohamed Elghitany, Department of Economics, Boston University
Reference: http://tinyurl.com/SMA-WB-Report2013
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and faith-based groups have supported home village projects within Liberia. 
Funds have been used to rebuild clinics and health centers, schools and bridges, 
and to provide support to rural farmers (Antwi-Boateng 2012; The Advocates for 
Human Rights 2009). Members of the diaspora, primarily through the Liberian 
Professionals Network, have also encouraged the Liberian government to assist 
in the establishment of a Diaspora Investment Fund. Such a fund would use 
remittances directly for investment in small and medium enterprises in Liberia 
(LPN 2010). Although the government has been slow to provide a comprehensive 
response, the organization continues to advocate avenues to provide greater and 
more effective investment  opportunities. 
tHe roLe oF tHe diasPora in Post-ConFLiCt reConstrUCtion
The diaspora’s influence has shifted from “hard” power during the war to “soft” 
power during reconstruction. The diaspora has redirected its engagement with 
Liberia from active (especially financial) support to wielding political and finan-
cial influence through organization and campaigning (Antwi-Boateng 2012). 
Political engagement 
The August 2003 Peace Agreement established the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission of Liberia (TRC) and was enacted into law in 2005. An early initia-
tive of the TRC was to engage the diaspora—particularly the U.S. diaspora—in 
its work, which it did through partnership with The Advocates for Human 
Rights.14 The diaspora was able to partake in the hearings and statement-giving 
that produced the final findings of the TRC report. The rationale for including 
the diaspora in the TRC process in part was a result of the diaspora’s economic 
influence, which made it also politically powerful. The Sirleaf government fur-
thermore recognized early on the potential for harnessing diaspora resources in 
peace-building and reconstruction and therefore sought its participation (Young 
and Park 2009). Political organization took other forms too. Diaspora members 
campaigned actively for various candidates during the election and the Union 
of Liberian Associations in the Americas hosted meetings to discuss institutional 
development and governance in Liberia both before and after the election.
14 The organization was known at the time as Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights.
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knowledge remittance
The Liberian diaspora in the U.S. is highly educated. Of the 53,251 Liberians 
over the age of 25 counted in the 2011 U.S. ACS survey, 25.7 percent held a high 
school diploma and 36.4 percent had some college or an associate’s degree. 
Another 17.8 percent held a bachelor’s degree, while 8.1 percent had attained 
a graduate or professional degree. The median household income for Liberians 
surveyed was $41,340.15 A well-educated diaspora for Liberia implies relatively 
high remittances because of higher income. High levels of education also rep-
resent an important source of knowledge that could be used from afar or lured 
back to Liberia to fill in capacity deficits.  
As a part of Liberia’s Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), the Liberian government 
has begun to encourage knowledge and skill remittance to Liberia. It established 
the Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) and Senior 
Executive Service (SES) programs with the intention of drawing back the edu-
cated and skilled members of the diaspora. Because only 14.4 percent of public 
sector employees hold graduate degrees, “the focus is to recruit doctors, engi-
neers, scientists, economists, environmentalists, business executives and other 
highly skilled professionals” (Grigorian et al. 2008).
It is important to note, however, that initiatives to use the resources of the 
diaspora are not apolitical: “Capacity builders are not merely imparting knowl-
edge, but intervening politically” (Hughes 2011: 1499).16 When locals have to 
compete (or feel like they do) with diaspora returnees for government jobs and 
economic opportunities, the result can be a kind of cold war (Antwi-Boateng 
2012). Liberians who stayed behind may feel as though they are more deserv-
ing of these opportunities because they lived through the war and consequently 
suffered proportionately more. This reaction may be an unintended and perhaps 
unavoidable sentiment in the current context. But, programs like TOKTEN and 
SES must be implemented thoughtfully not to exacerbate resentment and cause 
legitimacy problems, especially for those expatriates destined for government 
positions. 
15 Median household income for Liberians is lower than the national average but is still significantly above the 
poverty line in the U.S.
16 For a critical analysis of diaspora expatriate programs see Caroline Hughes’ “The politics of knowledge: ethnic-
ity, capacity and return in post conflict reconstruction policy,” Review of International Studies, October 2011.
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social remittance
Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011) identify four types of social remittance: norms, 
practices, identities, and social capital. They make the case that in addition to 
economic outcomes, diaspora engagement affects ideas and behaviors in home 
countries too. Social remittances can be imparted individually or collectively 
(through organizations) and affect health outcomes, education outcomes, politi-
cal views, etc. The provision of social remittance is just as valuable as monetary 
remittances in post-conflict states; needs extend far beyond the monetary in 
instances where there has been total institutional collapse.
In Liberia, social remittances are evident in a variety of forms. Members of the 
diaspora have, for example, participated in persuasion/dialogue through conflict 
mediation, counseling of child soldiers, and the encouragement of productive, 
non-violent political dissent. Other avenues have included public diplomacy, 
civic engagement, development assistance and support for job creation pro-
grams (Antwi-Boateng 2012). Members of the diaspora also continue to provide 
know-how about starting and operating businesses to those pursuing formal or 
informal small enterprises (The Advocates for Human Rights 2009). Although 
social remittances are not distinctly separate from knowledge remittance, social 
remittances represent a wider array of social goods transmitted from the dias-
pora to the home country.
ConCLUsions and next stePs
Liberia’s economic situation is improving, but capacity building will take time, 
and getting back to pre-civil war levels of income will only happen slowly. 
Remittances have been an important source of income to many Liberian house-
holds in Liberia, other West African countries, and refugee camps both during 
the war and in its aftermath. Beyond individual consumption, the diaspora has 
also been brainstorming ways in which to leverage funds for greater and larger-
scale business and infrastructure investment. The diaspora’s political engage-
ment and social remittances also have played an important part and cannot 
be excluded from the remittance story. After all, remittances are not possible 
without a diaspora.
More can be done to use the great capacity stored in remittances and the dias-
pora for reconstruction of Liberia. The government has made welcome steps to 
encourage remittances through increased MTO competition and through the cre-
ation of programs such as TOKTEN and SES. Including the diaspora in the TRC 
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process furthermore was a pioneering move from which other countries engaged 
in TRC processes can learn much. However, important limitations still exist. 
Even greater benefits for development and reconstruction could be achieved by: 
1. extending remittance services to reach more people in more remote 
 locations
Promoting remittances to allow more households greater access to these funds 
is an important development imperative, especially while alternative sources 
of income remain limited. Attention must be paid in particular to reaching rural 
areas where bank branches are less accessible. Providing greater access and/or 
using microfinance networks to provide money sending-receiving services could 
lower (travel) costs and disseminate the benefits of remittances more widely. 
Using microfinance networks and mobile technology may be a way in which 
the rural poor could benefit from money-sending services in ways they cur-
rently cannot. 
2. allowing dual citizenship for Liberians living in the diaspora
A significant hindrance to longer-term investment in Liberia for many in the 
diaspora is the fact that they are not able to hold dual citizenship. The Liberian 
government would be much better served by revising this policy and to allow 
this transnational community to maintain ties equally to both home and host 
country. The Liberian diaspora is a transnational population in the truest sense; 
its members are likely 
to invest more time and 
resources in Liberia if 
they were able to move 
freely between the two 
places.
3. exploring ways to leverage remittances to finance investment through 
diaspora bonds and securitization of remittance flows
The African Development Bank (AfDB) has made the case that diaspora bonds 
“have a rich history of bailing out countries in times of crisis” and that securitiza-
tion “will help countries in Africa access international capital markets, reduce 
convertibility risk, and obtain investment-grade ratings” (Shimeles 2010). Many 
African countries face institutional constraints to exploring these financing 
options, but AfDB and the World Bank have suggested solutions to these limita-
Remittances for post-conflict states like 
Liberia are an invaluable source of income. 
But, it is important that remittances not 
become a substitute for structural develop-
ment. 
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tions (Ratha et al. 2008). Given Liberia’s weak financial markets and infrastruc-
ture deficiencies, finding new sources of financing development is imperative. 
Remittances for post-conflict states like Liberia are an invaluable source of 
income. But, it is important that remittances not become a substitute for 
structural development. Being first (or second in Liberia’s case) in remittances 
is not, in itself, a laudable achievement. There are downsides to remittance-
dependence, too. Small, closed economies with large inflows of remittances and 
little absorptive capacity may experience exchange rate appreciation, inflation, 
and an erosion of external competitiveness. Although their benefits certainly 
outweigh their costs in Liberia, remittance flows may furthermore create disin-
centives for the government to provide jobs and other economic opportunities 
(Grabel 2008). Remittances can—and do—support reconstruction in war-torn 
countries like Liberia but remittances cannot sustainably be a replacement for 
government reform, investment, and reconstruction. 
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Section III: Diaspora Networks and 
Co-Development
5. Mobile remittances: a novel tool for 
Post-Conflict development?
Daivi Rodima-Taylor
The use of novel information and communication technologies (ICT) has become 
increasingly widespread in remittance transfers in many developing countries. 
That applies particularly to diversifying mobile service platforms. It has been 
estimated that developing countries account for approximately two-thirds of 
the world’s mobile subscriptions (OECD 2009, 14). In Sub-Saharan Africa where 
there are some of the lowest levels of infrastructure investments in the world, 
the use of mobile telephones is rapidly expanding—there are 10 times as many 
mobile phones as land-lines and 60 percent of the population has mobile cover-
age (Aker and Mbiti 2010, 207). Mobile phones are increasingly evolving from 
“simple communication tools” to complex “service delivery platforms” (208) that 
enable marginalized populations access to diverse mobile money services and 
development projects (m-money and m-development). Used increasingly for 
financial transfers, mobile phones enable “affordable financial services for the 
first time to many people with 
extremely limited means, while 
offering them greater security 
and efficiency than traditional 
alternatives” (OECD 2009: 19). 
Mobile telecommunications contribute to better access to information, improved 
connectivity within social networks, and enhanced security. They have facili-
tated vast reduction in communication costs and that has improved market 
efficiency and enhanced economic production in many developing areas (Jensen 
2007; Aker 2010). 
MoBiLe reMittanCes, deveLoPMent, and Post-ConFLiCt 
CoMMUnities
Mobile technology has the potential to reshape social and economic relations 
in local communities, creating novel networks and enabling new modes of 
money and information transfer that is important both for governance as well as 
economic development initiatives. Mobile-based applications are widely used in 
Mobile telecommunications contribute 
to better access to information, improved 
connectivity within social networks, and 
enhanced security.
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public governance in many places in Africa (e-governance), allowing people bet-
ter access to information and decision-making, particularly at local and munici-
pal levels. ICT-based applications are used widely for diverse services such as 
processing business applications; customs clearance; citizen and electoral regis-
tration; tax, financial, land and human resource management (Waema and Adera 
2011). While amplifying social interactions and frequently enabling better state-
society integration, the use of mobile technology for local governance can also 
create alternative and informal structures outside formal governance (Graesholm 
2012). Mobile technologies are also significant in facilitating alternative economic 
institutions. According to Molony (2009), informal entrepreneurs and market 
traders in Tanzania rely almost exclusively on mobile phones for maintaining 
their networks and expanding customer base. Mobile applications can be crucial 
for building trust and relations of production in the local informal economy, 
creating novel types of social capital that are more impersonal and maintained 
through information and communication technologies—“socio-technical capital” 
(Molony 2009). Mobile technologies have potential to create new relationships 
in the local communities, and re-ordering social and economic hierarchies in 
society (De Bruijn, Nyamnjoh, and Brinkman 2009, 21).
Mobile phone-based financial applications are particularly important in post-
conflict contexts that are frequently characterized by a systemic breakdown 
of telecommunication, transport, and market infrastructures. Communication 
among the people of a nation is of crucial importance for sustainable peace-
building and post-conflict rehabilitation, and modern information and commu-
nication technologies can serve as tools of national reconciliation and develop-
ment (Best 2010). In many post-conflict communities, mobile phones are the 
only means of communication and security. In post-conflict Liberia with devas-
tated fixed-line telecommunications infrastructure, a vibrant mobile phone sec-
tor with several competitive operators emerged, enabling increased productivity 
and more efficient business strategies among local farmers and entrepreneurs 
(Best 2010). A similar situation was observed with mobile telecommunication 
services among micro-entrepreneurs in post-conflict Rwanda (Donner 2004). And 
in Somalia, satellite communications (VSAT) infrastructure emerged and oper-
ated in a largely self-regulated fashion in local war-torn communities, providing 
productive and innovative business opportunities for local entrepreneurs (Feld-
man 2007). There, remittances sent through informal transfer systems such as 
hawala provided a particularly strong incentive for the development of a strong 
telecommunications infrastructure (see also “’Informal’ Remittance Systems and 
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Post-Conflict Development,” this volume). Mobile financial platforms are often 
essential for post-conflict communities as they enable the continuation of local 
livelihoods amidst the breakdown of formal financial institutions and physi-
cal infrastructure (including roads, markets, and fixed-line telecommunication 
networks). 
issUes oF regULation and integration oF MoBiLe reMittanCe 
systeMs 
Several recent studies on mobile remittances have suggested that m-banking 
can effectively contribute to the financial inclusion of the poor and marginal. 
M-banking provides convenient and secure financial services to those previously 
unbanked (Sultana 2009, 4), accommodating the requirements of a cash-based 
economy and irregular income flows (Alampay 2010, 78). Branchless banking is 
less expensive as it is based on existing infrastructure and equipment, includ-
ing agent shops and mobile phones (Alampay 2010; McKay and Pickens 2010). 
Mobile remittances can contribute to development by reducing direct remittance 
costs, increasing the geographical spread of distribution points, increasing the 
percentage of remittances flowing through formal channels, and contributing 
to a broader inclusivity of poor populations to financial services (Porter 2009). 
Remittances could potentially be effective drivers for m-money usage as they 
have a well-defined and steady customer base and are relatively stable as com-
pared to other forms of investment (Alampay 2010).
M-money allows a mobile phone subscriber to deposit value on their mobile 
account and send it to another individual (Alampay 2010: 77). Current m-money 
services include transferring money between individuals domestically and 
internationally, bill payments, repayments of loans of various microfinance and 
credit arrangements, etc. The actors involved in m-banking can be diverse—
some m-money applications are offered by banking institutions, some by tele-
communication providers, and in many cases, there are partnerships between 
banks and mobile communication companies (Aker and Mbiti 2010; Porteus 
2006). The two main models of mobile banking involve the “bank-based model” 
where every customer has a direct contractual relationship with a licensed and 
supervised financial institution through a retail agent; and the “nonbank-based 
model” where customer transfers or exchanges cash at a retail agent in return 
for an electronic record of value (Sultana 2009). The development of mobile 
money transfer systems therefore faces a fundamental challenge of facilitating a 
coherent policy and regulatory environment needed for a successful use of the 
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applications. That applies particularly to the convergence of communication and 
financial services that often involve separate regulatory authorities (OECD 2009). 
Some recent studies indicate a comparatively greater success of nonbank-based 
models of mobile money applications. These include the initiatives of M-PESA 
in Kenya as well as G-Cash in the Philippines. M-PESA (m-money in Kiswahili) 
started as a service for the receipt and payment of microfinance loans through 
the Safaricom mobile network and since 2007 has successfully developed other 
functions like remittance transfers, micro-insurance, school fees and bill pay-
ment (Mas and Morawczynki 2009; Sultana 2009). It allows cheap and rapid 
money transfers across Kenya, and the accounts can also be used for storing 
money. It has been estimated that more than 80 percent of those with mobile 
phones in Kenya use mobile money, and that annual mobile money transfer in 
Kenya reaches 10 billion USD (Fengler 2012). M-PESA is viewed as a payment 
service provider rather than a formal bank by the regulating authorities and 
the Central Bank of Kenya, and the service of payment transfer is listed in the 
telecommunication services license agreement. It therefore falls legally under 
telecommunication service. However, the primary regulator of mobile opera-
tors’ m-banking services is the banking regulator. Money collected by agents is 
deposited in a trust account in one of the leading commercial banks in Kenya, 
providing legal protection to the beneficiaries. It cannot be used for lending or 
investment by the mobile operator. Concerns over money laundering and cus-
tomer privacy have been further mitigated by regular monitoring by the Central 
Bank of Kenya and the Communication Commission of Kenya. M-PESA services 
are often credited for improving the circulation of money in Kenya as well as 
enhancing the transparency of money transfer operations. They have provided 
unique opportunities for integrating different forms of financial inclusion, includ-
ing microfinance, savings, and remittance transfer services. 
The G-Cash initiative in the Philippines is another success story of a nonbank-
led branchless banking scheme. It was introduced in 2008 by Globe Telecom 
and functions as an electronic money transfer facility. It allows person-to-person 
transfers, purchase of goods from merchants, and bill payments (Alampay 2010; 
Porter 2009; Sultana 2009). The G-Cash initiative similarly owes its success partly 
to an enabling legislative framework and efficient safeguards. The General Bank-
ing Law of 2000 allowed the recognition of microfinance as a legitimate bank-
ing activity, and the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 helps regulate electronic 
transactions and provides necessary safeguards.
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One of the main challenges for mobile remittance systems is finding the balance 
between regulatory and policy measures that are aimed at protecting consumers 
against fraud, and the potentially constraining effects of certain anti-money-
laundering/combating-financial-terrorism [AML/CFT] regulations on mobile 
money transactions, account opening requirements, and the authority of the 
agents involved in money transfers (Sultana 2009; Alampay 2010). Challenges 
also lie in creating enabling institutional and legislative environments for mobile 
remittances, including necessary regulatory reforms involving the telecommu-
nications and banking sector, and related institutional partnerships. In order 
to improve cross-border and institutional interoperability and better integrate 
remittance transfers with other financial services, attention must focus on 
enabling mobile money ecosystems. Such ecosystems would benefit from collab-
oration among multiple stakeholders such as banks, telecommunications opera-
tors, microfinance institutions, non-governmental and government institutions 
(Jenkins 2008; Omwansa 2009). Successful mobile money ecosystems enable the 
creation and replication of frameworks for larger regional mobile transactions 
and possibly regional e-currency, facilitating easy online payments across vast 
geographical areas (Jenkins 2008; Omwansa 2009). Developing expansive eco-
systems for m-transfers can be seen as the next frontier for advancing innovative 
remittance services that may particularly benefit post-conflict areas.
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6. transnational remittances and development in 
Post-Conflict societies: the Case of el salvador
Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda
In analyzing remittances in post-conflict societies, one must begin with the 
conflicts themselves. How did the conflicts originate, including the associated 
migration and remittance flows? What were the roles of the migrant sending 
and receiving countries in the conflicts and in the post-conflict remittance and 
development dynamics? In the case of El Salvador’s civil war in the 1980s, the 
subsequent mass migrations to the U.S. and the rise of major remittance flows 
in the last 30 years exemplify the importance of this transnational process over 
time; that process continues to shape the future of remittance sending and 
receiving communities long after the armed conflict has ended. 
This transnational analysis also holds critical lessons for perhaps the most 
important global challenge and opportunity in the 21st century: peacefully and 
successfully managing integration and development between rich and poor 
countries. The massive inequalities that will need to be overcome, both within 
and across countries, create a world ripe for conflict. Associated with these 
inequalities, the largest mass migrations in human history will occur in the next 
few decades, both rural-to-urban as well as international migrations, generat-
ing billions in remittances, most of it currently in cash without the advantage 
of financial intermediations via savings and investment for development. While 
trade and investment reform 
have been extensively pur-
sued as the orthodox policies 
of choice in pre- and post-con-
flict environments, the next 
few decades will see the rising 
importance of migration and 
remittance policy reform. 
This reform movement will 
be much more significant in 
determining the quality of human development and sustainable livelihoods in 
both sending and receiving countries, empowered by links to the world’s vast 
diaspora communities (Hinojosa-Ojeda et al. 2013).
In the case of El Salvador’s civil war in the 
1980s, the subsequent mass migrations to 
the U.S. and the rise of major remittance 
flows in the last 30 years exemplify the im-
portance of this transnational process over 
time; that process continues to shape the 
future of remittance sending and receiving 
communities long after the armed conflict 
has ended.
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transnationaL Post-ConFLiCt soCieties: eL saLvador and 
tHe U.s.
The case of El Salvador and the U.S. highlights the fact that migration and 
remittances have taken on an increasingly influential role and have become 
more dominant forms of North-South integration, which in turn have activated a 
series of transnational dynamics that affect the potential for human development 
in both sending and receiving countries (Hinojosa-Ojeda et al. 2001; Andrade-
Eekhoff and Silva-Avalos 2003). In the U.S., the 2012 Presidential election is 
just one example of the growing importance of Latino diasporas, which are 
 contributing—much like the Irish and Italian diasporas did in prior centuries—
to the changing nature and direction of U.S. politics at home and abroad (Pew 
2012a, 2012b).1 In post-conflict El Salvador, migration and remittances have 
transformed the Salvadoran economy from one dominated by agricultural 
exports, primarily coffee, to an economy where remittances have replaced both 
traditional and non-traditional exports (see Figure 1). At the same time, high 
levels of consumption (financed by remittances) and other U.S. influences have 
increasingly characterized Salvadoran society and culture over the last decades. 
Figure 1: Coffee exports, U.s. aid and remittances for el salvador as a 
 Percentage of gdP, 1960–2010
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Source: Author’s calculations.
1 Such influence from migrant groups within the host society can be a perceived threat within the “migration-
security nexus” as well as to existing political, economic, social, and cultural norms (Lindley and Vollmer, 2009).
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The Salvadoran Diaspora is very significant as a cautionary by-product of one of 
the major U.S. wars of the late 20th century. This U.S. intervention was a catalyst 
for a surging Salvadoran population within the U.S., which now accounts for the 
second largest foreign-born Latino population. Characterized by strong concen-
trations in strategic cities such as the metropolitan regions of Los Angeles, Wash-
ington, D.C., New York, and Houston, Salvadorans represent the fastest growing 
Latino ethnic group in the U.S. (Terrazas 2010). Whereas the current population 
of El Salvador is just over 6.2 million, it is estimated that between 1.8 million to 
2.6 million Salvadorans live in the U.S.2 Furthermore, the Salvadorans living in 
the U.S. produce about three times the GDP of El Salvador (Table 1). These highly 
skewed economic realities mean that the largest source of income, savings, 
investments and financial services potential exist in the context of the Diaspora 
and not within El Salvador’s national borders. Meanwhile, Salvadoran economic 
contributions to the U.S. are also substantial, exceeding many U.S. cities and 
some states by comparison. It is important to understand that the situation of 
Salvadorans living in the U.S. is highly unequal and varies depending on the 
income levels of the communities where they are concentrated. Strong migration 
corridors exist between localities in El Salvador and the U.S., which greatly influ-
ence the poverty and human development opportunities for migrants and their 
families in both the U.S. and El Salvador. 
table 1: Population/gdP Comparison: el salvador, salvadorans Living in the 
U.s., and the United states
Population GDP per Capita GDP
El Salvador 6,227,491 $3,703 $23,062,800,000
Salvadorans 
in the U.S.
1,827,000 $41,542.46 $75,898,076,956
United States 311,591,917 $48,111.97 $14,991,300,000,000
Sources: U.S. Census Bureau; 
CIA World Fact Book
World Bank GDPPC World Bank Gross 
Domestic Product
tHe ConFLiCt, its origins, and Post-ConFLiCt PoLiCies
The civil war in El Salvador that lasted from 1979 to 1992 is estimated to be 
responsible for the deaths of more than 75,000 people. During the Reagan 
Presidency, a very significant part of late Cold War American foreign policy was 
committed to supporting the right-wing Salvadoran government forces fight 
against the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). In fact, U.S. 
2 The U.S. Census Bureau reports 1,827,000 Salvadorans living in the U.S.; in contrast the Salvadoran Ministry of 
Foreign Relations reports a much larger number of 2.6 million Salvadorans who live in the U.S.
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military and economic aid accounted for an average of 13.5 percent of Salva-
doran GDP during the years of the war, and at the time represented the largest 
U.S. aid commitment ever in Latin America (USAID 2013; Seelke 2012). These 
conflicts, the U.S. involvement, and the resulting migration to the U.S. did not 
simply appear from one moment to the next (Commission for the Study of Inter-
national Migration 1990). Instead, the conflict and resulting migration have roots 
in 19th century class and global relations that were characterized by longstand-
ing inequalities, injustices, and the important role of the U.S. as well as social 
forces operating within Central America, legacies of which persisted and became 
more acute throughout the 20th century.3 
Prior to the outbreak of the war, migration from El Salvador to the U.S. was 
miniscule with the exception of an elite population that would travel to the U.S. 
(Escobar 2010). However, from 
the time of the war until now, 
approximately one-fourth to 
one-third of the population is 
estimated to have emigrated, 
primarily to the U.S. This 
migration to the U.S. began as largely political and refugee in nature; it continues 
today, but now is primarily socio-economically motivated. The first major waves 
of migration occurred in large part as refugee populations arriving to the Wash-
ington, D.C. and Los Angeles metropolitan areas (Hamilton and Chinchilla 2001; 
Molina 2008). In these urban areas, many of the refugees’ receiving communities 
were set up with the support of U.S. -based solidarity and religious networks. At 
the same time, these solidarity and religious networks were heavily involved in 
trying to stop the war and move it towards a negotiated resolution. In El Salva-
dor, this position was shared by the guerillas during most of the conflict, and this 
outcome was eventually reached in 1992. 
The Peace Treaty negotiated between the governing party, the Republican 
Nationalist Alliance (ARENA) and the FMLN guerrilla movement in 1992 
attempted to create the context for a development agenda going forward (Boyce 
1996). However, the dramatic drop in U.S. aid, combined with the damage of 
the war upon the society and economy, made it very difficult to build upon the 
development framework laid out in the Peace Accords (Lopez 2003). In the post-
conflict environment, U.S. bilateral aid plummeted from more than $500 million 
3 For 19th century El Salvador and Central America see: Lindo-Fuentes 1991; Browning 1971. For 20th century 
globalization, economic and social changes see: Reynolds 1988; Robinson 2003; Coatsworth 1994; Goodwin 2001.
The experience of El Salvador teaches us a 
great deal about 21st century development 
policy challenges both in a post-conflict 
society as well as in transnational economies 
in general. 
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annually during the 1990s to less than $30 million per year in 2011 and 2012 
(USAID 2013; Seelke 2012). Fortunately, the huge and unanticipated boom in 
remittances has helped the Salvadoran economy and society to largely survive, 
albeit through an unsustainable mechanism. Remittance flows have grown to 
unprecedented and dominant proportions; in 2010, these flows represented 
nearly 15 percent of national GDP, more than six times foreign direct investment 
(FDI), and more than 12 times all foreign aid combined.4 
The experience of El Salvador teaches us a great deal about 21st century devel-
opment policy challenges both in a post-conflict society as well as in transna-
tional economies in general. Since the civil war, El Salvador came to be seen as 
a “Star Reformer,” but interestingly, not a “Star Performer” (Hausmann et al. 2005; 
Summers 2003). No country in the Western Hemisphere or anywhere around the 
world had so closely followed the prescriptions of think tanks associated with 
the University of Chicago and the “Washington Consensus” (Seelke 2012; Madrid 
2009). Following the war, El Salvador became a prime test case of the Washing-
ton Consensus and indeed El Salvador not only carried out structural adjustment 
policies, implemented free trade agreements, and fiscal reforms, it even adopted 
the U.S. dollar in 2001 (Edwards 2008; Edwards and Magendzo 2003; Towers and 
Borzutzky 2004; Segovia 2002). Yet despite its “Star Reformer” status, El Salvador 
has actually continued to be a “Poor Performer” (Edwards 2003; Acevedo 2003). It 
continues to experience significantly low rates of growth and increasing depen-
dence on remittances as the primary mechanism for growth, with very perverse 
effects nationally and internationally. 
tHe resULting HUMan deveLoPMent Crisis aCross Borders:  
a viCioUs CyCLe
In 2005, the UNDP El Salvador Human Development Report (HDR) focused on 
migration for the first time as a critical component of understanding human 
development challenges; this approach was echoed in 2009 in the World HDR 
(Programa de las Naciones Unidas 2005; UNDP 2009). Our research at the Uni-
4 In 2010, El Salvador’s GDP was $23,062,800,000, according to World Bank database, and remittances were 
estimated by the Central Bank of El Salvador (BCR) to be $3,430,900,000, representing nearly 15% of GDP. The 
same year the World Bank estimated foreign aid to El Salvador to be $283,450,000, or less than 1/12 of remit-
tances. 
In 2004, the UNDP El Salvador using data from BCR estimated that remittances equaled 655% of FDI, and this 
trend has generally maintained itself in recent years (Programa de las Naciones Unidas 2005). There has, however, 
been growing cooperation and development investment from the South in recent years, particularly from Brazil 
(Xalma 2012). Venezuela has also initiated large-scale investments through a series of Alba companies in the areas 
of petroleum distribution and other energy sectors, as well as basic food production and supply chains. The UCLA 
NAID Center intends to evaluate the impact of the socio-productive investments made in El Salvador by Alba. 
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versity of California, Los Angeles North American Integration and Development 
Center (UCLA NAID) has identified “vicious cycles” across migration corridors 
between the U.S. and El Salvador, which influence the opportunities available 
for human development in these places. The present vicious cycle is character-
ized by undocumented migration, lack of rights, financial exclusion, distorted 
cash-based economies, and external dependence, contributing to increasing 
inequality within the migrant sending and receiving areas (see Figure 2). The 
combination of the UNDP and NAID Center research has opened the door for 
increasing transnational research and policy discourses that are taking shape 
today to address how the process of migration and remittances affects human 
development across borders (UNDP El Salvador 2014). One of these initiatives 
includes the NAID Center searchable, online GIS tool for tracking village-by-vil-
lage, zip code-by-zip code migration corridors between the U.S. and El Salvador 
(GIS database). Using this tool, we’ve identified very dense micro-corridors of 
migration linking very particular micro-geographies across borders. We are 
also using these approaches to track the ways in which inequalities in access 
to human development opportunities in El Salvador are linked to inequality 
of human development capabilities in the U.S. Our initial findings reveal deep 
interdependencies between village economies in El Salvador with key zip codes 
in the U.S.5 
5 For example, 60% of the people from the town of Ahuachapán live in northern Boston zip codes, and the remit-
tances that these migrants send back amount to roughly the equivalent of 40% of local GDP, providing a strong 
(if artificial subsidy to local economic activity). Remittances in receiving households, however, can represent up to 
90% of income, making them extremely vulnerable to dynamics in the U.S. To more fully measure and understand 
how strong these dynamics are we will still need to conduct extensive surveying of binational households with 
detailed budget and expenditure portfolios of how the transnational families live in both the U.S. and El Salvador.
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Figure 2: transnational vicious Cycle between el salvador and the 
 United states
Source: Hinojosa-Ojeda and Takash 2011.
ConseqUenCes oF tHe “viCioUs CyCLe”
These intense interdependent relationships strongly influence price mechanisms 
in remittance receiving communities in El Salvador, increasing land and health 
care prices, for example, as well as putting strain on educational systems, youth 
aspirations, and productivity. These phenomena are not limited to El Salvador; 
in the south of Mexico similar dynamics can be observed, with similar effects 
upon local economic, social, and cultural factors (Hinojosa-Ojeda 2003). In El 
Salvador, these factors have depressed local production and rural activity with 
serious implications for future economic growth, food security, and poverty 
(Paige 1998). This trend seems counterintuitive in an extremely bio-diverse and 
historically very productive country (conditions that have long made it one of 
the most densely populated in Latin America). In the present socio-economic 
context, high land values and opportunity costs make it impractical for people 
to produce and earn a living (Damon 2010; Acevedo, Barry, and Rosa 1995; 
McReynolds 1998). This has had an overall negative effect upon human security 
as demonstrated by high dependency upon food imports and vulnerability to 
international price shocks, which contribute to food insecurity amongst the 
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poorest sectors and create large trade deficits. El Salvador’s overall low produc-
tivity and economic growth during the last several decades has resulted in strong 
out-migration pressures (Acevedo, Barry, and Rosa 1995).
The remittance boom that is currently sustaining the Salvadoran economy, soci-
ety, and culture of consumption is expected to decline in part as a consequence 
of changing demographics, an experience that is similar to other countries 
that have experienced large out-migration and today have relatively very little 
emigration (southern Europe, for example).6 As has already been observed in 
Mexico, migration rates are slowing (Cornelius et al. 2009). Furthermore, the 
issue of declining and rapidly aging populations raises a number of very serious 
problems for the future of remittance-dependent countries like El Salvador, 
including future potential productivity and the sustainability of social security 
programs. By examining these longer-term dynamics and what they mean for El 
Salvador, the message is clear that there is a very short period of time within the 
next couple of decades where human development and economic growth can 
benefit from present remittance flows.
To take advantage of the post-conflict opportunities presented by migration and 
remittances, the remittance process must necessarily be reformed beginning 
immediately. Whereas the present situation is supporting levels of consump-
tion and income growth in certain parts of the country, it is unsustainable over 
the medium to long term. For example, households receiving remittances 
appear to be doing extremely well compared to households that are not receiv-
ing remittances. This comparison also identifies a growing trend in inequality 
between remittance receiving and non-remittance receiving households, both 
in terms of income as well as access to basic services (Kandel and Cuellar 2012). 
However, when remittances are removed, the households become even poorer 
relative to non-remittance receiving households, not only in terms of assets 
but also in terms of sustainability over time (Programa de las Naciones Unidas 
2005). Expanding these realities into projections of what would happen to local 
economies without present remittance flows or to the country as a whole both in 
macroeconomic terms as well as in terms of development options reveals a very 
grim outlook for the future of El Salvador. 
6 Greece, for instance, was the number one migrant exporting country around 1970, even more so than Spain, 
Italy, and Ireland, and over recent decades this fell to near zero net emigration and essentially zero in remittance 
flows just before the current Euro crisis. In fact, the migration and remittance decline were actually contributing 
parts of the present economic problems in Greece and Ireland, which are now shifting back to out-migration and 
renewed remittance flows since the crisis (Sirkeci, Cohen, and Ratha 2012).
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The transnational vicious cycle not only has serious implications for El Salva-
dor; it has implications that are important for U.S. policymakers to understand 
as well, as the Salvadoran population and other migrant populations represent 
the largest growing component of the economic “base of the pyramid” in the 
U.S., particularly in terms of lack of access to financial services and prospects 
for economic and income growth. These dynamics are in large part transmitted 
by a broken U.S. immigration system where the majority of migration occurs 
as undocumented. Despite the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) obtainable by 
Salvadorans in the U.S., most migrants still arrive in the U.S. undocumented or 
become undocumented at some point (Miyares et al. 2003). This translates into 
decreased earning potential (undocumented immigrants typically earn 15–20 
percent less compared to their legal immigrant counterparts) and unequal access 
to immigrant and labor rights (Takash and Hinojosa-Ojeda n.d.; Hinojosa-Ojeda 
2010, 2012; Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002). Over the last 20 years, the U.S. 
Federal Reserve of Atlanta has documented the depressing of immigrant wages, 
owing in large part to a broken immigration system, which then ironically 
increases the demand for im/migrant labor and distorts the industries that are 
growing increasingly more dependent upon im/migrant labor (Brown, Hotchkiss, 
and Quispe-Agnoli 2008). At the same time, undocumented im/migrant families 
are largely unbanked with limited access to capital and financial services, and 
as a result, these lower income groups pay far higher fees for basic financial ser-
vices, like check cashing and sending remittances home in comparison to natu-
ralized citizens or documented immigrants (Hinojosa-Ojeda n.d.). This creates a 
situation where the costs associated with being poor and excluded are extremely 
high and are positively correlated as poverty and exclusion rise.
iMMigration reForM and internationaL deveLoPMent
Changes in U.S. immigration policy could be an extremely important lever for 
post-post-conflict development in El Salvador. The current “enforcement-only” 
approach to immigration has not only proven ineffective at curbing undocu-
mented immigration but has carried extremely high costs in terms of U.S. tax-
payer spending, human life, and security (Hinojosa-Ojeda 2013).7 The militariza-
tion of the border and the high costs associated with border crossing have forced 
migrants to rely on professional human smugglers and human traffickers, a 
business that has become increasingly lucrative, attracting more highly orga-
nized transnational organizations, often linked to other cross-border illicit activi-
7 Despite significant increases in border protection and enforcement, 92–98% of potential undocumented 
migrants keep trying to cross the border until they are successful (Cornelius et al. 2008).
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ties (Cornelius 2006). The routes of undocumented migration have also become 
increasingly dangerous, as they have been pushed away from traditional urban 
corridors into inhospitable desert terrains. Once in the U.S., undocumented 
immigrants continue to be subject to abuses in their workplaces, communities, 
and even in their homes, as the threat of deportation or loss of economic secu-
rity for themselves and their families keeps many from exercising rights and/or 
denouncing abuses (Kossoudji and Cobb-Clark 2002; Takash and Hinojosa-Ojeda 
forthcoming; Mazzucato and Schans 2011; Menjivar 2006). This situation has 
created a human rights crisis and is disconcerting, as such national policies that 
put migrants at risk of death, violence, and other abuses challenge the gains 
in human security and development made in the post-conflict era. In response 
to this, the governments of El Salvador and throughout Central America and 
Mexico, as well as international, regional, and U.S.-based migrant and human 
rights organizations, have endeavored to document and protect against abuses 
along the migration trajectory. 
While the debate over immigration reform in the U.S. demonstrates recognition 
of the need to change the present cycle of immigration, both from a human as 
well as an economic perspective, NAID Center and other research indicates that 
legalization of the approximately 11 million undocumented immigrants and 
their full incorporation into the economic mainstream would generate dramatic 
positive effects for the U.S. economy. This NAID Center computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) modeling reveals that the U.S. economy would benefit through 
comprehensive immigration reform by approximately $1.5 trillion over the next 
10 years, while in comparison a mass deportation would result in a $2.6 trillion 
decline to the U.S. economy over the same period (Hinojosa-Ojeda 2012, 2010). 
The positive impact of comprehensive immigration reform in the U.S. would 
exceed even traditional economic development agendas like trade and invest-
ment liberalization; however, these additional benefits would go disproportion-
ately to the U.S. rather than to the migrant-sending countries.
Using the same CGE models for the sending countries, however, reveals that the 
consequent impact of immigration reform in the U.S. would not be as positive 
for El Salvador, Mexico, or other migration and remittance-dependent countries. 
The post-1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) experience showed 
that as wages rose, the demand for immigration decreased, reducing these 
countries’ ability to export excess labor. This resulted in downward pressure 
upon local wages as an increasing share of working age individuals vied for 
limited economic opportunities in their communities of origin. The impact upon 
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remittance flows is mixed, as initially remittances rise with im/migrant incomes, 
but later these flows decline within the context of a changing and lower demand 
structure for immigrants. To mitigate the negative effects of U.S. immigration 
reform for the migrant-sending regions, it is critical to reform the process of 
remittances at the same time (Hinojosa-Ojeda et al. 2013). Our financial models 
suggest that financial intermediation (for example, financial products and ser-
vices) of remittances would exert greater impacts across borders than immigra-
tion reform alone, and far more than trade and investment liberalization policies 
(Hinojosa-Ojeda 2012, 2010).
To begin systematically reversing the vicious cycle that currently exists as well as 
ameliorate the negative impacts that may result from changes in U.S. immigra-
tion policies, it is critical that immigration and remittance policies be viewed, 
analyzed, and implemented together with international development policies 
in the migrant-sending regions. This has not been the typical approach of the 
U.S., where instead domestic issues (like immigration, which has clear implica-
tions across borders) and development policy have remained largely indepen-
dent of one another in their design and analysis. Policymakers have chosen to 
avoid the complexities of addressing the issues of integration, instead favoring 
approaches that are limited at best, and which often do not confront the root 
causes of the issues that they aim to address. In El Salvador, these limited policy 
approaches continue to ignore the deep relationships and interdependencies 
that existed between El Salvador and the U.S. prior to the war, and which have 
only increased in intensity as a result of U.S. involvement in the conflict, regional 
political and economic policies, and immigration and remittances beginning 
during the war and continuing to the present day. 
The recent decade of development policy between El Salvador and the U.S. 
consists of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Compacts, which are 
poverty reduction initiatives, and more recently, the Partnership for Growth 
(PFG), an Obama Administration initiative to promote economic growth in 
partner countries. El Salvador is one of the four countries picked for the PFG, 
along with Ghana, Tanzania, and the Philippines, and the same growth diag-
nostic methodology created by Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (HRV) has been 
applied across all four contexts to measure barriers to economic growth (Haus-
mann, Rodrik, and Velasco 2005). However, except for the Philippines, none of 
the countries chosen present such an intense transnational relationship with the 
U.S. as El Salvador does. In fact, one of the most striking problems with both the 
MCC and PFG is that they ignore the most characteristic elements of the relation-
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ship between the U.S. and El Salvador: migration and remittances (Seelke 2012). 
Despite the dominant role that migration and remittances have played in con-
tributing to sustaining growth and improving the human development options 
in both countries, the policy prescriptions proposed by the MCC and PFG to 
promote economic growth and reduce poverty do not systematically address 
the elements of the current transnational vicious cycle, nor do they refer to any 
of the potential opportunities that migration, remittances, or other phenomena 
(such as technology) present for achieving development goals. 
In response to the shortcomings of the PFG, the NAID Center initiated the cre-
ation of an alternative database capable of measuring and making more visible 
the influence of transnational dynamics upon the growth challenges faced in El 
Salvador as well as in Salvadoran migrant communities in the U.S. The objective 
is to contribute to the debate and to the design of other sets of policy prescrip-
tions in both the U.S. and El Salvador, including but not limited to rational immi-
gration reform and related development policies. This database and the process 
of transnational data collection and analysis methodologies aim to serve as 
complements to the PFG’s economic analysis. By offering insight into the human 
development challenges and opportunities for acting across borders, the NAID 
Center hopes to contribute to the creation of more informed and coordinated 
policies that address the root causes of the vicious cycle and capitalize upon the 
opportunities for arriving at a virtuous cycle (UNDP El Salvador 2014).
a Longer-terM aPProaCH to transForMing tHe viCioUs CyCLe
opportunities for transnational remittances and development
At the UCLA NAID Center, we are using a longer-term approach to diagnose the 
nature of these problems, come up with real solutions, implement these solu-
tions, and then test the implementation. To achieve this requires a wide range of 
mechanisms to help understand and diagnose the complex roots of the prob-
lem. For example, how do we diagnose the problem of why remittances remain 
primarily in a cash environment and generate a vicious rather than a virtuous 
cycle? Is it a problem of banks, regulations, or the inability of the MFIs and credit 
unions to break into this cycle? We’ve been analyzing the various components 
across the migration and remittance flows to determine the type of technol-
ogy, regulatory, and/or marketing interventions that would be needed to correct 
this problem. We’ve also gone further in asking and analyzing what would be 
required to create a transnational ecosystem that could potentially give access 
to financial services in the North and the South. Such an ecosystem would allow 
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individuals, communities, and families to make choices and ensure that finan-
cial intermediation contributes to reversing the “Dutch Disease” vicious cycle, 
while creating a dynamic whereby remittances are moved out of a cash environ-
ment into a banking environment that has the ability to leverage financial flows 
and services for savings, investments, and productive activities (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3: transnational virtuous Cycle between el salvador and the 
 United states
Source: Hinojosa-Ojeda and Takash 2011.
In exploring why financial exclusion persists and why the banking, mobile, 
and/or payments industries do not fix the problem themselves, we found that for 
these industries to move their business models from a financially exclusive focus 
on the top of the economic pyramid would be an extremely costly and labor 
intensive investment not easily remunerated. While they may be interested in 
the money to be earned in the bottom of the pyramid (BOP), they would rather 
someone else do the legwork to make this happen. Because of industry inertia, 
we had to develop of series of mobile and processing technologies and link them 
together, in order to provide banks the ability to offer their services to previously 
unbanked customers. 
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We also learned that to achieve the mission of transnational financial inclusion, 
it was critical to transform and integrate the financial processors segment of the 
global electronics payments industry. To do this, we had to design and imple-
ment a disruptive technological business plan intervention to “capture the com-
manding heights of the payments industry” and to create the “medicine” for the 
disease of financial exclusion, before we could test the impact of the medicine 
in randomized testing (Banerjee and Duflo 2011). Then we had to come up with 
rational cost structures that made it affordable and attractive for immigrants in 
the U.S. as well as for their unbanked family members in the country of origin. 
In this way, we were able to show that you can achieve cost reduction, increase 
acquisition of new customers, and get the technology into people’s hands.8 
Using teCHnoLogy For FinanCiaL eMPowerMent: 
key to tHe virtUoUs CyCLe
El Salvador has more than a 110 percent rate of mobile penetration and nearly 
universal coverage throughout the country. At the same time, in the highly 
concentrated U.S. urban migrant communities almost everyone has a personal 
mobile phone and lives within coverage. Despite this widespread access to 
technology, 86 percent of the population in El Salvador does not have a bank 
account; and in Los Angeles, for example, studies have found that between 
34 and 59 percent of immigrants do not have bank accounts (Demirguc-Kunt 
and Klapper 2012; Khashadourian and Tom 2007). Widespread access to mobile 
technology, combined with the advances in mobile banking technology over 
recent years, thus present a significant opportunity for providing all cell phone 
users with a virtual bank account. This opportunity led years ago to the creation 
of technology companies that could take advantage of the huge boom in mobile 
technology and translate research recommendations into concrete actions for 
financial empowerment and development from the BOP. 
In this way, technology has enabled linking the transnational BOP using virtual 
accounts linked to prepaid debit and mobile technology in the U.S. to similar 
accounts in Mexico and El Salvador that are attached to savings in local finan-
cial institutions. Using this mechanism, im/migrants and their counterparts in 
the country of origin can access much lower cost remittances as well as a wide 
range of financial services. The critical issue then becomes how to make sure the 
savings generated flows into productive investments in the im/migrant-sending 
8 We were able to reduce international transfer costs by 75% compared to Western Union (Hinojosa-Ojeda, 
2008).
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areas. This issue can potentially be addressed through the creation of finan-
cial instruments like “Diaspora Development Savings Bonds” for El Salvador, 
Mexico, and other migration and remittance-dependent countries, where this 
savings instrument would be made available to U.S. migrants or others as a safe 
way to save a part of their remittances or income at a fixed term and interest rate 
(Ketkar and Ratha 2010). This type of savings bond could be issued by local MFIs 
in migrant-sending communities and be backed by development institutions like 
USAID-DCA, the World Bank, and others, as well as by private investors; such 
bonds could be used to create risk pools that can reduce the cost of lending and 
generate a focus on productive activities in im/migrant-sending areas. Through 
the savings generated and financial partnerships, the MFIs are incentivized to 
support local development investments, generating both regional development 
and macro-economic impacts. 
In cities such as Oakland, Richmond, and Los Angeles, California a local-local 
transnational approach is employed in which technology is being adopted for 
creating mobile-linked city ID debit cards, or resident IDs regardless of immi-
gration status. These city ID debit cards will then be linked to municipalities 
in El Salvador that are also issuing and adopting municipal debit cards linked 
to mobile banking technology (Artz 2013; Saillant 2012). Providing this choice 
has had dramatic effects in the interest of people to adopt these mobile/debit 
mechanisms. Other research has independently predicted the same results, 
where if you provide immigrants with the ability to send a remittance to a sav-
ings account then the amount sent goes up; and more importantly, if you present 
people with a mechanism whereby they can send money and control access to 
that account from the U.S., the amount sent goes up even further (Ashraf et al. 
2011). It has been demonstrated that technology and business solutions can be 
invented to get remittance flows into a local development banking system. Adop-
tion of this platform in U.S. cities and home villages is currently being measured 
to see what types of impacts this intervention will have on local production and 
incomes as well as on financial inclusion and access to credit in im/migrant- 
sending regions.
Once this technology is widely available, it can be used for a varied range of 
applications beyond remittances and savings; it can become the conduit for 
anyone to access a wide range of financial services, such as micro-insurance, 
microcredit, and micro-payments, for example. In fact, the Salvadoran Social 
Security Institute (ISSS) is working with the NAID Center to enable the small 
scale purchase of health insurance by migrants for their family members in 
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El Salvador. While many 
countries and companies 
have tried to implement 
such a product, the major 
problem has been how to 
make these products easily 
available using a financial 
transfer mechanism that 
is readily accessible and 
that has reduced transaction costs. The transnational mobile and debit linked 
electronic payments platform that is central to our intervention allows for this to 
finally happen. 
The Salvadoran government is also pursuing another application of this tech-
nology through the potential implementation of the mobile debit electronic 
payments platform for distributing subsidy payments.9 El Salvador like most 
developing countries around the world subsidizes many things, and one of the 
most expensive is liquid gas for cooking. Currently, the government is subsidiz-
ing the market price of all liquid propane gas purchases at a cost of hundreds of 
millions of dollars, which the IMF has said is fiscally unsustainable. Using mobile 
banking technology, the government can give a “subsidy account” to every single 
household in the country. This will significantly reduce logistical expenses for 
the government and the subsidy recipients, and it will localize the use of the sub-
sidy, as the funds on the “subsidy account” can only be used to buy gas at stores 
affiliated as gas distributors. At the same time, the government will contribute 
to increasing the electronic payments capacity of El Salvador by eight times by 
adding nearly 40,000 gas distributors to the existing network of 5,000 stores 
with a Point of Sale (POS), and by turning cell phones into electronic points of 
payment. The projected impact is a reduction of the fiscal deficit of the country 
by 20 percent by conducting just this one subsidy on the platform. For individual 
households, there is also significant value added; by using the same debit card 
mobile platform, these households will also be able to receive and send low-cost 
remittances, and in the future access a range of microfinance services that may 
contribute to further reducing household vulnerabilities. 
9 This is a trend that is gaining ground around the world to transform government subsidies and other forms of 
cash transfers into tools for promoting savings, in addition to resolving problems of focalizing the use of subsidies 
(Zimmerman, Ravi, and Tosh 2012; Jackelen and Zimmerman 2011).
In post-conflict environments, especially 
where the North and South are increas-
ingly linked through migration and remit-
tances, the mobilization of just a fraction of 
the $400 billion in global remittance flows 
towards development goals offers serious 
potential for creating major development 
impacts across borders. 
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This is a breakthrough moment: after decades of work, finally mobile internet 
technology has reached a critical point that has made this transnational coordi-
nated intervention possible. There are now significant opportunities for its scal-
ability in multiple countries around the world and to ensure its financial viability 
both for the technology providing company (since it must generate a rate of 
return) and more importantly for the governments that are provided access to 
this technology at no cost. And all the while this is being achieved through the 
ability to provide financial services at lower costs, but in such a way that makes 
this infrastructure easily available via cell phones and thus capable of reaching 
massive scale. 
a virtUoUs CyCLe Moving Forward: reCognizing a new era in 
HUMan deveLoPMent oPPortUnities
In post-conflict environments, especially where the North and South are increas-
ingly linked through migration and remittances, the mobilization of just a frac-
tion of the $400 billion in global remittance flows towards development goals 
offers serious potential for creating major development impacts across borders. 
This is particularly true in the case of El Salvador, where getting 10 percent of 
remittance flows into saving instruments and leveraging investable funds with 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) in the migrant-sending areas is a goal that is 
realistic and achievable thanks to the opportunities made possible by technol-
ogy; achieving this goal would have a much more significant impact than current 
U.S.-El Salvador development cooperation initiatives.10 
In the post-post-conflict context, this case serves as an example of how new 
government-diaspora cooperation has the potential to emerge from conflicts. 
In El Salvador, the construction of a viable financial and technological future 
has the potential to leverage the migration and remittance dynamic that was 
the result of significant conflict and suffering; ironically, the same dynamic can 
now contribute to transforming the vicious cycle of exclusion and inequality into 
a virtuous cycle of inclusion and development with great benefits for both the 
sending and receiving countries. In doing this, it will be especially important to 
study and identify opportunities for post-post-conflict transnational coordinated 
development policies, particularly in light of the increasing influence of the Sal-
vadoran Diaspora in El Salvador and the growing role of Latinos in the U.S., and 
Salvadorans as a significant part of this population.
10 Such investable funds would represent five times more per year than what the Millennium Challenge Corpora-
tion and Partnership for Growth are planning to provide over five years.
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7. remittances and Community resilience 
to Conflict and environmental Hazards in 
northwestern Pakistan
Giovanna Gioli, Talimand Khan, and Jürgen Scheffran
Migration and reMittanCes in Pakistan
Pakistan has the world’s seventh largest diaspora and ranked seventh for remit-
tances inflow in 2012 (World Bank 2012) after India, China, Philippines, Mexico, 
Nigeria, and Egypt. Economic projections suggest that the annual inflow of 
remittances could exceed US$ 13 billion by the end of Fiscal Year 2012 (State 
Bank of Pakistan 2012), featuring a ten-fold increase since 2001 (Amjad et al. 
2012). According to the estimates of the Bureau of Emigration, about four mil-
lion Pakistani migrant workers live in different countries around the globe (2.5 
percent of the total population). Out of this diaspora, about half of labor migrants 
work in the six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)1 (Government 
of Pakistan 2013), primarily in Saudi Arabia and in the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE). Sources of labor migration are distributed unevenly across the country: 
since the first oil crises in 1971, rural regions of low agricultural productivity, 
such as the rain-fed areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), are the main suppliers of 
unskilled and semi-skilled migrant workers to the Gulf (Addleton 1984; Gazdar 
2003; Nichols 2008). 
KP is the area most dependent on foreign remittances within the country: foreign 
remittances account for 9.4 percent of the average monthly household income, 
compared to 5.1 percent for Punjab, 1.5 percent for Baluchistan, and 0.7 percent 
for Sindh (World Bank 2011). KP is also the biggest recipient of remittances from 
abroad as well as from within the country among all the four provinces of Paki-
stan, with nearly 31 percent of all households receiving remittances in 2007–08. 
The proportion of remittance-receiving households was even higher (36 percent) 
for the rural sector of the province (Khan and Khalid 2011).
Migration is not a recent trend in KP. The people of this region have always been 
extremely mobile. In pre-partition time, there was common migration to major 
cities in India (e.g., to Ahmedabad), seeking employment as watchmen, farmers, 
workers in dockyards and on ships (Nichols 2008). To a lesser extent, migrants 
from that location also acted as traders and moneylenders. Yet, it is only since 
1 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.
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the 1970s that migration to the Gulf has become one of the most widespread 
livelihood strategies in the area, cushioning against economic shocks that result 
from the uncertain and risk-prone agro-pastoral economy. KP is still one of the 
most food-insecure provinces, featuring 26 percent of the food-insecure districts 
of the country—second only to Baluchistan (28 percent) (WFP 2004). Recur-
rent famines were common until a few decades ago, especially in the months 
between Kharib and Rabi (April–May) when food stocks were depleted and it 
was still too early to harvest. 
Migration to the Gulf is a steady and growing phenomenon that has significantly 
improved the food security and overall living standards of migrant-sending 
households in KP. Migration is deeply embedded in the socioeconomic struc-
tures of the local communities and also plays a role in social hierarchy, bringing 
heightened status to migrant-sending households. Fathers migrate and sons 
follow suit after reaching adulthood. The suffering and the sacrifices of migration 
to the Gulf are vividly portrayed in rich Pakhtun oral heritage, conveyed through 
music and poetry. 
This section explores the role of remittances among the communities of the Swat 
and Lower Dir districts of KP. The goals here include: 
•  Building knowledge about the use of remittances by local communities to 
cope with situations of conflict and deal with the aftermath of environmental 
hazards;
•  Collecting information on the impact of remittances on community resilience 
to conflict and climate change;
•  Linking migration and development in the framework of post-conflict and post-
disaster relief and reconstruction. 
MetHodoLogy
The present study is based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
research carried out in October 2012 in conflict-affected villages with high 
numbers of households involved in labor migration out of the native district, to 
locations both within and outside the country. The Union Councils were identi-
fied through consultative meetings with local NGOs and civil society representa-
tives who had knowledge and experience in the area. We purposely sampled 
only remittance-receiving households as they were the only households relevant 
to this research. For that reason, we did not aim for a balanced representation of 
geographical units.
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For quantitative data collection, a structured questionnaire was administered to 
602 households in four Union Councils (UC), two in each selected district (Swat 
and Lower Dir). The sample was stratified by gender to give representation to 
women (out of 602 households structured questionnaires, male and female rep-
resentation is 69 and 31 percent, respectively). In addition, we also conducted 
two Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), one in each district, with male migrants 
from the community.
reMittanCe Case stUdy: tHe swat and Lower dir distriCts oF 
kHyBer PakHtUnkHwa
Swat and Lower Dir districts feature some of the highest numbers of workers reg-
istered for overseas employment in 2012 (17,995 and 19,196, respectively—GoP 
2013). Both districts are situated in the Hindu-Kush mountain range and face 
heavy environmental pressures, including the adverse impacts of the climate 
change. Weather conditions are harsh, with extensive snowfall in winter and 
drought in summer. Excessive precipitation causes damage to the traditional 
mud-built kacha houses, and also causes landslides (Steimann 2005; Siegmann 
2010). The misuse of natural resources that has intensified since the merging of 
the Swat princely state with Pakistan in the 1970s has led to significant defor-
estation (Khan 2007). These climate-induced risks are further aggravated by 
neglected road infrastructure in the area. The flood of 2010 that killed more than 
2,000 people, washed away thousands of homes, and destroyed several roads 
and bridges further devastated the region.
KP has also witnessed a dramatic escalation in incidents of terrorism over the 
last decade. “Talibanization” of the area peaked in 2007, leading to frequent 
bombings of schools, places of worship and hospitals, target-killings and 
kidnapping, and other types of widespread violence (UNDP 2012). The Mal-
akand division, and particularly the Swat district together with FATA (Federally 
Administered Tribal Area) were most affected by the insurgency, resulting in a 
severe conflict costing thousands of lives. The warfare led to mass displacement 
of the population in various parts of the province. The authority of the state was 
eventually reestablished through a full-scale military operation in 2009. Yet, 
insurgent attacks are still widespread in both districts and the situation remains 
precarious. 
In our sample, 22 percent of the surveyed households were affected by the 2010 
flood and 90 percent by the conflict, while nine percent were not affected by 
either. 
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key Findings
According to our survey, the great majority of migrants were employed in the 
Gulf (92 percent), with Saudi Arabia being the top destination. There are several 
reasons for this, including the fact that Saudi Arabia has a long history of coop-
eration with Pakistan. Obtaining a visa to the Gulf is easier and less expensive 
than to Western countries.
Because of prevailing patriarchal norms, such as the system of Purdah that pre-
scribes segregation between sexes, labor migrants are almost exclusively male. 
This was reflected in our sample where all migrant workers were male and 
overwhelmingly migrating alone, without the family (95 percent). 
The custom of migrating to the Gulf is widespread in the area to the degree that 
neither conflict nor environmental hazards (such as the 2010 flood) were consid-
ered having played a direct role in the decision to migrate. A large number of the 
respondents (94 percent) have identified “Poverty/Lack of economic opportuni-
ties in situ” as the only determinant for migration. Migrant educational status was 
found to range mostly between illiterate (22 percent) and 10th grade (59 percent). 
Regarding the type of employment, almost half of the migrants (43 percent) were 
engaged in unskilled labor, 25 percent in semi-skilled labor, 25 percent were 
skilled laborers, while four percent and three percent were agricultural laborers 
and professionals, respectively. 
Social ties proved crucial in facilitating the migratory process as 59 percent of 
the respondents were able to reach the destination country thanks to help with 
visa provisioning from a relative residing in that country. Thirty-seven percent of 
the respondents resorted to a recruiter, while the remaining either crossed the 
borders illegally or were sponsored by relatives or friends. 
Hundi/Hawala2 is the most common way of sending remittances back home 
(59 percent), followed by bank transfers (26 percent), and transfers by compatri-
ots working in the destination (eight percent). Telebanking (easy paisa) is avail-
able only for internal migrants. Five percent of the respondents were found to be 
unable to remit as they were still repaying the costs of migration. 
2 For a detailed description and discussion of the Hawala system, see Section I of this volume, “’Informal’ Remit-
tance Systems and Post-Conflict Development.” Hawala plays an extremely salient role in Pakistan as it presents 
many advantages as compared to formal value transfer systems, including swiftness, easy accessibility, freedom 
from bureaucratic procedures, as well as cost-effectiveness. Higher trust is also a factor as hawala is often ac-
cessed via family or social networks and is embedded within the Islamic tradition (Ballard 2003). On the other 
hand, the anonymity and efficiency of hawala may facilitate the channeling of money for illegal operations, includ-
ing smuggling, money laundering, tax evasion, and terrorism (Fagen and Bump 2006).
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The top usages of remittances were found to 
include investing in real estate and construc-
tion (35 percent), business (28 percent), 
social ceremonies (17 percent), pilgrimage 
(nine percent), and transport (seven percent).
Remittances are perceived as playing a major role in improving the living 
standards of migrant-sending households. The first investment that causes an 
immediate change in the perceived lifestyle is the construction of a new house. 
This means switching from the traditional Kacha structure (walls made from 
a mixture of mud or clay and straw) to Pakka houses (with brick or concrete 
walls). As construction materials can be expensive, Pakka houses confer higher 
social status to the household. 
Better housing also improves 
health conditions of the fam-
ily as well as builds resilience 
to natural hazards. Thanks to 
migration, many households 
are also able to buy modern 
appliances for their homes, either obtained from abroad or purchased locally. 
Obtaining such appliances is associated with increased well-being and exposure 
to the outside world. 
Better education for children is another major change resulting from migration. 
Education is now a priority for the parents, as an educated person is able to gain 
a good job abroad. Education is considered particularly important for male chil-
dren as they are viewed as more capable migrant workers. However, migration 
has helped improve education of girls too, partially because of local resistance to 
the Taliban’s opposition to female education. 
The possibility of investing more money in social spending is also perceived as 
a major asset for remittances-receiving households. This has to be understood in 
the context of the Pakhtun society, where the principle of hospitality (melmastia) 
is more than just a matter of politeness, but rather a duty to be fulfilled at any 
cost. One’s respectability and social status are frequently determined by adher-
ence to this custom (Lindholm 1996). 
Only seven percent of the surveyed households reported that remittances had 
not effected significant changes in the lifestyle of the family. However, this may 
correspond to the fraction of migrant households that are not remitting as they 
are still paying back the costs of migration. The top usages of remittances were 
found to include investing in real estate and construction (35 percent), business 
(28 percent), social ceremonies (17 percent), pilgrimage (nine percent), and trans-
port (seven percent). 
122   A Pardee Center Task Force Report  |  October 2013
reMittanCes dUring and aFter tHe ConFLiCt
As a result of the conflict, more than two million people fled the Swat Val-
ley, Lower Dir, Buner, and Shangla districts. People were forced to leave their 
homes, fields, and livestock in fear of the militants who burnt the ripened 
crops, destroyed orchards, slaughtered the livestock, and damaged fish ponds 
as well as irrigation canals in almost all areas of Swat district. Some 80 percent 
of the refugees took shelter with local host families or rented accommodation 
mostly with money remitted by migrant relatives (Jahangir 2009). As stated by 
the chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Asma 
Jahangir: “Had the citizens not acted in a prompt and generous way, protection 
for the IDPs3 would have become virtually impossible.” The reasons for this may 
be attributed to the above-mentioned principle of melmastia as well as tribal 
loyalties that may have compelled people in different districts to grant hospital-
ity to conflict refugees belonging to the same tribe. Mobilization from the locally 
strong Awami National Party (ANP) played a role too. 
Remitted money had a central importance during the active conflict as it 
remained the most important and sometimes the only supply line to ensure the 
survival of household. Those who had remained, either due to prolonged and 
continued curfews or to harvest the field and the orchards, were facing starva-
tion that could be avoided only thanks to remittances. In our sample, 74 percent 
of the respondents reported to having avoided starvation during the conflict 
thanks to remittances, and nine percent were able to evacuate the family and 
rent houses in other cities such as Peshawar Abbottabad, Mardan, Rawalpindi, 
and Islamabad where their children were able to continue their education.
In the aftermath of the conflict, remittances constituted a bulwark in the 
reconstruction of livelihoods for 23 percent of the people surveyed. Most of 
the respondents reported to have used remittances to rebuild their houses. 
This correlates with recent studies on the Swat crisis, where 59 percent of the 
reconstruction costs were found to have been borne by the house-owner himself 
(UNDP 2012). The majority of financing for such houses came from remittances 
sent by relatives working abroad. Approximately 30 to 40 percent of the people 
of the surveyed areas were working abroad and the money sent by these work-
ers during the insurgence ensured the survival of their relatives back home 
(UNDP 2012). The other major supporter of the housing reconstruction was the 
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which provided funds to 17 percent of 
3 Internally displaced persons.
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the affected population. International donor agencies also took part in support-
ing housing reconstruction in the area (accounting for 17 percent in the total 
reconstructed houses). Relatives of the affected households living in non-affected 
parts of KP province and other provinces also extended their support in housing 
reconstruction; the share of such families was 10 percent (UNDP 2012).
The impacts of remittances are not limited to the recipient households. Remit-
tances are often crucial in the recovery and stabilization of the local economy 
and rehabilitation of public services in the post-conflict period (Lindley 2009). 
Interviewees in both Swat and Lower Dir districts reported that remittances 
had been the main reason for a speedy recovery in the region. Immediately 
after the conflict, businesses swiftly reopened, and housing and infrastructure 
reconstruction was carried out mostly thanks to the efforts of private citizens. 
Some migrants returned immediately after the conflict with a goal of starting a 
business and helping the reconstruction. 
reMittanCes dUring and aFter tHe 2010 FLood
Swat, and to a lesser extent, Lower Dir districts have been also severely 
impacted by the 2010 flood. While people were still struggling to rehabilitate 
their livelihoods after the consequences of the conflict, the August 2010 devas-
tating floods exacerbated the situation by destroying crops, eroding agricultural 
land, and killing livestock. Approximately 100,000 acres of soil along the Swat 
River was washed out. According to the ACTED (Agency for Technical Coopera-
tion and Development) rapid need assessment conducted in 173 villages of Swat 
district, 286 people lost their lives and 9,450 houses were completely swept 
away, along with many roads and bridges in the area (Shah 2010).
In line with recent literature on remittances and natural hazards in Pakistan 
 (Suleri and Savage 2006), households that contained migrants were able to 
absorb the economic shock much better than non-migrant households as the for-
mer did not depend entirely on income from agriculture and livestock. Seventy 
percent reported to have been able to avoid starvation thanks to remittances. 
They were also able to rebuild their livelihoods quicker and restore household 
assets destroyed by the flood (20 percent). Such households were able to improve 
or reconstruct their houses, thus building resilience to future environmental 
shocks (10 percent). Only two percent of the respondents reported the evacua-
tion of the family in the aftermath of the flood. 
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ConCLUsions
Remittances in the surveyed communities of KP proved crucial in coping with 
the aftermath of both conflict and environmental hazards. Survival during these 
events as well as reconstruction of household assets in the aftermath became 
possible largely due to the contributions from the migrant community. Yet, apart 
from family ties, such reconstruction was carried out mainly at the individual 
household level, with scant involvement from the community. No significant 
organized channels to collect and transfer money collectively from migrant 
destination countries were detected. 
The well-established and decades-old diaspora from KP in the Gulf is mostly 
organized on the basis of regional committees whose scope of intervention is 
limited to extreme emergencies (such as collecting money to ship home the 
dead body of a compatriot). The committees are also involved in advising on 
serious legal issues that Pakistani migrants may face in the Gulf, where migrant 
rights are virtually nonexistent and migrants are abused on a regular basis. The 
major Pakistani political parties have representative bodies in the Gulf, but their 
activity is limited to raising money for the party. Religious channels are preferred 
when migrant workers intend to donate money for charity. Thirty-two percent of 
migrant-sending households were found to not contribute to their community, 31 
percent would donate to local mosques and madrassa, while 34 percent would 
invest individually in charity and poverty relief. 
A pressing question to be addressed is how the international aid community and 
Pakistani government are able to enhance the involvement of Pakistani migrant 
communities in the Gulf for post-conflict and post-disaster relief and reconstruc-
tion (World Bank 2010). Further research on labor migration and remittances 
in Northwestern Pakistan is needed. For successful co-development initiatives, 
more efficient and transparent means to channel and invest remittances have to 
be identified in order to strengthen the local economy, build local capacity, and 
improve community resilience. 
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8. Filling the gap in Health staffing in Post-Conflict 
states: a Modest but innovative Proposal 
Frank Feeley, Susan Foster, Kara Galer, and Martin McKee
High rates of “brain drain” from many developing countries are one reason for 
a shortfall in the supply of health professionals in these countries. Emigration 
of health professionals can be particularly severe in countries that have experi-
enced a humanitarian crisis. Severe shortages of health professionals in fragile 
states, especially those emerging from conflict, will not be relieved in the short 
run by expanding the numbers in training. 
Our hypothesis is that:
a)  there is a substantial number of medical and nursing graduates working in 
high-income countries who have considered returning to their home  countries;
b) have been discouraged from doing so because of concern about loss of future 
pension entitlement; and 
c) may be encouraged to return 
by using development funds to 
continue contributions to their 
current public pension plans. 
For countries that have expe-
rienced conflict or humanitarian crisis, the emigrant’s ties to the health  system 
in the country of refuge may be weaker, making the “pension incentive” poten-
tially more effective in leveraging the return of desperately needed health 
 professionals.
Continuing to pay pension contributions using development funding might be 
one way to encourage the return of experienced health professionals to post-
conflict states—a “remittance” of skills necessary to rebuild the health system.
a CritiCaL sHortage wHere HeaLtH Care is CritiCaL 
The need for more medical workers in many low-income countries is clear. The 
World Health Organization (WHO) and others have documented the increas-
ing scale of the shortage (Kinfu et al. 2009; Stilwell et al. 2004); in Sub-Saharan 
Africa alone one estimate suggests 240,000 more doctors and 551,000 more 
nurses would be needed by 2015 to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
Continuing to pay pension contributions 
using development funding might be one 
way to encourage the return of experienced 
health professionals to post-conflict states—
a “remittance” of skills necessary to rebuild 
the health system.
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(Scheffler et al. 2009). While less severe overall, similar challenges confront 
many countries in Asia (Rao et al. 2011). However, some of the greatest problems 
are seen in countries emerging from conflict, where health facilities may have 
been destroyed and health workers and their families face grave personal danger 
(Donaldson et al. 2012; Doocy et al. 2010). Often, conflict driven immigration fol-
lows patterns already set by previous immigrants who left for economic reasons 
(Fagen and Bump 2006). 
For example, in the UK in 2000, 1.7 percent (2,698) of physicians came from four 
countries with a history of repression and civil strife—Sudan, Myanmar, Libya, 
and Sri Lanka (Mullan 2005). Clemens and Petterson (2007) report that there 
were more Liberian-born doctors in the U.S. in 2000 than in Liberia, and in that 
year 81 percent of Liberian-born nurses were living in nine migrant-receiving 
countries. This pattern held for other African countries torn by civil strife in the 
1990s. More than 40 percent of physicians born in Angola, Congo Brazzaville, 
Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone were practicing 
in one of nine developed countries1 in 2000. 
In rebuilding a country after the end of war, civil disorder, or humanitarian crisis, 
the reconstruction of health systems should be a priority. Nurses, doctors, phar-
macists, and others with clinical training must be recruited or enticed to return 
to staff the rebuilt health system. This is particularly true as humanitarian NGOs 
withdraw from the stabilized country. Expatriate doctors that staffed health care 
facilities during the emergency will likely return home or move on to a fresh cri-
sis as the NGOs withdraw. How, then, can donors raise the professional staffing 
levels in the health system they are helping to rebuild? 
One way is to train more health workers. This will almost certainly be necessary 
anyway, given that most countries experiencing conflict will have had inade-
quate numbers to begin with (Kinfu et al. 2009). But medical and nursing schools 
are expensive and difficult to establish. Both teaching faculties and teaching 
facilities may have been destroyed during the emergency. Even if training places 
become available, it is not clear that there will be enough qualified high school 
graduates to take these seats, particularly if secondary education was also 
disrupted during the crisis. Even with a flow of new students into training pro-
grams, it will be five to 10 years before the expanded flow of trained graduates 
reaches the health care system. 
1 United States, UK, France, Canada, Australia, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, South Africa.
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The alternative is for donors to seek to motivate the return of the health work-
ers who left during the emergency or before. There are several arguments for 
seeking to do so. First, and most obviously, returning health professionals who 
fled in mid-life have valuable years of clinical experience in their home country, 
and those who left a bit earlier in life may have additional training and experi-
ence in the country to which they relocated, but both groups will know their 
home language and local culture. However, they bring much more. Research on 
social remittances has shown how those from developing countries who return 
to their countries of origin following temporary migration can bring new visions 
of what is possible. Levitt and Lamba-Nieves (2011) described how those who 
returned to the Dominican Republic from the U.S. had a different “outlook” on 
life, characterized by greater ambition, new ideas, and a commitment to com-
munity engagement. Individuals displaced by conflict may be especially willing 
to return. They may have remaining family members with whom they have 
strong bonds (the migration of a family member from a conflict setting has been 
described as an insurance policy) while they may also have assets in their coun-
try of origin, being protected by their remaining family, that they wish to return 
to  (Lindley 2009). 
Second, professionals who flee a crisis are less likely than more conventional 
economic migrants, who have time to plan their move, to enter the country of 
refuge through its graduate training system, less likely to be fluent in the lan-
guage of the receiving country, and so are less likely to be licensed and practic-
ing their profession. Migrants who stay in health care tend to be concentrated 
in less attractive specialties and in low-level posts, often well below their level 
of ability. Refugees who fail to obtain licensure in the country of refuge may be 
surviving in low-skilled and menial jobs. Finlay, Crutcher, and Drummond (2011) 
examined a group of 15 refugees from South Sudan, trained as physicians in 
Cuba and residing in Canada, where they had not obtained medical licensure. 
These refugees showed a general desire to return to their homeland and prac-
tice medicine, but were reluctant to return for two main reasons. Most wanted 
assurance of Canadian citizenship so that they could return to Canada if condi-
tions worsened in South Sudan.2 But for many, the reluctance to return was also 
driven by a need to earn money (which they were doing in Canada) to share with 
families in refugee camps or villages back home. These refugees were relatively 
2 Most had accumulated nearly enough time in Canada to qualify for citizenship, and return was delayed for 
some in order to meet the requirement.
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young; most fled the war as children and were sent for a medical education by 
the government in exile of John Garang. 
a Modest, innovative ProPosaL
We propose one measure that may help to overcome some of these barriers to 
encourage the return of locally trained health workers from the more fortunate 
nations where many of them now reside. Some refugee clinicians might be 
encouraged to return to their natal country if the return does not create a seri-
ous economic burden for them in the long term. This would involve tackling 
the golden chain that ties him or her to the developed country’s health system. 
The professional and his employer contribute significant amounts into pension 
funds, either private or governmental. These pension systems will not begin 
paying a benefit until the member reaches a defined retirement age, which is 
currently 66 in both the U.S. and the UK. Depending on employment history and 
pension fund rules, the amount of the retirement benefit generally continues to 
grow with each annual contribution. We trace the impact of two hypothetical 
examples; a nurse from Sierra Leone and a doctor from Liberia. Even if she finds 
an attractive job back home and no longer has family ties binding her to the 
developed country, the nurse from Sierra Leone working in the UK or the Libe-
rian doctor in the U.S. will be reluctant to reduce her pension income by leaving 
developed country employment prematurely. The economics literature confirms 
that employees in such “defined benefit” pension plans are less likely to change 
jobs, particularly as they near retirement age (Hurd 1996; Gale et al. 2004). 
What if the developed country government continued contributions to the pen-
sion plan for health professionals returning to strengthen the health systems 
of their home country? The expense would not be great. In the U.S., the cost 
in 2013 would be $14,099 per year3 if development funds covered both the 
employer and employee contribution to Social Security for the Liberian doctor. 
In the UK in 2013, it would cost about £5,355 (US$8,140) per year to maintain 
the contribution funds to the National Health Service pension scheme for the 
nurse returning to Sierra Leone. 
The total cost for continued contributions to pension plans as an incentive for 
refugee health professionals to return would be modest. To cover the pension 
fund contributions of 100 Liberian doctors practicing in the U.S. costs $1.41 mil-
lion per year. But the return of even one-third of the 107 Liberian-born physi-
3 Assumes the doctor is earning more than the Social Security maximum salary base of $113,700. 
http://tinyurl.com/SSA-taxrates. 
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cians in the U.S. in 2000 (Clemens and Petterson 2007) would increase by 50 
percent the number of Liberian physicians who remained at home, and would 
cost less than $500,000 per year. The potential exists for minimal financial input 
to yield substantial gains in the professional staffing of the health system in a 
post-conflict state. 
There are, inevitably, some 
challenges. Mechanisms 
would be needed to verify 
that the beneficiary of the 
continuing pension contri-
butions is practicing in the 
disadvantaged country. Orga-
nizations must be identified to take on this verification task. Yet if successful, this 
innovation could encourage a reverse of the “brain drain” and add to the supply 
of health professionals more quickly—and more cheaply—than new local medi-
cal or nursing schools, which may still see their graduates disappear overseas. 
These pension fund contributions would be fitting reparations for countries that 
have staffed their health system with imported professionals without incurring 
the cost of their academic training. For countries recovering from humanitarian 
crisis, the “pension incentive” would be a low-cost way to encourage the reverse 
migration of professionals with the requisite clinical and cultural skills to rebuild 
a shattered health system. 
A first step would be to survey expatriate health professionals from some 
post-conflict countries on the factors that bind them to the country of refuge, 
and those that would encourage them to return home. Response to the pension 
continuation proposal could be explicitly tested in such a poll. If the results are 
encouraging, the proposal could then be field tested in a country like Sierra 
Leone, with a development agency such as the UK Department for International 
Development continuing the National Health Service (NHS) pension contribu-
tions for returning health professionals, and advertising this opportunity through 
the NHS and expatriate networks. In a relatively small country like Sierra Leone, 
with active foreign assistance programs, it should be possible to confirm that the 
refugees receiving pension support do return and practice their profession. The 
experiment could be evaluated by monitoring professional registrations in both 
countries. If it accelerates the return of health professionals, the scheme could be 
rolled out more broadly to post-conflict countries and other victims of the “brain 
drain” struggling to augment the health care workforce. 
Yet if successful, this innovation could encour-
age a reverse of the “brain drain” and add 
to the supply of health professionals more 
quickly—and more cheaply—than new local 
medical or nursing schools, which may still 
see their graduates disappear overseas.
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Because of their interconnectedness with 
diverse social and economic realms of 
conflict-affected communities, remittances 
hold vast potential to enhance post-conflict 
human security.
Section IV: Task Force Findings, 
Policy Recommendations, and Suggested Areas 
for Further Research 
The papers in this volume investigated a wide range of issues central to conflict-
induced remittance systems and the possibilities of leveraging remittance funds 
for post-conflict development. Remittance flows in post-conflict contexts have 
been very sparsely researched so far, and there is an urgent need for scholars 
as well as policymakers to give more attention to this increasingly important 
topic. In the current environment of accelerating transnational human and 
capital flows and the recurrent and fragmentary nature of conflicts, the study of 
the dynamics of the remittance transfers and their role in combating poverty is 
increasingly relevant to all aspects of human security and peace-building. 
The Task Force papers established that remittances are vitally important for 
sustaining local livelihoods as well as rehabilitating institutional infrastructures 
and improving financial inclusion in post-conflict contexts. Drawing upon exist-
ing networks of social support and interacting with a variety of local institutions, 
remittance flows enable multi-
scale connections between 
diverse organizations and 
networks and foster local 
innovation, entrepreneur-
ship, and empowerment. 
Highlighting the increasing complexity of global remittance systems, the Report 
examined opportunities for greater formalization of remittance transfer channels 
and possibilities for enhanced collaboration with diverse institutions of varying 
degrees of formality. The papers also established the increasing role of diaspora 
networks and migrant associations in post-conflict co-development initiatives. 
Because of their interconnectedness with diverse social and economic realms of 
conflict-affected communities, remittances hold vast potential to enhance post-
conflict human security. However, the improved integration of remittance flows 
into post-conflict development efforts still poses considerable challenges. The 
main areas of these challenges as well as suggestions for further research and 
policy applications are outlined below. 
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1.  reMittanCes, FinanCiaL inCLUsion, and MULti-sCaLe 
institUtionaL PartnersHiPs
• Most conflict-induced remittances are transferred through informal channels 
that are embedded in existing social institutions and networks of reciprocity. 
Although the formal banking infrastructure is often lacking in conflict-affected 
situations, modern informal remittance transfers can involve complex connec-
tions to diverse formal sector institutions. These reciprocal connections and 
potential for adaptive linkages should be further researched and drawn upon 
in leveraging remittances for post-conflict development. The motivations and 
needs of people to participate in financial institutions of different degrees of 
formality should receive more attention.
• Conflict-induced remittance systems can be highly entrepreneurial in char-
acter, encouraging local adaptations that foster linkages between financial 
institutions of different levels and degrees of formality. In the contexts of post-
conflict devastation, opportunities for collaboration among existing remittance 
institutions and diverse local infrastructures should be further explored.
• Partnerships should be explored with a wide range of institutions of financial 
inclusion, including post offices, mobile banking platforms, microfinance 
institutions, credit unions and cooperative marketing associations, as well as 
local rotating savings associations, women’s economic groups, farmers’ asso-
ciations and natural resource user groups, and umbrella organizations for local 
producers and entrepreneurs. In African contexts, local semi-formal savings 
and credit cooperative organizations (SACCOs) could be potential partners for 
remittance systems. A broader view of remittance institutions that bridges the 
formal and informal divide and enables productive partnerships should be 
encouraged. 
• Extending remittance services to allow more households in remote and rural 
locations greater access to these funds is a development imperative. Providing 
improved access and diversifying the institutional set-up for money transfer 
services could lower transfer costs and disseminate the benefits of remit-
tances more widely. Use of microfinance networks and mobile technology 
may help the rural poor benefit from money transfer services in novel and 
 productive ways. 
• As the institutional challenge to local post-conflict development often lies in 
facilitating the building of social capital to enhance the bridging capacities of 
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local institutions, attention must be given to existing local networks of mutual-
ity and practices of livelihood. Informal businesses and local savings-credit 
networks have frequently emerged as major coping mechanisms in conflict-
affected communities, and therefore providing support to them can be para-
mount. Remittance transfers associated with these institutions can provide 
unique points of leverage for expanding financial inclusion in conflict-affected 
environments.
• Remittance institutions have the potential to contribute towards broader, 
transformational goals of financial inclusion through a focus on the intercon-
nected aspects of human empowerment and agency. The act of sending or 
receiving remittances can also act as a gateway into formal financial systems, 
thereby providing access to formal financial services for larger numbers of the 
“unbanked.” More research is needed on how sending or receiving remittances 
can provide more people access to financial institutions of various degrees 
of formality, in accordance with their needs and existing infrastructural 
 possibilities.
2.  diasPora networks, Co-deveLoPMent, and CoLLeCtive 
 reMittanCes
• Fostering co-development projects among the diaspora is an important ele-
ment of post-conflict reconstruction. Collective remittances should be more 
intensively drawn upon to invest in various infrastructural and rural develop-
ment programs in direct partnerships with recipient communities. Unmedi-
ated collaboration should be encouraged between post-conflict states and the 
diaspora to more efficiently channel remittances into development activities. 
• Attention must be given to the increasingly diverse networks and organiza-
tions of the diaspora that enable migrants to participate in co-development 
projects (including organizations such as hometown associations, ethnic, 
religious and professional associations, nongovernmental associations, dias-
pora investment and development groups, etc.). Although such organizations 
are increasingly prevalent, knowledge about their specific activities and the 
impact of collective remittances to the development of migrants’ home coun-
tries is scarce, and additional research is needed.
• Novel types of government-diaspora collaboration should be encouraged, with 
a focus on diverse transnational partnerships on the levels of organizations, 
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networks, and communities. The role of new technologies such as mobile 
remittance platforms in developing these partnerships should be explored. 
• A better understanding is needed of the overlapping and complex links among 
various immigration issues and regulations, and post-conflict remittance flows 
and their role in national development. Regulatory frameworks should focus 
on facilitating the ties between diasporas’ home countries that allow for more 
efficient flows of economic as well as social remittances in the form of skills, 
technology, and values. In many contexts, legalization of multiple citizenships 
and other similar measures that allow the transnational community to main-
tain ties to both home and host countries would constitute a significant step 
towards longer-term investment in post-conflict rehabilitation. 
• High rates of brain drain from many post-conflict countries are an important 
reason for a shortfall in the supply of professionals in these countries. Severe 
shortages of health professionals in conflict-affected states, for example, will 
not be relieved in the short run by expanding training. To reverse the “brain 
drain” in a post-conflict country, there is a need to study the processes and 
rationales of immigrant professionals’ decisions to return home. This should 
include a focus on reforming pension and development assistance programs 
in the nations of destination and origin in a way that will encourage the dias-
pora to return. 
• More research is needed into remittance patterns of people in forced migra-
tion contexts, including motivations for remitting, remittance flows and 
channels, in-kind versus monetary remittances, and implications of the remit-
tances to reoccurrence of violent conflict. Better information is needed about 
family and gender dynamics involved in sending and receiving remittances, 
about senders’ motivations to remit, and the uses of remittances by receiving 
parties. In-depth ethnographic research involving participatory observation, 
daily financial diaries, and other similar methodologies is recommended.
3.  LegisLative and regULatory issUes
• Contemporary remittance systems are part of increasingly complex global 
financial networks. Because of their high degrees of fragmentation and ano-
nymity, informal remittance transfers that predominate in post-conflict regions 
may in some cases be vulnerable to criminal abuse. Regulatory efforts should 
consider contextually differentiated and culturally sensitive approaches to 
existing remittance systems in post-conflict areas. Thus, regulatory efforts 
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should include multi-sided collaboration with local remittance agents, custom-
ers, and diaspora representatives.
• Flexible and locally adaptable solutions should be sought when regulating 
transnational remittance flows. Regulations like the Dodd-Frank Act amend-
ments to the Electronic Funds Transfer Act that was intended to offer protec-
tion to U.S. residents sending funds to foreign countries may be difficult to 
apply in post-conflict contexts where the financial regulatory structure is weak 
and legislative and institutional infrastructure unstable. It is suggested that the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) use its authority to adjust the 
requirements of certain disclosures about remittance transfers that may render 
these transfers problematic in post-conflict contexts. 
• More research and analysis is needed regarding international legislative 
frameworks that impede migration and remittance flows. Harmonization of 
the regulatory environment would enhance collaboration within a wide range 
of stakeholders, including local, national, and transnational actors. 
4.  BUiLding LoCaL resiLienCe—reMittanCes and HUMan seCUrity
• The increasing connectedness of diverse aspects of human vulnerability 
that may disrupt peace and development needs more attention. The human 
security approach highlights the role of remittances in building local resilience 
through reliance on a broad range of local institutions with a focus on indi-
vidual and community empowerment and participation. 
• As part of the broader framework of financial inclusion, remittances in post-
conflict countries should not be approached as a separate issue from those 
such as environment, health, education, and gender. Both social and economic 
empowerment goals should be considered in leveraging remittances for post-
conflict development.
• The assessment of the impact of remittances to community resilience needs to 
view human conflict in combination with various environmental factors. Local 
adaptation to environmental hazards and climate change cannot be separated 
from adaptation to disruptive socio-economic and political circumstances, 
including violent conflict. More research is needed into remittances as an 
adaptive mechanism to multiple, simultaneously occurring environmental and 
social crises. 
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• In the present era of heightened local and transnational mobility and recurrent 
cycles of conflict, attention must be given to broader institutional frameworks 
for the management of diverse shocks and disruptions. Such frameworks 
should include new spaces of collaboration between diverse state and non-
state actors.
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